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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
The Utah Supreme Court has appellate jurisdiction over this case'under Utah Code 
Ann. § 78A-3-102(3)(j). The Supreme Court is authorized to transfer this appeal to the 
Court of Appeals under Utah Code Ann. § 78A-3-102(4). The Court of Appeals has 
appellate jurisdiction over this case pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78A-4-103(j). 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES 
i ? 
Because Jacob Christensen is dissatisfied with Haynes' Statement of Issues, it 
presents the following statement of the issues presented on appeal and on cross-appeal: 
Issues on Appeal 
1. When a court determines that a road has been dedicated to the public 
pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 72-5-104, but the issue of width is not the focus of the 
litigation, is it proper for the court to allow the authorities of the state, counties, or 
municipalities to determine the reasonable and necessary width of the road pursuant to 
the authority granted them under Utah Code Ann. § 72-5-108? 
Standard of review. A determination of the district court which relies upon 
statutory interpretation is reviewed for correctness. Selrnan, Inc. v. Box Elder County, 
2009 UT App 99, j^ 3, 208 P.3d 535. 
2. Did the trial court err in not quieting title to portions of Haynes' property 
that were not in dispute? 
1
 "Jacob Christensen" refers to Appellees and Cross Appellants Jacob Family Chalk 
Creek LLC, Catherine B. Christensen, L.L.C., and Brian Garff. 
"Haynes" refers to Appellants and Cross Appellees Haynes Land & Livestock Company 
and Triple H. Ranch, LC. 
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Standard of review. In equity cases appellate courts review the record to 
determine whether the evidence clearly preponderates against the findings of the trial 
court. The findings should not be disturbed unless the clear weight of the evidence is 
against them. Merrill v. Bailey and Son, 99 Utah 323, 331, 106 P.2d 255 (Utah 1940) 
(citations omitted). 
3. Is the reasonable and necessary width of a road dedicated to the public 
pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 72-5-104 limited to the beaten path of the road as it 
currently exists? 
Standard of review. A determination of the reasonable and necessary 
"width of the [public] highway presents a question of fact." Accordingly, the trial 
court's determinations are reviewed for clear error. Town of Leeds v. Prisbrey, 
2008 UT 11,^5, 179P.3d757. 
4. Was the evidence of public use of the Road sufficient for the Court to 
determine that the RoadJ was dedicated to the public pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 72-5-
104? 
Standard of review. 
We review the trial court's legal interpretation of the Dedication Statute for 
correctness and its factual finding for clear error. But whether the facts of a 
case satisfy the requirements of the Dedication Statute is a mixed question 
of fact and law that involves various and complex facts, evidentiary 
resolutions, and credibility determinations. Thus we review the trial court's 
decision regarding whether a public highway has been established under 
3
 The Road, in general, refers to the loop is represented in red on Trial Exhibit 117, a 
large color copy of which is submitted herewith at Appendix "D". [See also Appendix 
"E" attached hereto that identifies points of interest on Trial Ex. 117.] 
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[the Dedication Statute].. .for correctness but grant the court significant 
discretion in its application of the facts to the statute. 
Jennings Investment, LC v. Dixie Riding Club, Inc., 2009 UT App 119, U 5, 208 P.3d 
1077 (citing Town of Leeds v. Prisbrey, 2008 UT 11, U 5, 179 P.3d 757). 
Issues on Cross Appeal 
5. Did the trial court err in failing to find that the Road was dedicated to the 
public through Section 34 of Range 8 of Township 2? 
Standard of review. See standard of review for Issue No. 4, above. 
DETERMINATIVE PROVISIONS 
Utah Code Ann. § 72-5-104: 
(1) A highway is dedicated and abandoned to the use of the public when 
it has been continuously used as a public thoroughfare for a period often 
years. 
(2) The dedication and abandonment creates a right-of-way held by the 
state in accordance with Sections 72-3-102, 72-3-104, 72-5-1-5, and 72-5-
103. 
(3) The scope of the right-of-way is that which is reasonable and 
necessary to ensure safe travel according to the facts and circumstances. 
Utah Code Ann. § 72-5-108: 
The width of rights-of-way for public highways shall be set as the highway 
authorities of the state, counties, or municipalities may determine for the 
highways under the respective jurisdiction. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Less than 20 years after Brigham Young first said, 'This is the right place," 
settlers created a road in the Uinta Mountains in an area known as the East Fork of the 
Chalk Creek. This Road was used by loggers to haul trees to sawmills, it was used by 
church groups for recreational outings, it was used by homesteaders to reach their cabins, 
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it was used by hunters, it was used by tens of thousands of sheep and their shepherds, and 
it was used by families and scout troops to go to the picturesque Blue Lakes for fishing. 
As a result of the continuous public use which created and expanded the Road, maps of 
the area reflected its path as early as 1875. The Road has been on maps ever since, 
including a Summit County Map exactly 100 years later, which indicates the Road is 
public. 
The land surrounding that Road was originally owned by the Federal Government 
and the railroad, and later passed into private hands. The Boyers4 acquired their land 
around the Blue Lakes in 1905. The Jacob/Christensen families acquired over 9,000 
acres in 1941, and the Haynes family also completed its acquisition of over 9,000 acres in 
1941. Without a doubt, the public Road was there first. These three families used the 
Road to access their property, to build cabins, and to travel to the Blue Lakes for fishing. 
Unfortunately, one of these families was not like the others. The Haynes family 
tried to control use of this public Road. As Haynes concedes its brief: "The minutes of 
the Summit County commissioners for September 2, 1947, state that the fish and game 
warden 'asked that an investigation be made as to the status of the Road through Howard 
Haynes Property, and leading to Blue Lake, as Mr. Haynes had closed the road to the 
public and the same had generally been used by the public for a long time." [Haynes 
Brief at 43.] 
4
 "Boyer" refers to Appellees and Cross Appellants Fern J. Boyer, Gerald G. Boyer, 
Gregory J. Boyer, J.S. Hansen, Alfred C. Blongquist. 
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Haynes5 misguided crusade to control the public Road continues. In 1998, 
Haynes filed this lawsuit to restrict or eliminate use of the Road by the Boyer and Jacob-
Christensen families. Discovery went on for years, and finally the case was tried last 
year. The trial court concluded that the evidence was "overwhelming" that the Road is 
public. Following this convincing defeat, Haynes adopted a new approach - to restrict 
use of the Road by forcing a potentially unsafe road width determination. However, the 
trial court was unable to make a reasonable decision on the width of the Road following 
trial because precious little evidence had been presented on road width during trial. 
Simply put, road width was not an issue at trial. The trial court initially hazarded a post-
trial guess at 18 feet, without indicating whether that width was the traveled way, was to 
include shoulders to allow two-way traffic to safely pass, and so forth. However, the 
Court later withdrew that incomplete finding as early thinking and non-binding dicta. 
This later ruling is not appropriately mentioned by Haynes in its Brief. 
Rather than making a factual determination of road width without the facts, the 
trial court properly requested that Summit County exercise its statutory duty to 
investigate and determine an appropriate width of the Road, which it did. Summit 
County determined, based on safety and other considerations, that the Road is 36 feet 
wide. This ruling equally impacts the Haynes and the Jacob-Christensen families, 
because the public Road crosses both of their land. 
Unsatisfied with its efforts to cut-off or limit access to the Jacob-Christensen and 
Boyer family land, Haynes now asks this Court to reverse the trial court's rulings on road 
width and even on the intensely factual judicial finding that the Road is public. This 
5 
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Court should affirm the trial court's rulings on road width and with respect to the Road 
being public. In addition, the Court should modify the trial court's ruling in one respect -
- determining that the Road extends to the Blue Lakes. The evidence presented at trial 
was undisputed that the public used the Road to get to the Blue Lakes for fishing. An 
extension of the trial court's ruling regarding the length of the public Road would restore 
access to the Boyer family to property that it has owned for generations. The Boyer 
family addresses this issue in its brief. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
1. Orientation of the Properties and the Road. 
Haynes owns approximately 9,574 acres of real property along or close to the East 
Fork of Chalk Creek in Summit County. [H.R.000002, f 6 (Exhibit A) (the "Haynes 
Property").] Jacob-Christensen also owns approximately 9,346 acres of real property, 
which adjoins the Haynes Property both on the south and west borders of the Haynes 
property. [H.R. 000002, If 6 (Exhibit B) (the "Jacob-Christensen Property").] 
The Road at issue in this Lawsuit consists of a loop providing Jacob Christensen 
and Boyer access to their respective properties over land owned by Haynes. This loop is 
represented in Trial Exhibit 117. The trial court broke down the Road into different 
segments. [H.R. 001406, p. 14, ^ J 5.] The first segment of the road departs from 
Highway 133 ("Chalk Creek Canyon Road") and travels in a southerly direction until it 
reaches Jacob Christensen property (the "Bench Road"). [Id.; see also Trial Ex. 117 
(Haynes' portion of Segment A).] The first quarter mile of the Bench Road crosses over 
land owned by the EJinghams and the remainder, over land owned by the Haynes. [Id.] 
6 
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Once it reaches Jacob Christensen property, it travels in a southern and easterly direction 
until it reaches the Boyer property (the "Middle Fork Road"). [H.R. 001406-001407, pp. 
14-15, Tj 5; see also, Trial Ex. 117 (Jacob Christensen portion of Segment A and segment 
C).] There is a fork in the Bench Road located on the Haynes property at the northwest 
corner of Section 7, Range 8, Township 2, which travels in an easterly and somewhat 
southerly direction. [H.R. 001407, p. 15, If 6; Trial Ex. 117 (Segments B & D).] The 
Road then turns south over Haynes' property through Sections 15, 22, 23, 25, and 
portions of Section 27 of Range 8, Township 2 until it reaches the Jacob Christensen 
property, due north of Joyce Lake. [H.R. 001407, p. 15, ^ f 6; Trial Ex. 117 (Segment D 
on Haynes' property).] The Road then travels the east side of Joyce Lake on Jacob 
Christensen property until it reaches the Boyer property at the north end of Section 34, 
Rage 8, Township 2. [Id.; Trial Exhibit 117.] The Road then crosses the Boyer property 
(the "Boyer Road"), travels across the reservoir, then travels to Jacob Christensen's 
property once more, completing the loop in the center of Section 34 of Range 8, 
Township 2, near the southern end of the Boyer Reservoir. [H.R. 001407-1408, pp. 15-
16,1|6.] 
2. Existence of the Road. 
According to official government documents, the Bench Road, Middle Fork Road, 
and the East Fork Road (to approximately the center of Township 2, Range 8, Section 8) 
portions of the Road have existed for over 100 years. [Trial Ex. 108; Trial Ex. 109; Trial 
Ex. I l l ; Trial Ex. 112.] In 1875, the United States surveyed the lands over which the 
first two miles of the Bench Road are located. [Trial Ex. 101.] This survey shows the 
7 
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road described as "road to sawmill" leaving Highway 133 and extending to the south of 
section 1 of township 2N Range 7 East. [Trial Ex. 101, p. 36.] The remaining lands in 
which the Bench Road, Middle Fork Road, and the first portion of the East Fork Road are 
located were surveyed in 1893. [Trial Ex. 103; Trial Ex. 111.] The surveys show that by 
1893 the entire Bench Road had been established and the Middle Fork Road extended 
south all the way to Section 4 of Township 1 North, Range 8 East. [See Trial Ex. 103; 
104; 105, pp. 400, 419, 425, 428-29, 432-33, 438-40, 443; 111 and 112.] Further, a 
1900 U.S. Geological Survey map shows the Middle Fork Road extending through into 
what is marked as Segment C on Exhibit 117. [Trial Ex. 113; 117.] 
3. Use of the Road. 
A. Presence of Sawmills and Timbering Activity Along the Road. 
There is evidence of sawmill and timbering activity along the first couple miles of 
the Bench Road as early as 1865. Specifically, in 1865 the probate court granted the 
petition of L.L. Randall, Jacob Huffman (and two others) to saw timber on Chalk Creek 
Canyon. [Trial Ex. 131.] Historical records establish that the referenced sawmill was 
located approximately two miles up the east fork of Chalk Creek. [Trial Ex. 137, p. 139 
('The men who first owned these mills were as follows: L.L. Randall owning a saw mill 
about two miles up from Pine Cliff, in the East Fork of Calk [sic] Creek."); Trial Ex. 158, 
p. 9; Trial Ex. 101, p. 36; 108.] Further, a 1874 map of the Territory of Utah [Trial 
Ex.163], a 1875 Mineral Map of Utah [Trial Ex.164] and a 1878 Mineral Map of Utah 
[Trial Ex. 165] also show the existence of a saw mill in this vicinity. This mill was 
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operated for many years and supplied timber to the local communities. [Trial Ex. 158, p. 
9-] 
In addition, the record shows another sawmill, owned by Merritt Staley, was 
located "way up the East Fork where the ledges are." [Trial Ex. 159, p. 3.] This sawmill 
was in existence at least by 1886 because a newspaper reported diptheria spread through 
Merritt Staley's family in 1886 while the family was living at Staley's "saw mill in the 
mountains." [Trial Ex. 146; Trial Ex. 147.] It operated for at least four years as at least 
one record shows it was still operating in 1890. [Trial Ex. 159, pp. 2-3.] 
In 1893, a United States surveyor reported seeing two old sawmills located along 
or close to the Road. [Trial Ex. 105, pp. at 431, 440.] One of the sawmills was located 
close to the Road at Point I, and the other was located along the Road at Point A. [Id.; 
Trial Ex. 117.] Shirley Macfarlane, the daughter of Howard Haynes, testified that the 
remains of a sawmill in Section 7 were present from her earliest recollection. [Trial Tr. 
Vol. Ill, p. 733:11-25.] 
The record also shows individual members of the public cut down and hauled 
away timber from the land adjacent to the Road. Fern Boyer and Robert Powell, born in 
1928 and 1929, respectively, testified that in their youths they recalled their families 
using the Road to cut wood for fire wood, fence posts, etc. [Trial Tr. Vol. II, pp. 422:17-
22, 424:19-426:1, 428:19-22 ; Trial Tr. Vol. Ill, p. 484:3-21.] Gwennola Blonquist, born 
in 1912, testified that people used to use the road to go up to a sawmill to obtain lumber. 
[G. Blonquist Depo, p. 13:2-16; admitted at Trial Tr. Vol. Ill, p. 556.] 
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B. Grazing and Trailing of Livestock Along the Road. 
Sheep herds constituted another portion of the public that used the Road. 
According to several homestead records, individuals also settled along the Road for 
purposes of farming, grazing, and sheep herding. [See e.g., Trial Ex. 120, pp. JC 1546— 
47; Trial Ex. 119, pp. JC 1572-73.] 
A good portion of the Jacob-Christensen property and part of the Haynes property 
are enclaves within the boundaries of the forest where the sheep were grazed and trailed 
into other forest land or parts of Wyoming. [Trial Ex. 117; Trial Ex. 149, p. 8; Trial Ex. 
157, p. 7 , in App. II, Tab 28; Deposition of Lloyd ("Collard Depo."), p. 18, admitted at 
Trial Tr. Vol. IV, p. 874.] 
The number of sheep moved specifically along the East Fork of Chalk Creek can 
be partially measured by information about shearing and dipping corrals in the area. The 
"Clark Brothers . . . built the first shearing corral, which served thousands of sheep for 
many years." [Trial Ex. 137, p. at 143.] In 1890, the Deseret News reported that a sheep 
herder who was herding "Church sheep, and was camped near Bishop Clark's shearing 
corral on Mill Fork of Chalk Creek, is lost." [Trial Ex. 148, p. 494.] Mill Fork of Chalk 
Creek connects to the Road in Section 20, Township 2 North, Range 8 East, [Trial Ex. 
117], and is shown as extending into and stopping at a corral indicated as Point L on Trial 
Ex. 117. [Trial Ex. 117, Point L; Trial Ex. 110.] 
In 1893, a United States surveyor reported that John Clark had a dipping corral 
located along Segment A of the Road (ccPoint J"). [Trail Ex. 117; Trial Ex. 105, pp. 431, 
447.] In 1895, an article in the Coalville Times reported that 40,000 sheep had been 
10 
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dipped already at Clark's corral that seasoii, and that by the end of the season tlicy 
expected to dip 100.000 sheep. [Trial Fx. 150. p. i ! \ yeai later, another article 
reponcd inai o\ v.i - ' o . , , . ^ . . ^ i . ' . . .,pi c-i .. ;a * .-. ^  •.-•rial m i <v;<> '• : F\ 
151., |: 1 1 Clai k's dippii lg corral coi itii n led operations at ICUM UU uugii 1898. [See, e.g., 
1 rial Ex. 152, p. E] 
C. Homes and Farms. 
Aloi lg witl ) tl lese h\ isiness acti1 nik s, 1: :»y appi oxii i lately I 882 people begai I 
building homes, corrals, ditches, and fences along or close to the Road. [rfrial Ex. 119, 
pp. JC 1570- 72: Trial Ex. 120. pp. JC 1542. 1544 46.] 
I I * - • > . . ' ! •>-''••' . " l* ' s , 
Township 2 North, Range 8 Ea^L thiough winch Segment A of the Road passes (/Tomt 
E"). JTrialEx. 1 E7-Trial F \ 1 19. pp JCl^wO 77.; I E luiili .-. Imuso. corrals, and a 
U^HMe. and itNcu ihe property for grazing ana kinning. | :. i;;- ! : ] 
vV. oialex did not iiic his E n n c s l r a d en' n \ e \ v : :/ - ' • ' . > ' • ' • • i 
1559, 1562.J Thus. I "or more ihan ten years he used and occupied die land w ilia >ui license 
or permission from die Iccicral government. A liomestead patent was issued lo W Staley 
Leonard W Randall ("*1 \\ . Randall") began occupy inu land along Segment A of 
Tic l\---ad between !882 and i;-.;E' m i.ie same location a^  die "Randall"" cabm i^^niilied 
of i Si ii vcy Plat« I ("I- 'oil .t I ; ")• |' I. i i; il Ex. 117: Trial E 112; I i i. ii E::? : 120, j >p JC 1542, 
1544 46.j 1 le built a house, corrals, ditches, and fences, and used the property for 
grazing and farming. [Trial Ex. l n0. pp. ] ^ 17 1 Ml- 16 ] \ :<uv\r\ plat map aEo noted 
11 
299473v2 
the location of an irrigated field in the area ("Point G"). [Trial Ex. 117; Trial Ex. 112; 
see also Trial Ex. 129.] In 1896, L.W. Randall first filed his homestead entry, again more 
than ten years after he began to use and occupy the land without license or permission. 
[Trial Ex. 120, pp. JC 1537, 1540.] A homestead patent was issued to L.W. Randall in 
1903 for the 160-acre parcel. [Trial Ex. 120, p. JC 1558.] 
Between 1893 and 1896, two other individuals began occupying land in Section 8, 
Township 2 North, Range 8 East, along Segment B of the Road, for purposes of 
establishing a homestead. [Trial Ex. 121, pp. JC 2347-48; Trial Ex. 122, pp. JC 2327-
28; Trial Ex. 117.] 
George Huff settled on land in Section 8, Township 2 North, Range 8 East, in 
December 1893, and established his actual residence a year later ("Point B"). [Trial Ex. 
117; Trial Ex. 121, pp. JC 2337, 2347.] In addition to building a home, he built a stable, 
corrals, and fencing. [Trial Ex. 121, pp. 2345-47.] He also cleared and cultivated part of 
the land. [Trial Ex. 121, pp. 2345-47; see also Trial Ex. 130.] Similar to W. Staley and 
L.W. Randall, Huff did not immediately file his homestead entry, but waited two years, 
filing in December 1895. [Trial Ex. 121, p. JC 2337.] A homestead patent was issued to 
Huff in 1901 for the 160-acre parcel. [Trial Ex. 121, p. 2351.] 
In 1896, Charles Saxton also filed his homestead entry in Section 8, Township 2 
North, Range 8 East ("Point C")- [Trial Ex., 122, p. JC 2314; Trial Ex. 117.] He built a 
house, corrals, fencing, and ditches. [Trial Ex. 122, pp. JC 2325-27.] He cultivated 
some of the land, and indicated it was good for grazing. [Trial Ex. 122, pp. JC 2325-27.] 
299473v2 
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A homestead patent was issued to Saxton iii 1903 for the 160-acre parcel . [1 rial Ex. 122, 
p. IC 2333.] 
Ai I 1893 Government Survey re lit a. , lunher use oi me rauid r \ nui.iiL ....-a 
mile Horn the fluff and Saxion homesteads ("Point I )" i . : i r:al l ;x. 1 12; Trial 1 A . I 1 | 
•\ lilin cai-in was located at h u n t ! I near ihc Ko.r- ' ; ;;.i. i ^ : : : \; i. I x • .] 
Tl: ii.!: ; is til s same sectioi i in i : vl: licl i ( 2!a::i: k ' s d ippi i ig cc i :t: a! ai id ai I old sa vv i nill \\ e:t :::: local: ::: • :::! , 
w h i c h sec t ion r e m a i n e d in federa l o w n e r s h i p unti l 18yy.
 L i i i a i L x . 112.J N o t iocumei i t s 
show grant of title, license, or permission h\ the federal government for am person o 
during the relevant l ime period oi 1880 to 1890. [ i iial Lx. 107.J 
According to government records from 1893, Segmei it A of the Road, ended at a 
sixth caf.ii lO^ju w .ii Section >. I vi\\ nsiup . m ii.i. Kam.-e *a i'a.-a i ;"•. , . i i J : r-^i : ••:. 
1 I • * • - ^ ' ' : - \ • ' h v \ \ g m - • '•' ' . , • - . -i • * :• • i^; y 
ihc federal g o v e r n m e n t iW a m person or entity to f mid and use the cab in uii the proper ty 
e i the r b e i o r e or ma m g the r e ! e \ a n t t ime p c n o d oi : > S o > " ' *-'l*/> ; S W ' T r i a l E x . 1 0 6 . ] 
tesen }oir s i inc / Wt iter I diversion 
in January 1903, a Notice of Appropriat ion of Water was filed for the dual 
purpose of establishing a reservoir in Section 34, Township 2 North, Range 8 East,7 and 
divet tii :ig tl :ie watei to I Ipt< :::):i I a t id Coal < > ill :: , [' I i ial 123, p. 560.] 1 1 K • v /ate i >, • a s i l eeded ii i 
Sec t ion 34 o f T o w n s h i p 2 I\VHLII. Nange 8 1
 £IM.
 f> mv cu r ren t loca t ion oi . m i <H i U Water 
U s e r s ' r e s e r v o i r s , and is ;i Mot ion i h m u p h whir l - \br >'oa.d passed ITi-inf ! » \\" ; l »wjng 
location of Boyer Lake).] 
13 
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Upton and Coalville for "irrigation purposes, domes [tic] purposes, and other useful 
purposes." [Trial Ex. 123, p. 560.] 
E. Hunting and Fishing 
The Road also provided access for recreational activities in and aropnd the East 
Fork of Chalk Creek, such as hunting and fishing. [Trail Ex. 139, pp. 10-11;9 Trial Tr. 
Vol. II, p. 428:10-22.] In 1899, the Coalville Times reported that people were hunting 
and killing bear in the vicinity of "East Fork Creek." [Trial Ex. 154, p. 1; see also Trial 
Ex. 153, p. 1.] Red Hole, which is accessed through Segment A of the Road as it 
traverses through Section 18, "was a natural haunt for bear and a very popular hunting 
ground." [Trial Ex. 139, p. 26; Trial Ex. 117 (showing location of Red Hole); see also 
Trial Tr. Vol. II, pp. 425:23-426:8.] 
Gwennola Blonquist, born in 1912, testified she went to the Blue Lakes using the 
Middle Fork Road twice in 1933 with her husband and several other "yahoos" to hike and 
recreate. [Gwennola Blonquist Depo., pp. 10:24-11:8, admitted at Trial Tr. Vol. Ill, p. 
556; see also, Trial Ex. 262 (photographs of Ms. Blonquist at the Boyer Reservoir).] 
During the trial, C. Kay Crittenden, born 1923, testified that he had gone up to the 
Blue Lakes and fished and camped on numerous occasions prior to 1935 and never saw 
any gates, signs, or any other obstruction preventing the public at large from travelling 
along the Road. [Trial Tr. Vol. Ill, pp. 502:5-504:18.] 
9




During the trial, Fern Boyer, born in 1928, testified that her lather (and others) 
used to go to the Blue Fakes to fish "all (he lime." [Trial 'IV Vol. II. pp - 1 - : F F 4 ^ : Q ] 
A .ii.iir.iK; ui pn-.-iograpns were a iimueo »*i .eo:. * ! •..»,:• , : ; , , i r. ; • "1 hin- .") 
:Mhi^ Mh . ! -tk die ly i^b uineliaine. [ i rial Fx. 261 .J She testified she would go up 
a> ihe Blue I akes annuailx in die lc>30s for iwo weeks at a time \* iih her grandparents to 
camp. flsn and ML tini.-u. | i * i i . : M vp ! . * . . • , 
A l"()i i :r lei t esi( lei il of; I Ipton, R obert 1 'owell, 1: oi i i in 1929 testified on oi :ie occasioi i 
that he and his cousiii drove part way up tlre Middle Fork Road, parked and walked to ihe 
Mine Fakes. In fact, nn the way down he testified they encountered the local fish warden 
Lamont Slaley testified that in 1939 at the age ol \2 his scoutmaster took him and 
his scout troop camping to the Blue Lakes for four or fi\ e da\ s. [Deposition of I.amorit 
Male).
 ; . . . : : . . . ..;• . 
Finally, the biuL'.nnlu oi Mvrtle Rigb\ , a lady homesteader, states: 
Sundays were especiaih sun ami exciting at Chalk Creek Ranch in the Summer. 
More frequently than not there were eii\ \ isitors. A bountiful lunch was prepared, 
favorite horses were saddled, a team harnessed - and e \ e r \one was off to Blue 
Fake or Bear River to fish. 
[ 1 rial Ex. 160, p. 6.] 
F. Socials and Dances 
Social e\ ei its like dai ices also oca n i ed ii I tl :ie ai ea " J / I K n I a dai ice w as scl iedi lied 
[in Upton during the late 1800s], the word traveled far. The men and women at the 
sawmills high in tlle hills heard of it and e\en those herding sheep around and abo\e ihe 
15 
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sawmills" came. [Trial Ex. 142, p. at 31.] By 1891, an amusement hall was built in 
Upton. [Trial Ex. 137, p. 143; Trial Ex. 139, p. 7; Trial Tr. Vol., II, p. 435:10-17.] 
G. Federal Ownership of the Land in Dispute 
The United States retained ownership of every even-numbered section through 
which Segments A and B of the Road traverse until approximately 1896. [See, e.g., Trial 
Ex. 119, p. JC 1559 (stating that homestead entry for section 18 was filed December 26, 
1895); Trial Ex. 120, p. JC 1537; Trial Ex. 121, p. JC 2338; Trial Ex. 122, p. JC 2314.] 
Odd sections of land along Segments A and B of the Road transferred to the Union 
Pacific Railroad on January 8, 1869. [Trial Ex. 127; 12 Stat. 489, § 3; Trial Ex. 132, p. 
516.] A table attached hereto as Appendix "F" details when each section along Segments 
A and B of the Road passed from federal ownership. [See also, Trial Ex. 128.] 
H. Public Acknowledgments of Road Status. 
The importance of canyon roads, such as the Road at issue in this Lawsuit, to the 
local communities they served is shown by the 1894 minutes of the probate court. These 
minutes reflect that the "[p]rosecuting attorney was instructed to forbid any person or 
persons from closing any of the canyon roads in Summit County that have beefn used as 
public highways for seven years and to prosecute any person violating the instructions 
herein given." [Trial Ex. S.C. 243.] Further, the minutes of the Summit County 
Commission show that in 1913 the county expended monies for road work on Sage Brush 
Flats which constitutes part of the Bench Road. [Trial Ex. S.C. 244.] In 1918, the road is 
set forth on the Summit County Map and in 1975 the entirety of the road including the 
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loop is designated as a Class D iuau on Surnn lit Com lty's general highway map. ["'"1 rial 
Ex. 166. Trial F \ * 
I a; m*er. Cwemhaa j>io;upiis:. AOI si ;;: : v i 1. icsiiiicu ;m.; - nui me\ used 11 ic KoaU 
IU Lia\el LU the :' :.- I akc-; i!v k li.-\ ••.: = !-, n .d . W ;v . '- \\ •... • 
people that usee! ;he Road. jG. Blonquisi ! kpo p i ••" '- \ . rem Mover testified thai 
the community was shocked ^ mi • mw.nd ! Tavnes. Sr. bulked off access \ la the Road in 
aboi it 19' 1 7 g iven 1,1 lat it 1 ladi i t bt :er i etc: s< : ; i • : iTpi ic it ai id. ai lyor ic ii vas ii ee to travel i ipon 
... , I rial Tr. Vol . i f p p . \ 10:1 / - T k . ^ l . j S m i i l a r l ) . Rober t Powel l testified thai pr ior to 
1950. it w a s his be l i e f that the e o m m u n i t v v iewed it as a public road. (Trial Ti Vol III, 
. .•-(•• . i • ^vrri in 1 v 1 * -. . -.id !<\: • d . .\ -. * 
restrictions on access along the Road until tlic late 1940s or early 1950s and the public 
was free to traverse across it. [Trial Ti V T HI. pp. 507:22-509:12.] 
in I'uiiug on luu ioeai issue ol the La • .m! ;! • .•.;:••. ,5 • •'• '- o 
was public pursuant m \ uah Code Ann. y "  !-5-l()4. 1 low ever, because the width olThe 
Road was not the locus ol UK nimaliom lac mal court was not in a position to decide its 
litigation, the trial cour; -ilih/cd its sound discretion to allow Summit Count}', winch has 
the autlioiil) dial (he expertise to determine die width of public roads within its 
• ' ; . 1. 
According to Haynes, however, only a court can declare that a road has been 
dedicated to the public pursuant to § 72-5-104. a proposition not found in or supported by 
17 
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the plain language of the statute. Similarly, Haynes asserts that if a court does determine 
that a road has been dedicated to the public pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 72-5-104, it 
must make a determination of width or simply leave the width of the road in its existing 
"beaten path" condition. The former alternative has been expressly rejected by the Utah 
Supreme Court in Butler, Crockett and Walsh Development Corporation v. Pinecrest. 
Pipeline Operating, Co., 909 P.2d 225, 232 (Utah 1995) (holding that "it was not error 
for the district court to refuse to determine the width of the road when that issue was not 
the focus of the litigation"). The latter alternative is unsupportable as a determination of 
width is necessary to provide a complete remedy and to ensure the safe and convenient 
travel of the public over public roads - a task specifically delegated to county authorities 
by the legislature. See Utah Code Ann. § 72-5-104(3), 108; Jeremy v. Bertagnole, 116 
P.2d 420 (Utah 1941). 
Haynes also asserts that it is entitled to a ruling quieting the title to any potential 
claim against its property, past, present, future, known or unknown. This request is 
incredibly overbroad as well as untimely. The scope of a quiet title action is dictated by 
the challenges made to the title of the property owner. Utah State Department of Social 
Services v. Santiago, 590 P.2d 335, 337 (Utah 1979); Malualani B. Hoopiiana Trust v. 
Hoopiiana, 206 UT 53 \ 26. Accordingly, a party seeking to quiet title is not entitled to a 
determination regarding potential or speculative claims against the property, but only 
present claims or challenges against it. See id. The dispute in this Lawsuit was access 
across the Road. No other claims were asserted. Accordingly, the trial was correct in 
299473v2 
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refusing to rule that Ilaynes is entitled to quiet title lor any issues other thai1 as litigated 
V !he Lawsuit. 
i iaynes also makes nan iicarieu attempt u> v.iaiicnue u.c ^mnciency of the trial 
cert u: t's findii lgs tl iat poi tioi is of tl le R oad w ere dedicated to the pi iblic pi irsi lai it to I Jtal 1 
Code Ann. vj 72-5-11>4. I laynes" assertions are unfounded given ihc "V\cn\ helming" 
evidence that llic j-unnL u^a: inc HciiL.it Road .md MIOUK K<rk Kuad consistently, 
obligations to adcquaiel) marshal die c\ idenee and the trial court's determinations should 
he upheld This is particularly so given the level of deference afforded to a trial court's 
ueu.. •-:.-• . ..' •. : v-. .-i- -fe 
Aliui MKN f 
THE TRIAI , COURT WAS CORR E C ! IN LEAVING THE 
DETERMINATION OF ROAD WIDTH TO SUMMIT COUNTY 
\, HAYNES HAS ENTIRELY FAILED TO MARSHAL THE FVIOENCE 
SU PPORTING THE TRIAL COURT'S FINDINGS. 
Ilaynes ecu i lpletely iV * • - i < L - » • -; ^ ••• < • •< ' r - \ ]I-i • !l. • t 
doing, Haynes disregards the express requirement (hat an appellant challenging the 
iindii:j..> ol tiie li'uii v.ourt mii^t ""hrsi li-i : iiiv. c\ idenee supporting the chaiiuiged 
findii lg. tliei i si IOV ' tl iat tl le i i mi si laled evider ice is legalb ; ii ISI lfficiei it to si ippoi 1 tl ic 
findings when viewing the evidence and inferences in light most favorable to the 
decision." AWINC Corp. v. Simonsen, 2005 I IT App 168, f 9, 112 P.3d 1228 (citing 
Ting ey v. ChrisU mst w, 1999 t I I ' 69,1 | ' / , 1 % I Jtal i 68, 98 71 \2d 588) (en lpl u isis; ide lei !/; ; 
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see also, Harding v. Bell, 2002 UT 108, U 19, 57 P.3d 1093 (citations omitted) (holding 
that a party challenging a finding or verdict must "assume the role of 'devil's 
advocate.'"). 
Indeed, it is the duty of the Appellant to "present 'every scrap of competent 
evidence introduced at trial which supports the very findings the appellant resists' and 
then 'ferret out a fatal flaw in the evidence.'" T.K v. R.C. (In re E.H.), 2006 UT 36, f 
64, 137 P.3d 809. If appellants fail to fulfill their marshaling duties and simply "cite to 
the evidence which supports his or her position" the Court has "sufficient ground for 
affirming the trial court's findings." Wayment v. Howard, 2006 UT 56, j^ 9, 144 P.3d 
1147 (citations omitted). 
In its eighty three (83) page Memorandum Decision25 as well as the Ruling and 
Order, which incorporated the Memorandum Decision in its entirety, the Court expressly 
states that Road width was not a focus of the litigation, that it was not required to make a 
determination of the width of the Road, that Summit County was an appropriate body, by 
both statute and policy, to make the factual determination of the necessary and reasonable 
width of the Road, and that no "taking" or potential "taking" occurred or could occur by 
any alleged "road widening." [See H.R. 001469, ^ 54; 001469, If 55; 001470, U 55; 1471, 
1J56; 001474, \ 60; 001689, p. 10, copies of the Memorandum Decision and Ruling and 
Order are attached hereto as Appendices "A" and "B", respectively.] Despite these 
5
 Such a lengthy decision was warranted given the 174 Exhibits admitted at trial, the 26 
live witnesses, and four deposition testimonies submitted to the trial court. Further, given 
the highly factual nature of road dedication cases and the long time frame of relevant 
events, the trial court correctly provided detailed facts showing careful consideration of 
all of the various factual elements establishing the existence of the public road. 
20 
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findhigs, llaynes does not pro Her an\ _e\ ideiuje in supporioi jhc trial court's 
determinations listed above. Rather, 1 layncs mcreh rehashes arguments it made to the 
trial court,. [See, e.g., H.R 0012 1 ; 001280:1 LR 00150 1 152111 LR 001522-1529; I I.R. 
•••'
, !
 !• •'* ! " ;n • !-=-.- ' ' • '>: . ;IM^M ' \\;w >u- . -.ii-nle;-." ; ' i iha '• J mai'Mial 
the evidence supporting the trial court's position, the tria; conn's ruiing to allow Summit 
County to determine the reasonable and necessary width I>1 the pwi"'iu. ruau ^homvi ne 
O O M - M , . . ! n V - ' . - • * • . . . . • . . : • . 
Even il'I laynes' had marshaled the evidence as it is required to do. its claims fail. 
B. THE TRIAL COURT WAS NOT REQUIRED TO MAKE ,*• 
DETERMINATION OF RO \ D WIDTH A S IT W \ S NOT * !-><"; 
TI IE I JTIG \TTON 
Contrary to its position it I its Motion for Summan Imposition, I laynes has now 
admilled thru ifthe widlh of a roadwax is in *t the focus olThe litigation then a tiial court 
does not have U> make a ueu-rmmaiii;n regarding u.»: w ;; . ; j . : i ;;;<. AIM;, \ i ia\ i., - \v., -;, 
'-• .' tn<(< •' ". -' '?'<>( '«•- , , ; .7 ir.-;/v/.' I h'wLfinh *:• ( 'nr"ar. •//>••/ v. Pinecresl 
Pipeline Operating, Co., 900 P.2d 225. 232 (Utah 1995) (holding that that "it was nu 
error ior die district court to refuse to dctcnniuc ilu wuli.'i vi the ;oao wt^i: ilita issue was 
emphasis on road width during this appeal, width was not a focus of the underlying 
litigation. 
Tl lis ease 1 las beei i pei iciii ig since Septen lbei 1998. \S- "c: " I LR 00139< I j: •. 2 ] 
There were five days of trial in March of 2008, during which 26 witnesses testified and 
174 Exhibits were received. [Trial Tr. Vol. I, pp. 3^4; Trial Tr. Vol. II, pp. 259-260; Trial 
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Tr. Vol. Ill, pp. 474-475; Trial Tr. Vol. IV , pp. 746-747.] The entire focus of the 
dispute for the last ten years has been whether certain sections of the Road traversing 
Haynes' and Jacob-Christensen's property were public. 
As the trial court stated, "there was precious little by way of evidence presented 
concerning the width of any portion of this road." [H.R. 001470, ^ 55.] Indeed, cc[t]he 
Court was unaware the issue of width may arise specifically, and in fact it was hardly 
mentioned during trial except in closing argument and in one post-trial brief" [H.R. 
001470, Tj 55.] 
Further, it does not appear that Haynes is seriously arguing that road width was a 
focus of the Lawsuit such that the trial court had an obligation or even sufficient 
information to make a determination regarding the reasonable and necessary width of the 
Road. Indeed, Haynes cites to no evidence that width of the Road was a focus of the 
Lawsuit. [See generally, Appellant Brief pp. 16-26.] Instead Haynes makes the 
conclusory statement that "[e]vidence on all of this was before the trial court" without 
any citation to the record. [Haynes' Brief, p. 26]; Utah Rules of Appellate 
Procedure24(a)(l) ("[a]ll statements of fact and references to the proceedings below shall 
be supported by citations to the record."); Butler, 909 P.2d at 230 ("failure to cite to the 
record in a brief is grounds for assuming regularity in the proceedings and correctness in 
the judgment appealed from." (citations omitted)). 
Accordingly, at the very least, it should be determined that width was not a focus 
of the litigation such that the trial court was in a position to make the highly fact 
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dependent determination regarding the reasonable aiid necessary width of the Road. 
Butler, 9(W l \2d al 232. 
C 1 1 4 VINES' IN I Iilli I RE I < i ' il IK )I I Of I I I AI I C( )DE ANN. ^ , 1 - I t . , -, • 
72-5 108 IS I J.NS1 I'll" IF - Z I !: I • \ I l l E ^ NT) J 1 S \RGl I MENTti i- \ I i • 
1laynes claims that if the trial court does not decide the width of a road dedicated 
U) (lie public by use. then no other party inay make that decision. [Haynes' Brief, p. 17-
], owever. Haynes asserts this position without citation to any authority or evidence, 
arguing that the coi n 11 t n ist sii i rply "leave tl ic road at its : xisting widtl f \\ ill 101 it ai ly 
regard lo the safely or convenience of the pubiu j I laynes' Brief pp. ! 7-1 8 j : sec 
Man /;</;// v I'urk ( i l v . / / i c . . \ \ U; •. o S ] (]- 'lah Ct. App. I vW"7) ("We *• ill uoi •. en>ider 
issues.") (citations omitted). 
I laynes makes this wholly unsupported and eritiealh flawed argument despite the 
of public roads, jusi like the Road at issue in this ea^e, max be determined b\ oilier P\ : : 
bodied iffue issue is not the focus of die liiication before ihe irial eoun. 
1. S n in in i t C o ii n t y h a s t h e \ i 11 111 o r i ty to I) e % i e Re a s o n a b I e a n tl 
N e c e s s a r;; • W ' i d t h o f a R o a i 1 D e d i c a t e d t'v 
Haynes asserts that the trial court cannot delegate the Road width decision to 
Summit County because I Jtah Code Ann. § 72-5-108 only provides Summit Coin lty 
ai ithoi ity IU ) detei I i lii ic tl ic widtl i of i oads it develops ai id i lot tc • detei n lii ic the widtl i ; )f 
roads dedicated to the public pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 7 2 o - i u 4 . j ] !a\ n e ^ Briei, p. 
22.] Not even aUcmplinu to find support for ihis assertion in the statutes themselves, 
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Haynes instead points to inapposite case law in which courts have determined that a road 
has been dedicated to the public. [Id., p. 17, n. 80.] Simply because courts have decided 
that a road is public pursuant Utah Code Ann. § 72-5-104, however, does not mean that 
courts are the sole agents that can determine road width. Such a conclusion would 
require this Court to completely ignore the broad authorizing language of Utah Code 
Ann. §72-5-108. Indeed, Haynes' assumption that Utah Code Ann. §§ 72-5-104 and 72-
5-108 are mutually exclusive is misguided. A simple reading of the two statutes shows 
that they work together seamlessly. Selman, Inc. v. Box Elder County, 2009 UT App. 99, 
Tf 6, 208 P.3d 535 (The best evidence of legislative intent is the plain language of the 
statute which are given their plain, natural and ordinary meaning), (citations omitted). 
Paragraph 2 of Utah Code Ann. § 72-5-104 states that a dedication and 
abandonment creates a "right of way held by the state." Utah Code Ann. § 72-5-104(2). 
Utah Code Ann. § 72-5-108, in turn, allows "authorities of the state, counties, or 
municipalities" to determine the width of those rights of way under their jurisdiction. 
Utah Code Ann. § 72-5-104 then directs those authorities to designate a width that "is 
reasonable and necessary to ensure safe travel according to the facts and circumstances." 
Utah Code Ann. § 72-5-104Q).6 
For example, if a state, county, or municipal authority determines that a road has 
been dedicated to the public pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 72-5-104 and there is no 
6
 Haynes asserts that the current version of Utah Code Ann. § 72-5-104 does not apply 
because it was amended in 2001, after the Lawsuit was filed - this is incorrect. There 
was no claim under Utah Code Ann. § 72-5-104 until Jacob Christensen filed its 
Counterclaim on March 15, 2003. [H.R. 000065-000079]. 
299473v2 
24 
judicial challenge to such determination, Utah Code Ann. § 72-5-104(3) provides 
guidance to state, county, or municipal authorities regarding the reasonable and necessary 
width of those roads, and Utah Code Ann. § 72-5-108 gives them the authority to 
determine that width. This harmonious reading of two Utah statutes is entirely 
foreclosed by Haynes' strained interpretation. 
Alternatively, when there is a dispute over whether a road has been dedicated to 
the public pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 72-5-104 and it is determined by the trial court 
that it has, in fact, been dedicated to the public, it is possible that the width of the road is 
not the focus of the litigation. See, e g., Butler, 909 P.2d 225. When this occurs, Utah 
Code Ann. § 72-5-108 provides the right to the local authority with jurisdiction over the 
road to make a determination of width pursuant to the standards set by Utah Code Ann. § 
72-5-104(3). Again, this is precisely what has occurred, and as opposed to Haynes' 
polarizing interpretation, harmonizes the two closely related statutory provisions.7 Duke 
v Graham, 2007 UT 31, |^ 16 (stating that a court is to construe statutory provisions in 
harmony with other statutes under the same and related chapters.) (citations omitted). 
7
 Haynes also rehearses the legislative history of § 72-5-108, asserting that if the Utah 
legislature did not want Utah courts determining the width of roads dedicated pursuant to 
Utah Code Ann. § 72-5-104, it would have amended the provisions of Section 108 to 
expressly prohibit the courts from doing so. [See Haynes' Memo, at 3-6]. As held in 
Butler, however, courts may determine the width of roads declared public rights of way 
pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 72-5-104, but they are not required to do so if the width of 
the subject road is not the focus of the litigation before the court, such as here. 
Accordingly, there is no need for the Utah legislature to alter Utah Code Ann. § 72-5-108 
because it is entirely consistent with the existing case law. 
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2. The Trial Court Utilized Sound Judicial Policy in Deferring the 
Decision Regarding Road Width to Summit County. 
Rather than leave the issue regarding road width for further litigation or do 
nothing and jeopardize the safety of the traveling public, the trial court utilized sound 
judicial policy in deferring the decision to Summit County pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 
72-5-108. The trial court cited Chief Justice Durham's recent dissenting opinion in 
Pearson v Pearson, 2008 UT 24, 182 P.3d 353, in which she stated that 
in the judicial analytic hierarchy, questions should be resolved with 
statutory answers prior to recourse to either common law solutions or 
constitutional review. 
Id. at *f| 38; [H.R. 001471, f 55.] Accordingly, when faced with a determination of 
whether to force additional litigation or to defer to the authority granted by the Utah 
Legislature to Summit County pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 72-5-108, the trial court 
appropriately chose the statutory solution. 
Further, the relevance and application of Utah Code Ann. § 72-5-108 is 
inescapable in this instance as Summit County has reflected the Road on its maps as a 
Class D county road for the past 30 years, thereby making it a public road under the 
jurisdiction of Summit County. [Trial Ex. 114.] Accordingly, it is only reasonable that 
Summit County, as expressly authorized by the Utah Legislature, be the body that makes 
the determination regarding the width of the Road. 
It would be patently irresponsible for the trial court to do as Haynes requests and 
simply leave the width of the road dedicated to the public as its beaten path. Indeed, 
clear statutory provisions as well as established case law show that this is not a viable 
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option. Utah Code Ann. § 72-5-104 states that the "scope of the right of way is that 
which is reasonable and necessary to ensure safe travel according to the facts and 
circumstances." (emphasis added). Further, as the trial court correctly noted, the Utah 
Supreme Court has held specifically that "the width of the road is not to be measured by 
the width of the beaten track." [H.R.001468 (citing Jeremy v. Bertagnole, 116 P.2d 420 
(Utah 1941).] Rather, "dedication of a roadway to automobile traffic is the dedication of 
a roadway of sufficient width for safe and convenient use thereof by such traffic." 
Jeremy, 101 Utah 1, 10, 116 P.2d 420 (emphasis added); see also, Jennings Investment, 
LC v. Dixie Riding Club, Inc., 2009 UT App. 119, \ 34, 208 P.3d 1077 (stating that mere 
"[e]vidence of the width of the Road does not address the reasonable and necessary 
requirement for determining width of the Road."); [H.R. 001469.] By allowing Summit 
County to determine the reasonable and necessary width of the Road to ensure safe 
travel, the trial court followed sound public policy as expressly defined by the Legislature 
and long standing case law. 
3. Haynes Is Not Entitled to Remand with Instructions to Determine 
Width Based Upon the Historical Use from 1880 to 1896. 
Haynes' assertion that it is entitled to a remand for a determination of the width of 
the Road during the period between 1880 and 1896 fails for similar reasons. Haynes 
asserts that if it is not entitled to remand with directions limiting the width of the Road to 
18 feet, it is entitled to remand with instructions that the determination of the width of the 
Road be limited to the width and nature of the uses from 1880 to 1896. [Haynes5 Brief, 
pp. 29-31.] Haynes' position is directly contrary to established policy and law. 
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As a preliminary matter, the trial court did not hold that the road was public only 
between 1880 through 1896 as Haynes apparently claims. Rather, the trial court held that 
there was nothing barring the public from traveling freely on the Road from 1865 until 
1932: 
[BJased on the evidence, the court concludes that people.. .certainly used 
portions of this road...for at least 10 years, from perhaps 1865 to 1932, and 
certainly up to the time of statehood in 1896. The court finds that evidence 
overwhelming in fact. 
[H.R.001448,1| 22.] The trial court held that "from at least 1880-1896" the road had been 
used continuously by the public for ten years, but also stated that it was not until 1941 
that public use was interrupted. [H.R. 001436, f73; 001459, % 42 (emphasis added).] 
Haynes fails entirely to mention this finding by the trial court and instead misconstrues 
the trial court's conclusions as well as the evidence presented at trial. 
Further, a road dedicated to the public through use is not frozen in time to the 
width of the road at the time it became public. In Jeremy v. Bertagnole, 101 Utah 1, 9, 
116 P.2d 420 (1941), the Court stated that "[w]e cannot agree with counsel that, where 
the public have acquired the right to a public highway by user, they are limited to such 
width as has actually been used by them." Rather, the Court determined that the width 
of the public way must be wide enough to "make such use convenient and safe." Id. at 
424. Similarly, while "the greater part of the travel on a county highway is doubtless 
confined to the track made by vehicles, [] there must be room enough for travelers with 
wagons, carriages, or implements to pass each other and for necessary improvements and 
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repairs to be made so as to keep it in a suitable condition." Id. at 423 (citations omitted) 
(emphasis added). 
The same concept is reflected in section 72-5-302 of the Utah Code. In that 
o 
section, the Utah Legislature declared: 'The scope of the R.S. 2477 right-of-way 
includes the right to widen the highway as necessary to accommodate the increased travel 
associated with those uses, up to, where applicable, improving a highway to two lanes so 
travelers can safely pass each other." Utah Code Ann. § 72-5-302(4)(c) (2007). 
Haynes' argument completely ignores the overriding principle in both judicial and 
municipal width determinations: the safety and convenience of the traveling public. 
Accordingly, the trial court was correct in allowing Summit County to determine the 
reasonable and necessary width of the Road for the convenience and safety of the public. 
4. There Can Be No Taking As Haynes Took the Property Subject to the 
Public Road. 
Rather than focusing on the safety and convenience of the traveling public in 
determining the width of the Road, Haynes focuses instead on alleged private property 
rights in its attempts to limit the width of the Road to the narrowest point possible. 
Haynes' utakings" argument fails, however, as it purchased its property subject to the 
public road and never had any private property "taken" from it. 
The trial court stated in its Order and Ruling that "[t]his road was public before 
Haynes bought the property and Haynes accepted and took the property subject to that 
public right." [H.R.001687, p. 10.] 'Thus," the trial court stated, "it is not as if Haynes 
8




owned land, the public then crossed it and used it, and thus Haynes is being deprived of 
something he had but now has lost[]", rather, "Haynes never 'had' this road, it has been 
public since long before he purchased the land surrounding the public road." [H.R. 
001460, *! 43.] This finding of the trial court is consistent with Utah law. See, e.g., 
Sullivan v. Condas, 76 Utah 585, 290 P. 954, 957 (Utah 1930) (cc...[A]nd the plaintiffs 
when they acquired their interest in and to the lands, took them subject to the easement in 
favor of the public, unless it was thereafter extinguished by operation of the state law, 
which was not done.5'). Further, given that a public way is not simply limited to the 
beaten path, but is a width that is necessary and convenient for the safe travel of the 
public, Haynes took the property subject to the reasonable and necessary width of the 
public way. See Utah Code Ann. § 72-5-104(3). Accordingly, Haynes never had 
anything to "take" and its assertions fail. 
5. Summit County Has the Expertise Necessary to Make a Reasoned 
Determination Regarding the Width of the Road Pursuant to Utah 
Code Ann. §§ 72-5-104 & 108. 
Haynes is not harmed by the trial court's decision to allow Summit County to 
establish the width of the Road. Haynes argues that Summit County is "an institutionally 
poor forum for finding facts" and that the trial court is in a better position to determine 
the appropriate width. [Appellant Brief, p. 23.] This claim is false given that little 
evidence regarding the width of any portion of the Road was submitted and that the trial 
court itself noted that it "was unaware the issue of width may arise specifically, and in 
fact it was hardly mentioned during trial except in closing argument and in one post-trial 
brief." [H.R. 001470, t 55.] 
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Far to the contrary of Haynes' assertions, Summit County is in the best position to 
determine the reasonable and necessary width of the Road based upon established 
codification, experience, and expertise in determining the appropriate width for the roads 
under its jurisdiction. 
In post trial briefing, Summit County submitted the Affidavit of Derrick Radke, 
the Summit County Engineer, setting forth the standards which Summit County has 
codified regarding the determination of road width and making a recommendation 
regarding the proposed width of the Road. [H.R. 001491 (referring to the attached 
Affidavit of Derrick Radke).] Mr. Radke testified that he was familiar with the road at 
issue and, 
taking into account terrain, grade, anticipated speed of travel, approved 
development densities under zoning laws, drainage, maintenance, prior use, 
and other similar factors, [his] recommendation to the Board of County 
Commissioners will be that this public right of way must be at least 36 feet 
wide to ensure proper travel width, safety, and maintenance under 
AASHTO and Development Code standards. Of this total, 18 feet should 
constitute the traveled surface area. This width will allow two emergency 
vehicles to safely pass one another. The remaining 18 feet allows for 9 feet 
on either side of the road for further safety and to facilitate proper 
maintenance and use in keeping with the Development Code and Section 
11-6-9 of the Summit County Code. 
[Id] Given the detail and consideration given by Mr. Radke to the appropriate width of 
the public right of way, it can hardly be said that the recommendation is overly broad, 
biased, or poorly conceived. The recommended width provides enough room for two 
emergency vehicles to pass and adequate shoulder for the purposes of safety as well as to 
ensure that those pulled over on the side of the road are not trespassing. 
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Further, as noted in case law cited by Haynes, the codes and standards adopted by 
states and counties are evidence of reasonable width and in fact, should be referenced in 
determining the appropriate width of roads under Utah Code Ann. § 72-5-104. See 
Hunsaker v. State, 509 P.2d 352, 354 (Utah 1973) (The Court looked first to statutory 
presumptions regarding the width of a public road and then to potentially rebutting 
evidence); see also, Schaer v. Utah Dept. of Transportation, 657 P.2d 1337, 1342 (Utah 
1983) (city ordinances on road width may be "offered as evidence of what is considered 
reasonable and necessary under the circumstances"). Given that these are the very 
standards Haynes asserts the trial court should apply in determining the width of the 
Road, it is very difficult to see how Haynes can show prejudice when those same 
standards were properly applied by Summit County.9 
6. The Court Did Not Find that 18 Feet was the Appropriate Width of the 
Road. 
Haynes asserts on multiple occasions in its Appellate Brief that the trial court 
found that 18 feet was the appropriate width of the Road. [See, e.g., Haynes' Brief, pp. 
26, 27.] This is wrong as well as highly misleading. In the final Ruling and Order issued 
by the trial court, which Haynes ignores completely in its Appellate Brief, the trial court 
stated that "[t]he court's comments as to its 'feelings' [regarding road width in the 
Memorandum Decision] were in essence dicta and thoughts as the court ruled and 
Also of note is the fact that Jacob-Christensen is equally impacted by Summit 
County's determinalion regarding width of the Road as a substantial portion of the Road 
traverses its property. 
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reaffirms that the decision as to the width of a public road belongs to Summit 
County." [H.R. 001687, p. 10,1f 1 (emphasis added).] 
Thus, the trial court's dicta "feelings" regarding what might be an appropriate 
width were firmly rejected in the final Ruling and Order. This is appropriate given that 
"there was precious little by way of evidence presented concerning the width of any 
portion of this road." [R001470, «(| 55.] Accordingly, Haynes' request that this Court 
remand with instruction to the trial court to declare the appropriate width of the Road as 
18 feet is in error. 
7. If the Trial Court Is Directed to Determine the Width of the Road, the 
Issue Should be Remanded for Additional Evidence. 
If this Court determines that the trial court was obligated to make a determination 
of the width of the Road, the Court should remand with instructions to the trial court to 
hold additional briefing and evidentiary hearings. This instruction is necessary given that 
"there was precious little by way of evidence presented concerning the width of any 
portion of this road" and that width was "hardly mentioned during trial." [H.R. 001470, ^ | 
55; H.R. 001470, lj 55.] In order for the trial court to properly determine the reasonable 
and necessary width of the road for the safety of the traveling public additional evidence 
must be presented for the trial court to make additional findings of fact. 
10
 On a related note, Haynes' representation that the Road is currently 8-10 feet wide 
mischaracterizes the evidence presented to the trial court. [See, e.g., Haynes' Brief, pp. 
11, 32]. Though the width of the Road was not the focus of the litigation, on a handful of 
occasions width was mentioned incidental to the use and condition of the Road at various 
times. For example, testimony did come in that the Road at its narrowest was eight feet 
in 1945. [Trial Tr. Vol. IV, p. 797:1-22]. Other testimony regarding the width of the 
Road incidental to its use and condition, however, was that it was between 18 and 25 feet 
in width. [Trial Tr. Vol. IV, pp. 816:25-818:2]. 
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D. HAYNES CANNOT MAKE CONSTITUTIONAL CHALLENGES FOR 
THE FIRST TIME ON APPEAL 
Haynes5 unfounded assertions that Utah Code Ann. § 72-5-108 is unconstitutional 
and that the trial court unconstitutionally delegated "core judicial functions" were not 
raised below and have been waived. [See Haynes' Brief, pp. 22-27.] Haynes argues for 
the first time on appeal that "section 72-5-108 cannot constitutionally permit a trial court 
to delegate the determination of road width to a county legislative body" and cites to Salt 
Lake City v. Ohms, 881 P.2d 844 (Utah 1994), a case which sets out the standards for 
determining whether a statute unconstitutionally usurps core judicial functions. 
[Haynes' Brief, p. 23.] 
While arguments relating to the trial court's duty under the existing case law were 
made by Haynes at the trial court, claims of any constitutional obligation of the trial court 
or of the unconstitutionality of Utah Code Ann. §72-5-108 were not. Accordingly, 
Haynes' assertions regarding "delegation of a core judicial function" are not 
appropriately presented to the Court. State v Dean, 2004 UT 63, f^ 13 (u[I]n general, 
appellate courts will not consider an issue, including constitutional arguments, raised for 
the first time on appeal unless the trial court committed plain error or the case involves 
exceptional circumslances").] ] Haynes has not cited to any part of the record preserving 
11
 Even if Haynes had preserved such constitutional challenges, Utah Code Ann. § 72-5-
108 is not inconsistent with a court's role in making determinations regarding the 
existence of a public right of way and does not unconstitutionally delegate "a core 
judicial function." Jones v. Utah Board of Pardons & Parole, 2004 UT 53, ^ j 10 (citing 
Salt Lake City v. Ohms, 881 P.2d 844, 847 (Utah 1994) (stating that "[statutes are 
presumed to be constitutional until the contrary is clearly shown. It is only when statutes 
manifestly infringe upon some constitutional provision that they can be declared void. 
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such constitutional challenge nor has it made any arguments establishing how it should 
nevertheless be allowed to make such constitutional challenges as a result of plain error 
or exceptional circumstances, neither of which exists here. 
II. THE TRIAL COURT WAS CORRECT IN DENYING HAYNES' 
SWEEPING AND NEVER BEFORE PRESENTED REQUEST FOR A 
DECLARATION QUIETING TITLE TO ALL OF HAYNES' PROPERTY 
In its Appellate Brief, Haynes requests - for the first time, at the last minute of the 
last hour of this Lawsuit - that it is entitled to a declaration that other than the Road, there 
are absolutely no other encumbrances on its property, past, present, or future, despite the 
fact that the sole claim against the Haynes' property at issue at trial was the existence of 
the one singular Road. This expansive and unwarranted request effectively constitutes 
an attempt to take by ambush what was not at issue before the trial court. Accordingly, 
the trial court's refusal to include such expansive, surprise relief was more than 
appropriate and should be affirmed. Merrill v. Bailey and Son, 99 Utah 323, 331, 106 
P.2d 255 (Utah 1940) (citations omitted) (stating that in equity cases appellate courts 
review the record to determine whether the evidence clearly preponderates against the 
findings of the trial court. The findings should not be disturbed unless the clear weight of 
the evidence is against them.). 
Every reasonable presumption must be indulged in and every reasonable doubt resolved 
in favor of constitutionality."). Indeed Haynes' fails entirely to conduct any of the 
analysis required under Ohm to establish that a core judicial function is being usurped. 
Simply asserting that other courts have made determinations regarding width of public 
roads does not make such decisions a core judicial function. 
While Haynes' specifically references an area of land commonly known as Red Hole, 
which traverses both Haynes and Jacob Christensen property, the relief requested would 
cover any potential past present or future claim of right against the Haynes property. 
[Haynes' Brief, p. 27]. 
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An action to quiet title is one for equitable relief to quiet an existing valid title 
against a certain affirmative claim against it. Utah State Department of Social Services v 
Santiago, 590 P.2d 335, 337 (Utah 1979). In order to obtain such equitable relief, one 
"must allege title, entitlement to possession, and that the estate or interest claimed by 
others is adverse or hostile to the alleged claims of title or interest." Id. at 337-338; see 
also, Malualani B. Hoopiiana Trust v. Hoopiiana, 206 UT 53 f^ 26 (same). The scope of 
a quiet title action, therefore, is based upon the affirmative claims made against the owner 
of the title. See id.; see, e.g., 65 Am. Jur. 2d § 28 (cc[M]ere apprehension by an owner 
that an adverse claim will be asserted is insufficient to confer equity jurisdiction, [and] a 
claimant must usually wait until his or her rights have been actually interfered with 
before he or she can, by a quiet title suit, implied another from who he or she anticipates 
an injury.") 
In this dispute, the sole adverse claim at issue was the existence of a public road or 
prescriptive right held by Jacob Christensen and/or others over a discrete section of land 
commonly referred to (in the singular) as the Road. This is consistent with Haynes' 
pleadings as well as the evidence developed over the course of the ten years this case was 
pending before the trial court. 
Indeed, all of the evidence Haynes presents in support of its contention that it is 
entitled to sweeping additional relief actually contradicts its position. As an initial 
matter, as noted by Haynes, the Court expressly stated in its Memorandum Decision that 
"[tjhere is another road, which the court will call the West Fork Road, about which there 
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seems little dispute." [H.R. 1408. f^ 7.] Accordingly, the Court expressly acknowledged 
that any road other than the one singular Road was not at issue. 
The focus and intent of the Lawsuit over the course of its ten year history is further 
clarified when one looks at Haynes' own pleadings. In its Verified Complaint, Haynes 
asserts that 
Historically and up to the present day, access to the Jacob Christensen 
property has been gained by means of a grant of a limited right of way or 
easement strictly for agricultural purposes, which right of way or easement 
is evidence by that certain Quit Claim Deed, a copy of which is attached 
hereto marked Exhibit UC".... 
[H.R. 00003, If 12.] The Exhibit C, referenced in the Verified Complaint, is a 1939 
Quitclaim Deed for a right of way over that proceeds directly over the Bench Road 
portion of the Road at issue in this dispute. Specifically, the right of way is 
50 feet wide on both sides from the center line of an old road up the East 
Fork of Chalk Creek, said road entering the SE1/2 of said Section 36, Tp. 3 
N. R. 7 E., S.L.B. & M, at a point on the North (east and west line) of said 
quarter section on a bench west of chalk creek, and following said road 
thence to its Southeasterly terminal at the SW corner of Section 17, Tp. 2 
N.R. 9E., S.L.B. &M. 
[H.R. 000003, p. 3, U 12 (emphasis added).] The "old road" referenced in the 1939 
Quitclaim Deed roadway traverses the route commonly referred to as the Bench Road 
portion of the Road. 
In paragraph 14 of the Verified Complaint, Haynes references and attaches an 
agreement between Jacob Christensen and Haynes entered into in June of 1984 (the 
"1984 Agreement"), which expressly designates the roadway which has been the 
historical and present focus of the dispute between the parties at issue in the Lawsuit. 
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Specifically, the 1984 Agreement states that "controversies have arisen between the 
parties as to their respective rights and responsibilities in the roadway... which traverses 
the Haynes property and provides ingress and egress to the Jacobs/Christensen property." 
[H.R. 000004, p. 4, }^ 14 (referring to Exhibit D) (emphasis added).] The roadway is 
specifically defined as the "old road" referenced in the 1939 Quitclaim Deed referenced 
above - the Bench Road portion of the Road. [Id.] 
In paragraph 23 of Haynes' Verified Complaint there is a reference to a letter from 
Haynes to Summit County on June 26, 1997, which objected to Jacob Christensen's use 
of the Road. In that letter, the section of the road at issue is the same Bench Road 
described in the "deeded right-of-way" set forth in the 1939 Quit Claim Deed referenced 
above. [H.R. 000006, p. 6, ^ 23 (referencing Exhibit F) (emphasis added).] 
Finally, Haynes explicitly refers to and specifically defines that this Lawsuit 
concerns only one singular roadway in its Pre-Trial Brief: 
This action was commenced by Haynes the [sic] filing of its Complaint 
seeking an adjudication that Jacob Christensen, as owners of the JC Ranch, 
are not entitled to the use of any portion of the Roadway across the Haynes 
Ranch, except as expressly provided for in Plaintiffs' Exhibits 6, 7, 8, and 
9. 
[H.R. 001252-001253 (emphasis added).]13 Haynes then goes on to specifically define 
the Roadway into the sections commonly referred to throughout the trial as "the 'Bench 
Road', the 'East Fork Road', and the 'Middle Fork Road'" and describes the precise route 
13
 The Exhibits referenced once again refer to historic rights of way describing the Bench 
Road portion of the Road. 
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each section travels. [H.R. 001253-001254.] No mention is made of Red Hole or any 
other road that may exist which may be in dispute. 
Further, Trial Exhibit 117 was referred to extensively throughout the litigation to 
point out the location of the Road, points of interest along and around it, the boundary of 
the Road, etc. It was received without objection and was treated by all parties as 
accurately reflecting the Road at issue. [Trial Tr. Vol. I at p. 26:3-20.] Indeed, it is the 
very map that Haynes attached as Appendix D to their Appellate Brief without any 
objection, caveat, or condition. 
In fact, there is no evidence that any areas other than the Road were ever at issue 
at trial. There are references made to Red Hole during the trial, but those were all in 
connection with orienting the trial court to the location of the Road, the properties of the 
parties, and the use of the Bench Road to access that area, not to establish a public road or 
easement over any road or trail that might go down into the Red Hole area. [See, e.g., 
Trial Tr. Vol. I, pp. 26:21-27:11, 32:10-16, 62:18-24, 70:20-71:6, 89:4-19; Trial Tr. Vol. 
2, pp. 425:23-426:13, 428:10-22, 429:7-430:19; Trial Tr. Vo. Ill, pp. 648:10-22; Trial Tr. 
Vol. V, pp. 922:15-924:11,931:8-932:19.] 
Further, even if there were incidental references to rights over any other roads, or 
access points, it would be wholly unjust to adjudicate rights regarding any other areas 
given that ten years of litigation was focused on the one singular Road. See, e.g., Lee v. 
Sanders, 2002 UT App 281, Tf 7, 55 P.3d 1127 ("A trial court may not base its decision 
on an issue that was tried inadvertently."). Accordingly, the trial court was correct in 
rejecting Haynes5 sweeping and untimely request for relief. 
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In addition, Haynes entirely fails to marshal the evidence in support of the trial 
court's finding that Haynes is not entitled to a quiet title determination on anything other 
than the disputed Road. Instead, Haynes simply refers to two paragraphs in its Verified 
Complaint and one partial quote from the Court's Memorandum decision - skewing the 
references entirely in favor of its argument - and states that it is entitled to relief not 
granted by the Trial Court. [Appellant Brief at pp. 27-29.] Haynes' marshaling efforts 
fail to meet its obligations under the rules and laws of this court and the trial court's 
findings should be affirmed. Wayment v. Howard, 2006 UT 56, ^ 9, 144 P.3d 1147 (If 
appellants fail to fulfill their marshaling duties and simply "cite to the evidence which 
supports his or her position" the Court has "sufficient ground for affirming the trial 
court's findings.") 
III. THE TRIAL COURT'S DETERMINATION THAT PORTIONS OF THE 
ROAD ARE PUBLIC IS CORRECT AND SHOULD BE AFFIRMED 
Haynes' claims of insufficient public use are firmly contradicted by the 
"overwhelming" evidence presented at trial. The use of the Road by the public was 
continuous and unchallenged from as early as 1865 until at least 1932. Indeed, Haynes' 
woefully deficient effort to marshal the evidence supporting the trial court's decision is 
enough to uphold the trial court's determination that the Bench Road, Middle Fork, and 
East Fork to Section 8 have been dedicated to the public. Further, it is clear by the 
evidence on record and established case law that the use of the road was by the public, 
was not permissive, was substantial, and continued for a period of over 65 years. 
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A. THE TRIAL COURT'S DETERMINATIONS ARE ACCORDED A GREAT 
DEAL OF DEFERENCE IN ROAD DEDICATION CASES. 
Historically, appellate courts have granted trial courts "a fair degree of latitude in 
determining the legal consequences under [the road dedication statute.]5' Heber City 
Corp. v. Simpson, 942 P.2d 307, 309-310 (Utah 1997) (citations omitted). Specifically, 
We review the trial court's legal interpretation of the Dedication Statute for 
correctness and its factual finding for clear error. But whether the facts of a 
case satisfy the requirements of the Dedication Statute is a mixed question 
of fact and law that involves various and complex facts, evidentiary 
resolutions, and credibility determinations. Thus we review the trial court's 
decision regarding whether a public highway has been established under 
[the Dedication Statute]... for correctness but grant the court significant 
discretion in its application of the facts to the statute. 
Jennings Investment, LC v. Dixie Riding Club, Inc., 2009 UT App 119, f^ 5, 208 P.3d 
1077 (citing Town of Leeds v. Prisbrey, 2008 UT 11, lj 5, 179 P.3d 757) (emphasis 
added). Further, in making such a determination, the appellate court "considers] the 
evidence in a light most favorable to the trial court's findings...." Id. (citations omitted). 
B. HAYNES FAILED TO MARSHAL THE EVIDENCE SUPPORTING THE 
TRIAL COURT'S DECISION. 
Haynes' effort to marshal the evidence related to the trial court's finding that the 
Bench portion of the Road was dedicated to the public pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-
5-104 is a hopelessly short list of time periods, with no explanation of even those bare 
facts or how they support the trial court's conclusions. [Appellant Brief, pp. 33-37.] 
Given the extensive evidence actually presented at trial, it is clear that Haynes' has failed 
to meet its marshalling obligations and the trial court's determinations regarding the 
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dedication of the Road to public use should be deemed accurate. [See, e.g., H.R. 001393-
1477; Statement of Facts, supra; Subsection III. C, infra.] 
Haynes may not simply "re-argue the factual case presented in the trial court" and 
also cannot merely present carefully selected facts and excerpts from the record in 
support of its position. Chen v. Stewart, 2004 UT 82, «fl 78, 100 P.3d 1177. If the 
evidence is inadequately marshaled, the court assumes that all findings are adequately 
supported by the evidence. See id., Iflfl9, ^80. As has been established by the Statement 
of Facts - Haynes efforts fail to meet even their basic marshalling obligations and the 
trial court's determination that the designated portions of the Road are public should be 
affirmed. 
C. THE EVIDENCE IN SUPPORT OF THE TRIAL COURT'S 
DETERMINATION IS "OVERWHELMING." 
As is customary in road dedication cases, the factual record in this case is 
extensive - this is particularly so given that the case was pending for over ten years before 
the trial court. [H.R. 001394.] Haynes' alleged marshaling efforts - limited "primarily" to 
"documentary evidence" - fail to do any sort of justice to the factual record presented to 
the trial court over the many days at trial. 
No doubt there were many documents presented, ancient as well as contemporary, 
that comprise the 174 Exhibits in the Record. [Trial Tr. Vol. I, pp. 3-4; Trial Tr. Vol. II, 
pp. 259-260; Trial Tr. Vol. Ill, pp. 474-475; Trial Tr. Vol. IV , pp. 746-747.] In addition 
to the documentary evidence, however, and contrary to Haynes' woefully inadequate 
description of the evidence and testimony, there were numerous live witnesses (twenty 
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six14) as well a witness testimony in the form of depositions (four witnesses not present at 
trial15) presented at trial regarding use of the Road from the 1920s through the present. In 
fact, the trial court noted that the testimony of the live witnesses "was all relevant as it 
tended to prove an issue in the case, namely, who had used this road and under what 
conditions." [H.R. 001422, p. 30, f!9.] 
In addition to the live testimony, deposition testimony, and documentary evidence, 
the trial court judge, Judge Lubeck, had an opportunity to view the Road first hand in a 
day long physical tour of the Road during which the trial court's clerk took notes as the 
parties described the history of various areas along the Road and past uses. [H.R. 001037, 
H.R. 001437, p. 45, ^ 74.] This physical inspection is particularly noteworthy because it 
qualifies the trial court to make specific findings regarding the Road. 
14
 William L. Christensen, Trial Tr. Vol. I, pp. 117-175; Charles Horman, Trial Tr. Vol. I, 
pp. 177-229; Stephen Jacob, Trial Tr. Vol. II, pp. 261-310; William E. Christensen, Trial 
Tr. Vol. II, pp. 311-339; Gary Boyer, Trial Tr. Vol. II, pp. 346-393, Trial Tr. Vol. IV, pp. 
855-869; Greg Boyer, Trial Tr. Vol. Ill, pp. 402-410; Fern Boyer, Trial Tr. Vol. II, pp. 
414-450; Eugene Hansen, Trial Tr. Vol. II, pp. 451-458; Robert Powell, Trial Tr. Vol. Ill, 
pp. 478-500; C. Kay Crittenden, Trial Tr. Vol. Ill, pp. 501-526; Alfred Blonquist, Trial 
Tr. Vol. II, pp. 461-467; Trial Tr. Vol. Ill, pp. 529-535, Trial Tr. Vol. IV, pp. 871-873; 
Alan Spriggs, Trial Tr. Vol. Ill, pp. 540-552; Calvin Haskell, Trial Tr. Vol. Ill, pp. 573-
598; L. Kent Garfield, Trial Tr. Vol. Ill, 603-606; Howard Haynes, Jr., Trial Tr. Vol. Ill, 
pp. 607-683; Derrick Radke, Trial Tr. Vol. Ill, pp. 685-698; Shirley MacFarlane, Trial 
Tr. Vol. Ill, pp. 701-739; Thomas W. Moore, Trial Tr. Vol. IV, pp. 749-756; Dan 
Blonquist, Trial Tr. Vol. IV, pp. 757-766; Dave Edmunds, Trial Tr. Vol. IV, pp. 767-772; 
James M. Blonquist; Trial Tr. Vol. IV, pp. 773-778; Clifton Blongquist, Trial Tr. Vol. IV, 
pp. 780-793; Waynes Jones, Trial Tr. Vol. IV, pp. 793-800; Grant MacFarlane, Trial Tr. 
Vol. IV, pp. 806-832; Dennis Wright, Trial Tr. Vol. IV, pp. 835-849; Kent Wilde, Trial 
Tr. Vol. IV, pp. 852-854. 
15
 Gwennola Blonquist Trial Tr. Vol. Ill, p. 556; Lamont Staley, Trial Tr. Vol. Ill, p. 554; 
Lloyd Collard, Roy Metos - Trial Tr. Vol. IV, p. 874. 
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Accordingly, Haynes' statements that the evidence was primarily documentary is 
inaccurate. Further, Haynes argument that documentary evidence cannot constitute clear 
and convincing evidence that a road has been dedicated to the public is incorrect. In fact, 
clear and convincing evidence may be premised on historical documents, particularly 
where such documents are more reliable evidence than decades-old witness recollections. 
See Heber City Corp. v. Simpson, 942 P.2d 307, 309, 313 (Utah 1997) (relying on witness 
testimony and evidence that disputed road was designated as a public road on county maps 
in holding that road had been dedicated to public); Bonner v. Sudbury, 417 P.2d 646, 647-
49 (Utah 1966) (relying on official records of the city and witness testimony in affirming 
that disputed road had been dedicated to public use); Renfro v. McCowan, Case No. 2:05-
CV-00498, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 84493, *12, 17 (D. Utah, Nov. 9, 2006) (holding aerial 
photographs and testimony established by clear and convincing evidence that disputed 
road was dedicated to public); see also, Wicker v. Harvey, 937 So. 2d 983, 990 (Miss. Ct. 
App. 2006) ("ancient documents of record were more reliable evidence of what actually 
existed" in 1943 at the time property was conveyed than the recollections of witnesses). 
The trial court's determinations and well considered recitation of the 
overwhelming factual record supporting its findings are well established in the 
Memorandum Decision and are ample on their own to overcome Haynes' arguments 
regarding the sufficiency of the evidence. [See generally, H.R. 001393-1477.] Haynes5 
efforts to belittle the factual record before the trial court are further refuted by the 
Statement of Facts above showing the historical, unencumbered, long standing, 
continuous use of the Road for a period of at least 65 years by the public for uses such as 
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hunting, recreating, grazing, timbering, and farming. [Statement of Facts, supra.] Given 
this overwhelming evidence and careful consideration by the trial court of historical 
records, live witnesses, deposition testimony, and first hand viewing of the disputed Road, 
Haynes' arguments fail and the trial court's determination regarding the dedication of 
portions of the Road to the public should be affirmed. 
D. THE ROAD WAS USED BY THE PUBLIC, WAS NOT PERMISSIVE, AND 
WAS FOR A PERIOD OF OVER SIXTY-FIVE YEARS. 
Rather than fulfill its obligations to marshal the evidence to accurately portray the 
use of the Road, Haynes half-heartedly asserts that the use was only sporadic, that the use 
by homesteaders is not considered use by the public, and that the use was permissive. 
None of these arguments has merit. 
1. Homesteaders are not Adjacent Landowners. 
Haynes asserts that though homesteaders are not owners of the land, they 
nonetheless have some amorphous right to the land such that they are effectively adjacent 
land owners. [Haynes' Brief, pp. 39-40.] This is not supported by any law. 
The Utah Supreme Court has noted that there are only two classes of people that 
are not members of the public for the purposes of the Dedication Statute: "[individuals 
with a private right to use a road, such as adjoining property owners who 'may have 
documentary or prescriptive rights to use the road,' are not members of the public, nor 
are those who have been given permission to use a road [from the land owner.]" Utah 
County v. Butler, 2008 UT 12,1f 19, 179 P.3d 775 (Utah 2008). The homesteaders that 
used the land at issue here do not fit either category. 
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Federally owned land is public until such time as the homesteader is entitled to file 
for a patent, but not before. Cassity v. 11 Castagno, 347 P.2d 834, 835, 10 Utah 2d 16 
(Utah 1959). In other words, a homesteader does not have title or possessory interest to 
the subject property until "the homestead entry is properly filed with the appropriate 
government office." Lee v. Masner, 45 P.3d 794, 796 (Colo. Ct. App. 2001). This is 
consistent with U.S. Supreme Court holdings. For example in Wither spoon v. Duncan, 
71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 210, 210, 18 L. Ed. 339, 342 (1866), the Court held that "[i]n no just 
sense can land be said to be public lands after they have been entered at the land office 
and a certificate of entry obtained. If public lands before the entry, after it they are 
private property...." Id. at 210 (emphasis added). Accordingly, the property being 
homesteaded does not become private until the application of the homesteader is filed 
and recognized by the government authority. At all times prior, the land is public and 
inhabited and traveled upon by members of the public. 
In this case, the 1894 survey map for Township 2 North, Range 8 East shows that 
every point of interest named on the map was in an even-numbered section of land, 
except for the sawmill in Section 7. [Trial Ex. 112.] As a result, when the individuals 
accessed the sawmill in Section 20, they accessed public land. When sheep owners 
trailed in 100,000 sheep to the dipping corrals in Section 20, they accessed public land. 
Moreover, when L.W. Randall, William Staley, and their respective families built cabins, 
fences, and corrals, and established an irrigated field in Section 18 for more than ten 
years before filing an entry of homestead, they did so on public land. Lee v. Masner, 45 
P.3d 794, 795-96 (Colo. Ct. App. 2001). Because these activities were on public land, 
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the trial court correctly found that "ANYONE who used those sections, for any purpose, 
appears to the court to be a member of the public."16 [H.R. 001454, ^ 33.] Haynes5 
arguments accordingly fail. 
2. Use of the Road by the Public was Not Permissive. 
There is absolutely no evidence that the use of the Road was permissive. First, the 
vast majority of the land at issue was not in the hands of private owners, but was public 
and each and every person that used the road was, by necessity, a member of the public, 
as stated above. [H.R. 001454,1J33.] Use of the Road over odd-sections of land also 
constituted use by members of the public. When the Railroad filed its map of definite 
location in 1869, it legally became the landowner of every odd section in the East Fork 
area. 12 Stat. 489, § 3; H.R. Exec. Doc, Report of the Commissioner of Railroads, 
Appendix 1, at 516 (1st Sess. 1883-84). Between 1869 and 1902 when the Railroad 
owned the land, there is no evidence that the Railroad had involvement with the relevant 
land. [See Trial Ex. 127.] Indeed, as the trial court noted, 
there is no indication in the record that the railroad ever seriously sought to 
use this land, nor that any railroad ever attempted to interfere with its use 
by the public on these odd numbered sections. Thus, while technically 
perhaps private land as belonging to the railroad, the odd numbered 
sections were really public as well. It is certainly clear from the record 
before the court that there is no evidence the railroad ever sought to 
exercise its rights as a landowner, during the tenure of ownership, 
concerning the odd numbered sections at issue in this case. 
Further, the trial court also noted that "the court is not basing its conclusion solely on 
these homesteaders. They are merely some members of the public who used these 
portions of the roads as indicated." [H.R. 001457,t37]. 
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[H.R. 001455, f^ 34.] Haynes does not mention this finding by the trial court or provide 
any evidence to the contrary. Accordingly, the public was free to traverse the Road 
across the railroad land as often as it found it convenient or necessary and they did so 
without permission from anyone or anything. 
Haynes also vaguely argues that the land was "wild, uncultivated, and unenclosed" 
and therefore the use is deemed permissive. This argument is not persuasive. Indeed, 
the factual premise Haynes asserts (that the land is akin to an open prairie without 
obstacle which could be freely traversed in any direction) is not supported by the record. 
The trial court, through its own observations, stated as much: 
[N]ow having viewed the area, the court finds and concludes that persons 
traveling to the blue Lake [sic] would certainly, at least by very strong 
inference, use a road rather than cut through heavy timber, up and over 
cliffs and other steep terrain. Persons obtaining timber, for example, 
whether from a mill or on their own from the woods somewhere, would use 
a wagon to haul the timber and that wagon would go on this road, rather 
than through the wild and over steep terrain or over fallen timber. While 
hunters may have strayed off the beaten path to find game, they sensibly 
would travel Ihe road to get to an area to hunt rather than take off 
immediately through the wild terrain, even if on horseback. That at least is 
the reasonable inference the court draws from viewing this area and 
considering the normal and reasonable human conduct. 
[H.R. 001453, p. 62, 30.] Accordingly, Haynes' claims that use of the Road was 
permissive fail. 
3. Use of the Road by the Public was Substantial and Continuous for 
Over 65 Years. 
Last, Haynes attempts to fight the sufficiency of evidence by picking out a few 
select bits of evidence from the time period of 1880-1896 and makes the conclusory 
argument that the evidence is not sufficient. [Haynes' Brief, pp. 47-48.] Haynes fails, 
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again, to acknowledge that the trial court did not limit its findings to that time period, 
rather, the trial court stated that from at least that time, the road had become dedicated to 
the public. [H.R.001448, ^ 22.] Haynes' attempts to belittle the "overwhelming" 
evidence are unavailing and the trial court's findings should be affirmed. 
CROSS APPEAL 
It is the position of Jacob Christensen that the trial court erred in not finding that 
the Road was dedicated to the public from at least point K on Trial Exhibit 117 to the 
Blue Lakes. As a result of the trial court's failure to find this portion of the Road public, 
Jacob Christensen is unable to access the Blue Lakes as well as certain portions of its 
property. 
As just noted above, when the trial court visited the property and traveled the 
Road, it found and concluded "that persons traveling to the blue Lake [sic] would 
certainly, at least by very strong inference, use the road...." This conclusion is consistent 
with the clear and convincing testimony and historical documents demonstrating that the 
public, including families and scout troops, continuously used the Road to get to the Blue 
Lakes. [Trial Ex. 139, pp 10-11; Trial Tr. Vol. II, p. 428:10-22; G. Blonquist Depo., pp. 
10:24-11:8, admitted at Trial Tr. Vol. II, pp. 425:23-426:8; Trial Ex. 262; Trial Tr. Vol. 
Ill, pp. 502:5-504:18 (Crittenden testimony); Trial Tr. Vol. II, pp. 422:17-424:18, 
433:14-435:9 (Fern Boyer testimony); Trial Ex. 261; Trial Tr. Vol. Ill, pp. 485:22-486:20 
(Robert Powell testimony); Deposition of Lamont Staley, p. 17:12-21, admitted at Trial 
Tr. Vol. Ill, p. 554; Trial Ex. 160, p.6.] 
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The only evidence to the contrary which can be marshaled to support the trial 
court's decision not to extend the Road to the Blue Lakes is that the Road did not 
continue all the way to the Blue Lakes on an early map. This, however, is insufficient to 
overcome the overwhelming evidence of decades of public use of the Road to get to the 
Blue Lakes and the Court's own observation that the Road would need to be used to get 
to the Blue Lakes due to the local topography. 
Accordingly, Jacob Christensen hereby joins in the arguments of Boyer supporting 
such finding of public dedication. 
CONCLUSION 
Because none of the arguments advanced by the Haynes is sufficient to show that 
any error occurred, much less an error than in any way affected the outcome of the case, 
the trial court should be affirmed with respect to the judgment rendered in favor of Jacob 
Christensen. However, because the trial court erred in not extending the public Road to 
its logical - as well as legally and factually supported conclusion - the trial court's 
determination that the public portions of the Road do not extend through the Boyer 
property should be reversed. 
DATED this 6th day of August, 2009. 
PARR BROWN GEE & LOVELESS 
B y : C ^ 
Jonathan O. Hafen ' 
Bryan S. Johansen 
Attorneys for Jacob Christensen 
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Memorandum Decision, March 21,2008, H.R. 001393-001477 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR SUMMIT COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 




JACOB FAMILY CHALK CREEK, 
LIMITED, et.al. 
Defendant, 




HAYNES LAND & LIVESTOCK 
COMPANY, 
Counterclaim Defendants 
TRIPLE H RANCH LC, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
FERN BOYER, et.al. 
Defendants and Third Party 
Plaintiffs 
vs. 
HAYNES LAND & LIVESTOCK 
COMPANY, 
Third Party Defendants. 
MEMORANDUM DECISION 
Case No. 980600244 
Judge BRUCE C. LUBECK 
DATE: March 21, 2008 
The above matter came before the court for a bench trial on 
March 4, 5, 6, 7, and 11, 2008. 
Haynes, Triple H, and Chalk Creek-Hoytsville Water Users 
were present with and through Ray G. Martineau and Leslie Slaugh; 
Jacob-Christensen and Garff (Jacob) were present through Clark 
Waddoups, Tobi D. Potestio and Jonathan 0. Hafen; the Boyer 
parties (Fern Boyer, Gerald Boyer, Gregory Boyer and Alfred 
Blonquist, Trustee) were present with and through Brent Bohman; 
Summit County was present through Jami R. Brackin; and the State 
of Utah was present through Steven G. Schwendiman. Paul R. 
Poulsen for David B. Williams gave notice on March 3, 2008, that 
Williams would not appear at or participate in the trial. 
Timothy W. Blackburn for Bingham and Sons also filed a notice of 
non-appearance on March 4, 2008. 
A default certificate was entered April 18, 2006, against 
Stillman, the Halls, Helen Blonquist and Karel Snyder, who had 
written she has no property in Utah. 
BACKGROUND 
Haynes filed a complaint September 8, 1998. It sought 
declaratory judgment quieting title in plaintiff to property and 
sought an adjudication of the rights and duties between Haynes 
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and Jacob. The original complaint originally named as defendants 
Catherine Christensen, LLC and Brian Garff and Summit County. It 
also sought to enjoin defendants from interfering with 
plaintiff's property rights. 
In briefest summary, it alleged Haynes and Jacob owned 
adjoining properties in an area of Summit County known as Chalk 
Creek, Jacob's property being west and south of plaintiff's 
property. Historically there has been a limited right of way 
across plaintiff's land to Jacob's land solely for agricultural 
and livestock purposes. In May 1984 the parties entered an 
agreement which resolved the nature of Jacob's rights concerning 
the easement and plaintiff's right to cross Jacob's property to 
maintain an irrigation ditch to convey water from Jacob's 
property to Haynes' property. As to Garff, Haynes asserted Garff 
had no right to passage over the Haynes property to reach a cabin 
or other improvements, nor did Jacob, as such passage was beyond 
the quit claim deed and agreement of 1984. As to Summit County, 
plaintiff asserts the county improperly designated a private 
roadway on Haynes' property as a public road. 
Plaintiff seeks a declaration that Haynes owns its property, 
has an easement over Jacob's property to service the irrigation 
ditch, that the roadway across Haynes' property is not public and 
is solely for agricultural purposes and uses by Jacob, and the 
court should enjoin Summit County from issuing building permits 
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pending the outcome of the case. 
On September 28, 1998, Summit County was dismissed by 
Haynes. 
For reasons not shown by the file no action was taken until 
service of process much later and Jacob filed an answer and 
counterclaim on May 15, 2003. It denied the essential 
allegations and alleges Garff owns a cabin on the Jacob property 
and Garff and Jacob have the right to use a road crossing the 
Haynes property. The road crosses Haynes property from SR 133, 
the Chalk Creek Road, and extends southward to Jacob's property 
and has been designated since 1978 as a Class D County road. It 
is the only feasible means of access to the Jacob property and 
has been in use since at least the mid- to late 1800s. 
Jacob first seeks a declaration that the road is a Class D 
County Road and is a public road and Haynes may not deny or 
restrict Jacob's use. Jacob also seeks a declaration that the 
road has been in existence since the 1800s, is commonly known as 
an RS 2477 road, in reference to an 1866 federal statute, 
repealed in 1976. The road was part of the public domain and the 
right of use may not be extinguished without proper state 
procedures for abandonment of a public road. 
Jacob secondly seeks the alternate declaration the road is a 
public right of way. 
Third, Jacob seeks a declaration of easement by necessity. 
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Jacob alleges that before 1938, the Haynes and Jacob properties 
were owned jointly by the Wright Brothers, and that Jacob bought 
the property in 1938 and an easement was not expressly reserved 
to cross Haynes property. There is therefore an implied grant of 
easement by necessity for access to the Jacob property. 
Fourth, Jacob seeks a declaration that an easement was 
granted. This was granted February 3, 1939, and recorded, and it 
is subject to reasonable expansion when livestock grazing is not 
frequent and Jacob is entitled to enjoy the land for grazing, 
hunting, camping, and recreation, including construction of 
cabins to facilitate recreational use. 
Fifth Jacob alternatively seeks a declaration of 
prescriptive easement, that Jacob uses the road to access its 
property, that has occurred for more than 20 years, the use has 
been open and visible and without permission of Haynes. 
Sixth, Jacob alleges trespass, that Haynes has threatened to 
restrict Jacob's use and has locked gates. In 1997 Garff 
obtained a building permit to build a cabin on the Jacob 
property. Haynes then sought to restrict further approvals. 
Damages have followed because of plaintiff's conduct. 
Seventh, Jacob alleges the complaint of plaintiff is in bad 
faith. 
On June 4, 2003, Haynes replied to the counterclaim. 
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On August 27, 2003, Haynes moved to consolidate docket 
number 000600299 into this case. That case was entitled Triple H 
Ranch LC v Fern J. Boyer, Gerald G. Boyer, Gregory J. Boyer, 
Karel J. Snyder, H.S. Hansen, Helen Blonquist, Alfred C. 
Blonquist, Barbara Hall and Kevin Hall, defendants and third 
party plaintiffs vs. Haynes Land & Livestock, Lydia 0. Stillman 
dba Stillman Seven, Jacob Family Chalk Creek, Limited, Catherine 
B. Christensen, LLC, B.A. Bingham & Sons LLC, Chalk Creek 
Hoytsville Water Users Corp, Summit County, and State of Utah 
Department of Fire, Forestry and State Lands, third party 
defendants. The court issued a ruling and order September 23, 
2003, consolidating the cases as the motion was unopposed. The 
court asked that an order be prepared but it was not provided 
until April 11, 2005, when it was signed by the court. Based on 
stipulation in June 2005 a scheduling order was entered. 
That complaint, now consolidated into this case, alleges 
Triple H has an undivided 11/36 interest in property between the 
Haynes and Jacob properties, Fern Boyer has 3/40, Gerald Boyer 
3/40, Gregory Boyer 1/10, Karel Snyder 1/36, J.S. Hansen 1/6, 
Helen Blonquist has a claimed interest in the property, Helen 
Blonquist as trustee has a 1/6 interest, Alfred Blonquist has an 
undivided 1/12 interest, and defendants Barbara and Kevin Hall 
may claim an interest in property in this Chalk Creek area in the 
west half of the Northeast quarter and the northeast quarter of 
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the Northwest quarter of Section 34 Township 2 North Range 8 
East, SL Base and Meridian, with exceptions. The complaint was 
under Title 78 Chapter 39 and seeks partition by sale for the 
common benefit of all parties who own that property. It further 
alleges the property involved consists of 5 non-contiguous 
parcels, no party has any easements, partition without sale is 
impossible, and plaintiff asks for a decree determining the 
respective rights of the parties to the property, that it be sold 
subject to exceptions, and that the proceeds be applied to costs 
and attorney fees and then distributed according to the interests 
of the parties in the property. 
An amended answer and counterclaim was filed in July 2005 
pursuant to stipulation. The amended answer and counterclaim 
adds as another counterclaim the named defendants in what was 
formerly docket no. 000600299. It contains the same basic causes 
of action but alleges against all defendants and seeks 
declaratory judgment (1) against all counterclaim defendants that 
the road is a public road from the 1800s and Class D county road 
since 1978 (2) that the road is an RS 2477 road as against all 
counterclaim defendants, (3) that Jacob has a prescriptive 
easement against all defendants except Summit County for purposes 
of, among other things, livestock grazing, hunting, fishing, 
camping, snowmobiling, picnicking, recreational enjoyment, and 
the construction and use of cabins, (4) that Jacob has an 
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easement by necessity against Haynes and the State because when 
the property was sold by Wright in about 1938 Jacob was given no 
express easement and Jacob has no other access and Jacob is 
landlocked without the easement. A conservation easement was 
granted to the State in 1999 on part of Haynes property and that 
easement was taken by the State subject to Jacob's right to use 
the road, (5) as against Haynes and the State that Jacob has been 
granted an express but restricted easement in 1939 to use the 
road for moving livestock and related equipment and the express 
easement is subject to reasonable expansion to accommodate 
reasonable use and enjoyment of the benefitted land as noted in 
the third cause of action above, and (6) trespass as against 
Haynes in that Jacob owns an interest in the land and Haynes is 
threatening and attempting to block access and is thus 
trespassing and Jacob and Garff have been damaged in an amount to 
be proven, and (7) Haynes is acting in bad faith by bringing its 
complaint and Jacob has had to defend against a frivolous suit. 
On August 1, 2005, Bingham, one of the consolidated third 
party defendants filed an answer. 
On August 4, 2005, Summit County filed an answer to the 
counterclaim. 
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Williams filed an answer August 15, 2005, as well as a cross 
claim. Jacob answered November 9, 2005. 
The State filed an answer August 30, 2005, and Chalk Creek-
Hoytsville Water Users filed an answer on September 15, 2005. 
Other defendants filed various answers, some indicating no 
interest in the lawsuit. Hall filed a disclaimer April 6, 2006. 
Jacob filed a motion for partial summary judgment on 
September 8, 2006, as the next pleading. The court heard 
arguments on that matter on March 19, 2007, after extensions were 
granted for delayed briefing, and issued a Ruling and Order 
denying the motion on the public road issue on March 29, 2007. 
Since that time various discovery disputes have arisen and 
this trial date was scheduled. 
On October 3, 2007, the undersigned judge and court staff 
accompanied counsel and various others on a day-long journey to 
the property at issue, crossing the Haynes and Jacob properties 
while counsel and others pointed out various sites. That "field 
trip" was not on the record though the court's clerk was present 
and made some minutes which are part of the file. The court, for 
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its own information and memory, took some photographs which it 
retains as an aid to recollection of the area. Those are not part 
of the record though numerous photographs taken by the parties 
were introduced and received at trial. 
On January 15, 2008, the parties stipulated that the trial 
would proceed on the issues dealing with the parties' rights to 
use of the roadways, and to defer trial of any other issues 
dealing with partition of the Boyer property until after this 
trial. 
On January 25, 2008, the court signed an order based on 
stipulation of the parties that Jacob Family Chalk Creek LLC be 
substituted as defendant, counterclaim plaintiff, and third party 
defendant in place of the previously named limited partnership. 
The court on January 30, 2008, denied the request of Haynes 
and the State to postpone the trial awaiting Utah Supreme Court 
rulings. In fact the Utah Supreme Court issued the anticipated 
rulings dealing with public roads on February 12, 2008. 
The court heard evidence, received exhibits, heard argument 
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of counsel, received pre-trial briefs, visited the site, received 
post-trial briefs, and is fully advised. The court took the 
matter under advisement. 
It does not appear as if the facts are in great dispute, but 
the legal consequences of those facts is where this dispute is 
centered. 
The court finds as follows: 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
1. The nature of the parties appears, without serious 
dispute, to be as follows. 
2. Plaintiffs are Haynes Land and Livestock, Triple H Ranch 
LC, and Chalk Creek-Hoytsville Water Users. Haynes is a general 
partnership and owns property in Summit County. All property at 
issue is located in TIN R8E, T2N R8E, T2N R7E and T3N R7E, as 
described in Exhibit AA attached to Haynes Trial Brief. The 
Haynes property comprises just under 10,000 acres. 
Triple H is a limited liability company and it owns an 
undivided one third interest in the Boyer-Triple H property 
(Boyer property)in T2 R8 Section 34. Water Users is a 
corporation and it owns property also in Section 34. 
Jacob Family Chalk Creek LLC is a limited liability company 
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and Catherine B. Christensen LLC is as well, and each owns an 
undivided one half interest in the approximately 10,000 acres as 
fully described in Exhibit DD to plaintiffs' trial brief, land 
mostly to the west and south of the Haynes property. Throughout 
this decision the court will normally call the Jacot-Christensen 
entities "Jacob." That is not done to imply Jacob is more 
important than Christensen, but is simply shorter than writing 
Jacob-Christensen so frequently. On occasion, such as describing 
cabins, the court will use the Jacob cabin, or the Christensen 
cabin and so forth. Whenever "Jacob" is used, unless the context 
shows otherwise, the court is referring to the Jacob-Christensen 
entities and families. 
Garff is a family member of the Jacob entities who has 
attempted to build a cabin on the Jacob property. 
Bingham & Sons owns property between SR 133 and the Haynes 
property. Stillman owns property nearby. Fern Boyer, Gerald 
Boyer, Gregory Boyer, J.S. Hansen, and Alfred Blonquist own an 
undivided 2/3 interest in combination with Triple H of what is 
called the Boyer property in Section 34 T2 R8. 
Summit Count claims an interest in the Class D road and the 
State of Utah claims a grantee's right in the conservation 
easements involved or to be involved. 
3. This dispute concerns historic routes to travel across 
property owned by Haynes and whether that travel is over a public 
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road, whether that travel is permissible and governed by some 
form of easement, or whether access across Haynes' property is 
more limited. Other subsidiary issues abound concerning use by 
others as well. 
4. All references are to the Salt Lake Base and Meridian, 
and this land involves three townships, TIN, T2N or T3N, and 
Ranges 7E or 8E. Throughout, these will be short handed to Tl, 
T2, or T3, R7 or R8 together with the appropriate section number. 
From Coalville, Utah, the county seat of Summit County, 
heading basically eastward is SR 133, commonly called the Chalk 
Creek Road. That road travels easterly and eventually leads, over 
unimproved roads east of the area of concern in this case, to 
Wyoming and other areas of Utah. Leaving SR 133 approximately 18 
miles east of Coalville in a south easterly direction, Haynes and 
Jacob each own substantial property (approximately 10,000 acres 
each). The chain of titles will be discussed but in essence 
Haynes bought property closest to SR 133 in the 1930s and 1940s. 
Further removed from SR 133 Jacob also owns substantial property, 
and the Boyer parties own property consisting of substantially 
smaller acreage in a Section bounded by the Haynes property and 
the Jacob property. To get to their property Jacob has to cross 
the Haynes property, as do the Boyers to get to their property. 
Now disputes have arisen about the nature of that use and whether 
the routes traveled to gain access is a public road or whether 
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Haynes ownership of the property is subject to certain types of 
easements in favor of Jacob or Boyer. Up to the day of trial 
there evidently was an issue as to whether any access was allowed 
by Boyer and it is Haynes position still at trial Boyer has no 
easement to gain access to the Boyer property. 
5. From SR 133 a road crosses property owned by Bingham. 
That road goes for approximately one quarter mile and then leads 
onto the Haynes property as shown on X117 on T3 R7 Sec. 35. 
Interestingly, alL involved including Haynes have used this road 
and Bingham, the owner, evidently has never attempted to stop 
such use from SR L33 and Bingham did not participate in this 
trial. All involved have evidently treated this first quarter 
mile or so as always being open to the public. The road shown on 
that map X117 shows where the current course of that road in 
orange. The road at that point is commonly called the Bench Road 
or historically Sage Brush Flats, and it travels onto Haynes 
property in T3 R7 Section 35. There is now a locked gate and 
fence with severaL signs basically stating No Trespassing or 
Private Property. That gate is in Section 35 as above. The 
particulars of the beginnings of those signs and gate are in some 
dispute. The road at issue then travels further onto and through 
Haynes property easterly onto T3 R7 Section 36, then turns 
southerly onto T2 R8 Section 1. It splits in T2 R8 Section 7, 
and the "main" or Bench Road at issue goes southerly still across 
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Haynes property through T2 R8 Sections 7 and 18 until the Jacob 
property begins at T2 R8 Section 19 immediately south of Section 
18. At that point the road has commonly (and will be herein) 
called the Middle Fork Road. The land becomes more mountainous 
and less level. Thus, at T2 R8 the property line between Haynes 
and Jacob is the section line between Sections 18 and 19. The 
Middle Fork Road continues south easterly on Jacob's property 
through T2 R8 Sections 19, 20, 29, 32, 33 and into Tl R8 Section 
4, which is toward the south end of the Jacob property. At 
approximately that area Jacob and Christensen have built some 
cabins to be discussed below. The road then travels north 
easterly back through T2 R8 Section 33 and onto T2 R8 Section 34 
where lakes are located as discussed in the next paragraph. The 
Boyer property at issues is all within T2 R8 Section 34, bounded 
on the north, south and west by Jacob property and on the north 
and east by the Haynes property. 
6. At the split in T2 R8 Section 7 back to the north what is 
called the East Fork Road (or East Fork Loop) travels easterly 
and somewhat southerly, across T2 R8 Sections 8, 9, and 15 and 
then turns south and crosses T2 R8 Sections 22, 23, 26 and 27, 
all still on Haynes property, where it veers a bit west onto the 
Jacob property at T2 R8 Section 27, just north of and near what 
are called Joyce Lake and Boyer Lake or Boyer Reservoir located 
within T2 R8 Section 34. The road from the East Fork then 
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continues southerly across the Boyer property in T2 R8 Section 
34, crosses the reservoir and travels south westerly onto the 
Jacob property. Thus, considering the Middle Fork Road until it 
reaches the Boyer property, and the East Fork Road until it 
reaches the Boyer property, the named aspects of this road "meet" 
and a loop is formed. The entire road has in the past been 
called the East Fork of Chalk Creek, as it is in the East Fork 
Chalk Creek drainage, but the terminology used in this paragraph 
will be used throughout this Memorandum Decision to mean the 
Bench Road on the Haynes property from the northern beginning 
point in T3 R7 Section 35 until the property line between Haynes 
and Jacob at T2 R3 Sections 18 and 19. Thereafter the road will 
be called the Middle Fork from T2 R8 Section 19 all through the 
Jacob property until it reaches the Boyer property on T2 R8 
Section 34. On the Boyer property the road will be called the 
Boyer road. Continuing from there at the north end of the Boyer 
property in Section 34 T2 R8 on the Haynes property the road will 
be called the East Fork Road until it "rejoins" the Bench Road in 
T2 R8 Section 7. 
7. There is another road, which the court will call the West 
Fork Road, about which there seems little dispute. It leaves the 
Bench Road on Haynes property in T2 R8 Section 18 and branches 
off to the west and mostly south, onto Jacob property at T2 R8 
Section 19 and then remains on the Jacob property to the southern 
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border of Jacob's property at Tl R7 Section 12. 
8. The issues in this case concern the entire loop. Jacob 
and Boyers and Summit County contend the entire loop is a public 
road, including the Bench Road, Middle Fork Road, Boyer Road, and 
East Fork Road. Haynes and the State of Utah assert none of it 
is a public road but there is a prescriptive easement in favor of 
Jacob but none in favor of Boyer. 
9. At the beginning of trial plaintiffs conceded for the 
first time in an oral stipulation that Jacob could have an 
agricultural and recreational easement over Haynes' property 
along the Bench Road and East Fork Road consistent with the 
historical use including oil and gas exploration but that use 
does not include use for the fourth, or Garff, cabin erected on 
the Jacob property, to be discussed below. Jacob accepted the 
stipulation but of course urged it does not go far enough and 
Jacob has additional rights of use and Jacob claims the entire 
road is public. 
10. Most of this land was once owned by the Wright Brothers 
who conveyed various portions at various times to both Haynes and 
the predecessors of Jacob. In the mid 1930s various parcels were 
conveyed as shown on X300. The portions conveyed to Wasatch 
Livestock later basically became the Jacob property. 
11. In 1932 Haynes, through Howard Hayes Sr, acquired the 
northern half of Section 36, T3 R7, as well as T2 R8 Sections 9, 
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15, 22, 23, 26, 35 as well as the eastern half of Section 27, 
some of Section 34 except the Boyer property, and the eastern 
half of Section 3 Tl R8. Thus, Haynes bought in 1932 what is the 
northern portion of its current property, approximately 6200 
acres more or less. Thus, the Bench Road crossed Haynes property 
only on Section 36 of T3 R7. The remainder of the Bench Road, 
Section 35 of T3 R7, T2 R7 Section 1, T2 R8 Sections 7 and 18, 
went across land owned by others, not Haynes, until Haynes bought 
those portions, along with the southern half of Section 8 T2 R8 
in about 1941. Specifically, as shown on X204, Haynes bought the 
south half of Section 36 T3 R7 and T2 R7 Section 1 in 1940 and 
Sections 7, 17, and 18 and most of Section 8 T2 R8 in 1941. 
12. Triple H and the Boyers own undivided interests in 
Section 34 T2 R8. The land surrounds the Boyer Reservoir in 
Section 34 T2 R8. X116 shows the non-contiguous nature of the 
Boyer property within Section 34 T2 R8. The property basically 
surrounds the Boyer Reservoir owned and operated by the Chalk 
Creek-Hoytsville Water Users. The Boyers owned the land on which 
the Boyer Reservoir sits in Section 34 T2 R8, and it was formerly 
the Boyer Lake, one of three lakes comprising the Blue Lakes. 
The Boyers in 1903 filed a notice of appropriation for storage of 
water in a reservoir. The Boyer family received patent in 1914 to 
the Boyer property at issue and conveyed some of it to the Chalk 
Creek Reservoir Company for purposes of the reservoir. That 
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entity conveyed approximately 83 acres to the Chalk Creek-
Hoytsville Water Users. A right of way was acquired in 1934 from 
the Wright Brothers. X6. After conveying the reservoir land to 
what is now known as the Chalk Creek-Hoytsville Water Users, 
Boyers retained the land around the Boyer Reservoir as shown on 
X116. Triple H was formed in 2000 to purchase some of that land 
and now owns an approximate 1/3 undivided interest in what is 
called herein the Boyer property in Section 34. 
13. Haynes thus owns the land over which the Bench Road and 
the East Fork Road travel, and Haynes claims there are only three 
exceptions to Haynes record title: (1) the stipulated 
prescriptive easement in favor of Jaoob, (2) the easement created 
by the deeds, X6-X9, for limited livestock usage, and (3) an 
easement for the Chalk Creek-Hoytsville Water Users (Water Users) 
to construct and maintain the reservoir, Boyer Reservoir. 
14. Jacob bought its property, which again is to the south 
and west of Haynes property, from Wasatch Livestock, which was 
run by Irv Jacob. The Jacob property is again owned by the LLC 
and the Christensen LLC as equal undivided interest owners. It 
was purchased in the name of Jacob and Christensen in October 
1938. 
15. Once acquired the properties were basically run and 
managed by the parents of the current disputants. Howard Haynes 
Sr ran the Haynes property and his son and sibling Shirley 
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MacFarlane now basically operate the Haynes Land and Livestock 
LLC. Joe Jacob, the son of Irv Jacob, basically ran and operated, 
along with his siblings, the Jacob property during the time 
Howard Haynes, Sr, operated the Haynes property. Howard Haynes 
Sr. died in 1979. The testimony did not show when Joe Jacob 
died. The issues have arisen, as is always the case, in more 
recent times now that the "original" owners are not involved. 
16. For the basically 40 years Haynes Sr operated the ranch 
sheep and cattle grazed the area, some belonging to Haynes, some 
under lease, and various wildlife operations were allowed to use 
the property under contract as well. Beginning in about 1978 
Haynes allowed his property to be used as what was called a 
Posted Hunting Units. Various "outfitters" or companies would 
lease the land and charge customers to buy permits to hunt for a 
fee. Those people who hunted under the PHU, which later became 
Cooperative Wildlife Management Units, or CWMUs, were allowed on 
the property since 1978 until the present, on the Haynes 
property, to hunt deer, elk and other wildlife. Those lessees 
guarded the gates and checked during hunting season (basically 
August through October), as best they could, to determine that 
those on the Haynes land had permits. Some people, those who drew 
public permits, were guided. During that time frame perhaps 100 
people a year counting guests used the property of Haynes. There 
were permits for on average 40-50 animals per year, and two could 
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go in the hunting party and others could stay in the campgrounds. 
They could bring RVs, ATVs, tents, campers, horses, and so forth. 
Most of the property is not fences though some is. Haynes has 
several "cross fences'" on its property and some gates protected 
by "cattle guards." There is a fence between some of the Haynes 
and Jacob property at Sections 18-19 as discussed herein. 
17. Jacob has also leased its lands, or portions thereof, 
for various others to run sheep and other livestock, as well as 
their own sheep and livestock in the past. Jacob has built 
cabins on their property as well. These uses will be discussed 
further below. 
18. The court intends to find facts chronologically to 
explain its conclusions. To begin much before this litigation 
before statehood in 1896 all of these lands belonged to the 
United States and were part of the public domain. The "land use 
policy" of the United States was that the lands could be used by 
about anyone for about any purposes without permits, permission, 
or concern for the finite nature of resources. People could 
timber and hunt and graze livestock without regard to about 
anything. The even numbered sections were public land and the 
odd sections were public land until 1869 when they were acquired 
by the railroads. According to the title examination, X35, title 
to almost all of these relevant sections in this area vested in 
the State of Utah upon achieving statehood in 1896, and various 
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patents were granted to railroads as well and some lots were 
selected by Utah for various purposes such as a reform school, a 
permanent reservoir, and other purposes. There was no evidence 
that the railroad ever did anything with any of the sections 
involved in this area and the ownership of the railroads ceased 
just after 1900. 
19. Jacob claims the historical evidence shows the entire 
road, the entire loop involved is a public road under law and 
Haynes asserts it is not. Many historical documents, all hearsay 
but admissible under varying exceptions, were received and have 
been reviewed. 
20. Many historical documents were received, plaintiffs 
having stipulated they were admissible as far as being authentic 
and being exceptions to the hearsay rule. Plaintiffs objected as 
they were not relevant given that they could not produce 
sufficient proof by the necessary quantum of proof that this road 
was a public road. The court allowed admission of the documents 
and will briefly summarize as part of its findings those most 
heavily relied on by Jacob. 
21. A probate court entry from March of 1862 shows someone 
requested permission to take timber out of "East Kanyon" and to 
make a road. The court finds this is not convincing that this 
was in the drainage area of the East Fork of Chalk Creek but it 
does show that the public was, at that time, enabled to obtain 
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timber at will from the public lands. 
22. In 1865 a probate court docket minute entry shows 
approval was given for persons to take timber from Chalk Creek 
and have a saw mill. Again that does not demonstrate to this 
court by clear and convincing evidence this road at issue was 
involved as Chalk Creek could be any of the many miles now called 
Chalk Creek. It again shows some evidence, however, that the 
public was using the public lands. That court entry showed L.L. 
Randall and Jacob Huffman wanted a saw mill and those names will 
be found later herein. A 1947 historical text, X137, shows at 
page 139 that L.L. Randall had one of the first saw mills two 
miles from Pine Cliff, and that is in this area. Pine Cliff is 
along SR 133 just east and north of where this Bench Road leaves 
SR 133. Randall's homestead, discussed later, was along Bench 
Road in T2 R8 Section 18. X158 confirms Huffman operated a saw 
mill on the East Fork. 
23. Court minute entries from December 1866 and 1867 show 
two other requests in "Echo Kanyon" and Cache Cove for a "herd 
ground."' This is not convincing to the court as being in this 
immediate area though it again shows the public nature of the 
public lands and general area. 
24. Official government surveys from the time are convincing 
to the court. X109 shows quite clearly the area of T3 R7 Section 
35, where the current Bench Road leaves SR 133 going southward. 
-23-
Other maps and notes from this 1874 survey (the survey was in 
1873 and the resulting map from 1874, so those dates are largely 
interchangeable), combined with the stipulated expert report of 
Matthew Liapis, X296, show that there was a road in 1874 along 
what is now called the Bench Road and Middle Fork Road. 
25. In summary, that expert report shows Liapis attempted to 
determine if the 1873 and 1893 surveys described herein 
correspond to the current road at issue. He used the survey maps 
from 1874 and 1894. He consulted other experts, he toured the 
area and used other filed survey notes. He concluded the maps 
from the 1800s show the road then was substantially similar to 
the current Bench Road and Middle Fork Road with some fairly 
minor variations. He noted the surveyors in that time often did 
not venture into the interior of a section but only noted the 
roads along the section boundaries and basically "filled in" the 
area where the road probably went in the interior of a section. 
26. The survey notes from 1873 (the 1874 survey map) show a 
saw mill along the East Fork, T2 R8 Section 7, shown on X117 at 
Point A. 
27. A probate court minute entry of 1869 shows U.S. 
Surveyors were in Chalk Creek and the court asked a group of men 
to assist. X242. 
28. A territorial map from 1874 and 1875 shows a "saw mill" 
in this rough vicinity of these properties but it is impossible 
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to tell from that map precisely where the noted saw mill was 
located. X163, X164. 
29. In a court minute entry of 1879 L.L. Randall and others 
sought permission to divert water in Chalk Creek. X. 234. 
30. L.W. Randall applied for a homestead in 1896, indicating 
he had been living there since 1885, and he had improved the 
property and was he given a patent in 1903. X. 120. That is shown 
on Point F in X117 in Section 18 near the Bench Road. 
31 . In 1895 W.H. Staley applied for a homestead in Section 
18 T2 R8, indicating he had resided there since 1883, and he made 
improvements and irrigated and built corrals and such and he was 
given a patent in 1901.1 That is shown as being near the Bench 
Road on X117 at Point E in Section 18 T2 R8. 
32. A U.S. Survey Sectional and Mineral map of 1875 shows a 
cabin where Point K on X117 is shown, near the current Middle 
Fork Road on the southern end of the Jacob property. 
33. In 1895 George Huff applied for a homestead, indicating 
!While these accounts of this time and place fascinate most 
and may cause many to wish for those "good old days'' when a 
person could begin living in an area and create a homestead 
there obviously was a down side. A newspaper article from July 
1886 demonstrates that perhaps those days, while they had their 
glory and glamor, were not all so good. William Staley, 
according to the report, in the course of 10 days lost two sons 
and a daughter to "that dreadful disease diphtheria." The article 
states "The unfortunate family a short time ago had a new home 
burnt to the ground. Their lot seems more than human nature can 
bear." William Staley's brother, M.H. Staley a few days later 
lost two children, ages 3 and 5, to the disease. All 5 deaths 
were within the space of two weeks. 
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he had been living there since 1894, and he was granted a patent 
in 1901. X. 121. That was in Section 8 T2 R8, at Point B on X117. 
34. A court minute entry of 1894 indicated the prosecuting 
attorney should prosecute anyone who has been blocking public 
highways in any of the canyons in Summit County which have been 
used for 7 years. This does not directly relate to this area but 
again shows the public nature of the canyons to some extent. 
35. A Coalville Times newspaper article from August 1895 
indicated that about 40,000 sheep had been "dipped" and about 
100,000 were expected at Clark's corral. These numbers were to 
some extent corroborated by X401-405, which showed at Coalville 
(the county seat) the tax records for 1993 show some 200,000 
sheep were taxed as having been brought into Summit County for 
summer grazing. This is some corroboration that a large number 
of sheep were in the area but does not show the number of sheep 
specifically in Chalk Creek. Another article from the next year, 
1896, also indicated 100,000 sheep were dipped at Clark's. 
Clark's dipping corral was in T2 R8 Section 19, now on the Jacob 
property, very near the Middle Fork Road shown on X117 at J. 
Dipping of sheep occurred by having the sheep in essence "bathed" 
in a chemical, creosote, to keep the flies off them. 
36. Charles Saxton applied for a homestead in Section 8 Ts 
R8 indicating he had moved there in 1896. He was later given a 
patent. X. 122. That is in Section 8 T2 R8 south of the current 
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East Fork Road. 
38. Various news articles from the late 1890s show various 
people had killed bear in the East Fork of Chalk Creek (this 
entire area) but none show the specific use of any particular 
roads. Those articles show use by persons in the area on public 
lands but are not convincing that any particular road was used. 
39. A USGS survey map of 1903 shows the Bench Road and the 
Middle Fork Road to an area which appears to the court to be Tl 
R8 Section 4 and possibly into T2 R8 Section 33, north and west 
of the Boyer Reservoir. It also shows the East Fork Road 
terminating in the middle of Section 8 of T2 R8. The roads as 
shown on that map are reflected in X296, Attachment H. The court 
finds that map particularly compelling. 
40. In 1902 William Boyer, according to a public record 
(X123) applied to divert water from what appears to be the 
current dam at Boyer Reservoir, then called Boyer Lake, in the 
north east quarter of the north west quarter of Section 34 T2 R8, 
the site of the Boyer property and current Boyer Reservoir. 
41. In 1913 a record from the Summit County Commission shows 
that on November 5, 1913, the commission authorized the 
expenditure of county funds for improvement of the Sage Brush 
Flat road in Chalk Creek. Again, as found, Sage Brush Flats was 
the name of part of the area the court now calls Bench Road. The 
court finds this evidence refers to the Bench Road area. X244. 
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43. A Summit County map from the county surveyor in 1918, 
without a legend, seems to show a dotted line on, as best the 
court can determine, the rough area of Bench Road and the Middle 
Fork Road, again appearing to terminate at the south end of the 
Jacob property in Section 4 of Tl R8. The East Fork Road appears 
also to be depicted, again terminating in about the middle of 
Section 8 T2 R8. X. 166. 
44. In a Utah Historical Society paper written in 1983 on 
the life of Lady Homesteader Myrtle Rigby it was described how 
she settled in the Chalk Creek area and in the summers frequent 
city visitors arrived, teams and horses prepared, and everyone 
was off to Blue Lake or Bear River to fish. This is again not 
specific as to any particular route or road but it does show use 
of the public of this area on public land. X160 
45. A 1925 U.S. Forest Service map, X167, is claimed by 
Jacob to show the road. The court cannot decipher the map 
provided and cannot find the road referenced. 
46. X168, a U.S. Forest Service map of 1929 appears to show 
a trail, depicted on the legend as lower than a good or poor 
motor road and lower than a "Road Not Passable by Motor" roughly 
in the area of what appears to the court to be the Bench Road and 
the Middle Fork Road. It appears to show the entire loop, but it 
shows no lakes and does not appear to the court to be the same as 
the other maps showing the East Fork Road. A map from 1931, X169, 
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appears to show the same thing. A 1935 Forest Service map appears 
to show the same thing. X170. In 1942 a similar map shows the 
same loop road but it is on the legend as a "poor" motor vehicle 
road. X171. 
47. In a Summit County Commission meeting of September 1947 
(X 133) a Fish and Game Warden named Ira Page appeared and made a 
statement that Haynes had closed the road to Blue Lake and that 
road had been used by the public for a long time and the matter 
was referred to the County Attorney. 
48. At various times earlier various news articles and 
journal entries showed people were in this vicinity engaged in 
various activities. The court will not identify each date 
involved but in summary they showed as follows. Sheep herders 
from the hills came to dances at Upton, on SR 133 a few miles 
from the entry point to the Bench Road off SR 133, but there is 
no indication as to how those people traveled to get to Upton or 
precisely where they came from, but the court finds there is some 
inference they went on a road rather than through the deep forest 
or over cliffs or across creeks or streams. Sawmills were clearly 
present in the area in 1881. A man was lost in 1890 in the East 
Fork drainage area and a search posse was sent for him, but there 
is no indication of precisely where nor what routes were used. In 
1881 a news paper article showed a person from Upton was killed 
in a wagon accident 13 miles south east of Upton, which would be 
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in this area, after visiting a saw mill in the area. This shows 
persons from Upton visited this East Fork area. X145. 
49. Numerous people testified at trial about their comings 
and goings after these parties acquired their properties in the 
1930s and early 1940s. While the court was aware of the objection 
of Haynes the court allowed the testimony over the relevance 
objection of Haynes, indicating it would hear the evidence and 
determine if it was relevant. It was necessary for the court to 
hear the evidence as a whole before the court could determine if 
it was persuasive. The testimony was all relevant as it tended 
to prove an issue in the case, namely, who had used this road and 
under what conditions. 
50. William L. Christensen is the a grandson of A.E. 
Christensen, the grantee from Wasatch Livestock of what is now 
the Jacob property. He began going to this area and the Jacob 
property in the late 1930s as a young man, having been born in 
1932. He went with his father. After leaving the county road, 
SR 133, Chalk Creek Road, they would take a road and travel it 
until they came to the Jacob property. The court finds that was 
along the Bench Road. He saw no gates, locked or unlocked after 
leaving the highway. He did recall seeing a sawmill on the Jacob 
property about 1940. After his father died in 1945 he did not go 
to the property until the 1960s, after serving in the military 
and after being married and having children. A cabin had been 
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built by the Jacob family, as distinguished from the Christensen 
family, in about 1948 and he went regularly to use that cabin and 
enjoy the property. He began to see gates on the Haynes property 
in the 1960s. There were signs put up by Joe Jacob on the Haynes-
Jacob property line (between Sections 18-19of T2 R8) and he 
recalls them in the 1960s. He participated in the planning of 
what is called the Christensen cabin in the early 1970s and there 
were no restrictions on travel or construction equipment along 
the Bench Road or Middle Fork Road. He is familiar with Jacob 
having commissioned an oil and gas exploration and the big trucks 
that used the area and the Bench Road and Middle Fork Road for 
that purpose without difficulty. He participated in a meeting in 
1984 when Haynes, through Howard Haynes Jr., began to be upset 
about usage of the road. From that X255 was created, an 
agreement about use of the road, the so-called 1984 Agreement. 
The cabins built by Jacob and later the Christensens are located 
at approximately Point K on X117 in Section 4 Tl R8. He saw signs 
periodically in various places concerning trespassing and such 
but paid them no mind as he and his family always believed they 
had full access to the Bench Road and Middle Fork Road. On one 
occasion in the 1960s Howard Haynes Sr was stationed by the fence 
then existing off SR 133 and he allowed Christensen to pass after 
Christensen presented a note from Joe Jacob explaining who he, 
William Christensen, was. The 1960s is also the first time he 
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recalls seeing a fence between the Haynes-Jacob properties on 
sections 18-19 T2 R8. He recalls the road being narrow from the 
1930s and early 1940s, with ruts if the weather was bad, and that 
was so until perhaps the 1970s. He felt there was no limitation 
on the use of the road and that it was always a public road. At 
some point there was a gate and locks and Joe Jacob gave 
Christensen either a key or a combination to enter onto the 
Haynes property off SR 133. He assumed it was a public road until 
the 1960s when it became private. He never kept the Boyers off 
the Jacob property. 
51. William E. Christensen, son of William L. Christensen, 
testified the family wants to be free to develop the property as 
the Summit County zoning ordinances will allow, but the 
Christensens do not plan on having a big development but want to 
build other family cabins on their land. He has often hunted, 
fished, and otherwise recreated, at various times, and has taken 
many guests and others have been along, including television 
media trucks to film hunts and fishing activities on the Jacob 
property. No gates were locked before 1984. The road was often 
graded. He has had as many as 400 guests on the Jacob property 
and he nor those guests were never stopped. The Christensen 
family wants a conservation easement and full access may be more 
attractive economically if they are compensated for it. Travel 
was by the East Fork Road and Bench Road to the cabin areas. 
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52. Gary and Greg Boyer, brothers, own an interest in the 
Boyer property, and Gary Boyer has studied the road issue by 
examining historic documents for several hundreds of hours. He is 
the son of Fay and Fern Boyer. The Boyers first bought land in 
the area in 1905 and received patent in about 1913. Gary has 
been going to the area since he was a young man in the late 
1950s, and since then he has been hundreds of times. The Boyers 
usually went on the East Fork Road, and Howard Haynes Sr. had 
left a key under a rock so they could have access. There was 
another gate on the East Fork Road, just east of the split in the 
loop, on Haynes property in Section 7 T2 R8. Until the 1980s the 
main gate off SR 133 was not locked. There was a gate but it was 
open. The East Fork Road gate was first locked in the mid 1970s. 
Gary has never been turned away, and he has taken groups of 
people and none has ever been stopped from using the East Fork 
Road. Gary Boyer felt Haynes was attempting to block entry so he 
began a study of the area. He has believed the Middle Fork Road 
was always public. The Boyers would also like to build a cabin 
on their property. Many, many photographs were received, X269-
293, X307, portions of X51, and others, each consisting of 
multiple photos of various areas and portions of the road and 
signs from the early 1970s until the present. They show many of 
the beauties of the area, as well as portions of the road. As 
noted herein there are several photos from much earlier. 
-33-
53. In the late 1940s the Jacob f amily built a cabin, in the 
area in Section 4 Tl R8, near the south end of their property, 
west and south of Boyer Lake. They built a second cabin in the 
mid 1950s in the same area. Zoning ordinances then were not what 
they are now and almost no approval was needed and no inspections 
occurred by county officials. The Christensen family completed a 
much larger cabin in the same vicinity in about 1974. Sometime in 
the mid 1990s Garff began to build a cabin, what is called the 
fourth or Garff cabin. Garff evidently married a daughter of Joe 
Jacob, though the court may be incorrect, but in any event Garff 
is now a member of the Jacob family. He obtained building 
permits from Summit County and began building a large, 4500 
square foot retreait/residence on the Jacob property not far from 
the older Jacob cabins. That event was evidently the impetus for 
ths lawsuit which was filed in 1998. That Garff cabin evidently 
remains unfinished and little or no evidence was presented 
respecting this building. The court did observe it from a 
distance on the October 2007 field trip but paid little attention 
to its level of completion and the court is unaware as to the 
status of the interior of the facility. 
53. Charles Horman married into the Christensen family. He 
first went to the Jacob property in 1965, and he drove the roads 
in a passenger vehicle. He has been there often and frequently 
uses the property. He was basically in charge of building the 
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Christensen cabin, near point K on X117, in the early 1970s. It 
is approximately 5000 square feet, with 6 bedrooms and many, many 
bunk beds, and it is designed as a family retreat. It was built 
in the Summer months of 1972-1974, by using a crew of 5. It 
involved the normal construction equipment, including a large 
crane, cement trucks, 10 wheel dump trucks, front end loaders and 
heavy excavation equipment. He does not recall ever being asked 
to leave nor did the work crews ever experience any event wherein 
Haynes asked them to leave. Horman has used the property often 
and has often had large numbers of guests for church and youth 
gatherings at this cabin, and none were ever asked to leave the 
Haynes property or were they turned away. All material for the 
Christensen cabin was hauled to the site over the Haynes property 
on the Bench Road and Middle Fork Road and there was never any 
issue raised about usage of that road. Horman is aware of the 
1984 agreement and after that he found the main gate off SR 133 
locked which closed the road leading from SR 133 to Haynes 
property, and he removed the gate by force on two occasions, 
believing the 1984 agreement allowed access. He further 
developed two retaining and fishing ponds on Section 31 of T2 R8, 
and accessed those by what is called the West Fork Road, crossing 
Haynes property with large equipment and a crew and those too had 
free access across Haynes property along the Bench Road. Those 
have been stocked with fish regularly, at least every other year, 
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and private suppliers have been hired and have come to the Jacob 
property to plant the fish across the Bench Road onto the West 
Fork Road. Jacob, through Joe Jacob, put up signs on the gate 
leading from Haynes Bench Road to the Middle Fork Road on Jacob 
property, indicating private property and no trespassing. There 
is also a gate on the property line between the Boyer property by 
Boyer Lake and the Jacob property, and that is to keep the water 
users from the Jacob property. He never saw a gate locked between 
1965 and 1975 onto the Haynes property. He graded the entire 
road, the entire Loop, often during the 1970s. During the 1980s 
and into the early 1990s Alfred Blonquist, working at the time 
for Geary Construction, was hired to grade the road and he did it 
yearly along the entire loop. Blonquist was hired by Jacob and 
by the Hoytsville water users to do that work. 
54. The Jacobs have had a presence on their property also. 
They too went often to the property and were never stopped, never 
asked to leave. They have brought large groups of people also, 
church and youth groups, and have not been blocked from using the 
Bench Road and Middle Fork Road. They have invited various 
others, such as pond inspectors when they built fishing ponds on 
their property. The Jacobs also testify there was never a locked 
gate at entrance off SR 133 before 1984. There was one sign, X51-
32, on Middle Fork Road heading north off Jacob property to the 
Haynes property. It states "limited access road next 5.15 miles. 
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No Hunting, No Trespassing. Haynes Land & Livestock Co." That 
sign has been in place for some time. That sign is seen one 
leaves the Jacob property, off the Middle Fork Road, onto the 
Haynes property, the Bench Road. There was no testimony but the 
court finds, based on its travel to the site with counsel, that 
the distance between SR 133 and the boundary line between 
Sections 18-19 is approximately 5 miles. 
55. The 1984 Agreement, X255, is between Haynes and Jacob. 
It, in summary, indicated Jacob had certain claims, Haynes 
recognized the 1939 deed granting access, and stated Jacob could 
have a right of way as described in the 1939 deed but Jacob 
claimed further rights; Haynes was allowed to keep a gate but 
would provide either 100 keys to Jacob or a combination allowing 
access. Jacob agreed to allow Haynes a perpetual easement and 
right of access for irrigation purposes in sections 20 and 21. 
Both parties reserved any rights they claim. 
56. Robert Powell, not associated with either party, is a 79 
year old man who grew up in the Coalville area on a small farm 
and he often went to the East Fork drainage area. He went to the 
area often with his father in their 1934 truck, and the road was 
not blocked nor was the gate locked. They usually went to what 
are called the Blue Lakes, which consist of what is now Boyer 
Reservoir, Joyce Lake, and Blue Lake, which is east of Boyer 
Reservoir in T2 R8 Section 35. An incident he recalled in the 
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1940s happened where some man, not identified, said the road was 
private and Powell's father said it was not, it was open to all 
and that he had used it for years. In 1965 Powell recalled the 
gate being unlocked but locked in the 1980s. He as never stopped 
in his journeys. He did not describe the route of travel. 
57. Kay Crittendon, not associated with any parties, is an 
85 year old man and life long resident of Coalville. He often 
fished at the Blue Lakes before 1935 and there were no gates or 
fences and no signs, and that was true until 1941. After 1935 
his father did all the road work and helped build the Boyer 
Reservoir. He produced photographs from 1938 showing the East 
Fork Road at section 8 ended there. (X52-1 through 52-4, 
originals returned to Crittendon and copies substituted in the 
court record). His father cut the road east and south from the 
middle of section 8 where the East Fork Road ended and helped 
build what is now the current East Fork Road in 1938-1941. 
Crittendon fished at those lakes after World War II and when more 
people, sometimes called the "city savages," began to frequent 
the area Howard Haynes Sr began to try to stop the invasion by 
halting people at SR 133. Crittendon saw the dipping corrals in 
Section 19 T2 R8 and observed them just off the road Middle Fork 
Road. 
58. Alfred Blonquist, one of the owners of the Boyer parcel, 
was given a copy of a map before he bought the property. That 
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map, X205, shows the entire loop at issue was declared a Class D 
county road in 1978. That map's origin is unknown but it was 
created and filed with the Utah Department of Transportation in 
1978 pursuant to statute, now UCA 72-3-105. There was no county 
commission resolution or approval and no records appear to be 
extant which shed any light on how that Class D map came into 
being, it just exists and is on file with UDOT. It is also kept 
available for the public with the Summit County Recorder. It 
shows the entire loop is a Class D road since 1978. A Class D 
road is one that involves no maintenance by the county. 
59. The deposition of Gwennola Blonquist, now deceased, was 
received on behalf of Haynes. She was born 1912, lived in the 
Coalville area until 1933, left, and returned in about 1940. As 
a youth she and others went to the Blue Lakes without permission 
and lots of people used the roads and those lakes. They usually 
went via East Fork Road but the deposition did not, to the court, 
clearly identify the precise route. She saw Jimmy's saw mill and 
corrals which were along the Bench and Middle Fork Road, saw no 
signs or fences or gates, and all was open. Her family got lumber 
from the area without permission though that route was not notes 
as to how they got wherever they went. Small boats were on the 
lakes and were used by various people. 
60. The deposition of Lamont Staley, born in 1927, was 
received, as he now lives elsewhere. He lived in the area and 
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also went with his father in the mid 1930s to the area. They 
found what they believed was the crumbled cabin of his 
grandfather William by Red Hole Section 18, which is accessed by 
the Bench Road. He went on scout trips in about 1935 to Blue Lake 
without permission. He did not recall any gates and thinks it was 
all open. His route was not well identified. 
61. In March 2006 Haynes has petitioned, as shown in X134, 
the Summit County Board of Commissioners (SCBC) to vacate the 
Class D road which has been on file with UDOT. In an April 2006 
hearing the SCBC deferred action. X135. In September 2006 a 
petition for reconsideration was filed by Haynes, and a hearing 
was held February 14, 2007. X302, 260. The county has deferred 
action until this litigation is resolved. After this court issued 
its ruling denying Jacob's motion for summary judgment in March 
2007 Haynes again wrote the SCBC in April 2007 asking for another 
public hearing in May 2007. X303. That was evidently denied. 
Another letter was sent by Haynes in July 2007 asking for a 
public hearing. Another formal request was filed by Haynes in 
August 2007 on behalf of Chalk Creek-Hoytsville Water Users, 
joined by Haynes and Triple H. X304. 
62. Haynes has placed some of their property in a 
Conservation Easement in 1999. Haynes granted the easement to the 
State of Utah who may monitor compliance and is to preserve the 
Conservation Values of the property. Haynes reserved the right 
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to build structures on Section 18 T2 R8, Section 1 T2 R7, 
including as many as 6 cabins of up to 2500 square feet, along 
with out buildings. A Ranch Headquarters was allowed on Section 1 
T2 R7 or Section 36 T3 R7, each such section being in the 
northern portions of the Haynes property accessed by the Bench 
Road. 
63. There was ample contrary testimony from witnesses called 
by Haynes to contradict the recent use of the road at issue, the 
entire loop. 
64. One of the current partners in Haynes, Howard Haynes, 
Jr. MD, a man of 87, first went with his father to the property 
in about 1934 after the northern portions were purchased in 1932. 
He helped with the sheep and other chores, trailed (or drove) the 
sheep from Tooele to this land for Summer grazing, and did many 
tasks over the years. He testified at that time he believed the 
intervening land (Sections 7, 8, 16, 17, and 18, T2 R8, not owned 
by Haynes until about 1941), were crossed to get to the north 
portion of the Haynes property under the assumption that there 
was some sort of permission from the owners at the time. The 
East Fork Road ended at Section 8. The reservoir company 
furthered the road to get to the reservoir, Boyer Reservoir. His 
father kept the gate locked as much as possible with the intent 
to keep people, the public, out. He now runs the ranch with his 
sister Shirley MacFarlane. The property was heavily guarded in 
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hunting season, basically the Fall of each year, and the gate was 
locked as much as possible. Haynes has built one cabin on the 
property but the evidence did not reveal its location and the 
court does not recall seeing it. The court does recall seeing a 
small cabin off to the west of the Bench Road possibly in Section 
18 or Section 7 T2 R8 and that may be the cabin referenced by the 
testimony.. When problems began to arise in about 1981 he 
entered into the 1984 agreement, X255. Historically he recalls a 
saw mill, called Jimmy's, near the Haynes-Jacob border by 
Sections 18-19, and the Bench Road was well defined when the 
property was first purchased when he first went there. 
65. Haynes partner and sister Shirley MacFarlane, born in 
1935, went often to the property and it was always gated, there 
were signs, and it was guarded in hunting season. 
66. That agreement, X255, basically gives Jacob the right to 
use the Bench Road for the purposes in the deeds 
(agricultural)and a key or combination system was put in place so 
Jacob could use the road. Jacob gave Haynes an irrigation 
easement on Section 20 and 21 to install a head gate. Each party 
reserved any rights and claims it had. 
67. A deposition of Leroy Meadows, age 85, was received and 
considered. He was a local man and visited often in the area. 
He recalled a gate in about 1928, and always got permission from 
Howard Haynes, Sr, to use the land, or from the Wright Brothers, 
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the previous owners. The East Fork Road was not a road and was 
very primitive. By reputation in the area the road, the entire 
loop, was private and controlled by Haynes. 
68. The Clyde Collard deposition was also received. He was 
a man of age 86 when deposed in 2006 and he was familiar with the 
area. He ran sheep on the Jacob property by lease, after World War 
II. He recalled the gate being locked most of the time and Jacob 
also had a locked gate leading to Jacob's property. The East 
Fork Road was hardly ever traveled. 
69. Many others, including Thomas Moore, a part-time fire 
marshal, were in the area since the 1970s and stated the gate off 
SR 133 was locked and Haynes tried to keep people off the road. 
Many others on behalf of Haynes testified concerning the road 
recent years, since the 1960s or so. They have been on the 
property and the main gate off SR 133 was usually locked and 
Haynes attempted to keep people off the road. 
70. In September 1998 the deputy county attorney for Summit 
County wrote counsel for Haynes and stated the county took no 
official position on whether the road at issue, the entire loop, 
was or was not a public thoroughfare by operation of State 
statute. That contrasts with the current Summit County position 
which is that this entire loop road is a Class D county road and 
a public road. 
71. The road across the Boyer Reservoir, a portion of the 
-43-
Boyer Road, is only 12 feet wide. It goes across the top of the 
dam, which is inspected by state Department of Natural Resources 
personnel. It is classified as a high hazard dam should it fail. 
Outlet issues have arisen and the State officials have indicated 
the measuring devices need greater protection. They discourage 
any traffic across the top of the dam. If the road remains those 
dam officials recommend a 20-24 foot wide road at the top, which 
would require substantial cost of approximately $900,000 to 
change the Boyer Reservoir system. 
72. The Water Users initiated litigation in 1939 to condemn 
the land for what is called the Boyer Reservoir, though it was a 
natural reservoir before, as well as seek the roadway on the East 
Fork Road. The jury awarded damages for that taking in 1942. 
73. After all the conflicts in that testimony concerning the 
use of the properties, the gates and locks and signs, the court 
finds that after Howard Haynes Sr bought the final portion of the 
Haynes property in 1941 the gates were locked most of the time 
and it was the intent of Haynes to keep people off the property. 
Further, after Joe Jacob bought the property from about the same 
time frame in 1938 he locked the gate from Haynes property to the 
Jacob property at Sections 18-19 T2 R8 and it was Jacob's intent 
to keep the public off the property. Factually since 1941 the 
Bench Road and the Middle Fork Road and the East Fork Road have 
been private roads and hove not become public roads through usage 
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by the public since that time. 
74. The court finds this road at issue is basically a 
"summer'' road. There was no direct testimony as to the amount of 
snowfall at any given time but the court does not exist in a 
vacuum and can take judicial notice, even without being requested 
to do so in a civil matter under URE, Rule 201, of facts 
generally known. The court is not taking judicial notice that 
the road at issue is or is not passable at any given time, nor of 
precisely how much snow there is at any particular time, but 
there is a lot of snow this season and the court believes at this 
elevation this road is not visible or accessible by motor vehicle 
a good part of the year. Further, the court went on the "field 
trip" on October 3, 2007, and had off-the-record discussions with 
counsel. From all of the descriptions of the use of this road, 
it is clear that the "road" is not used when there is substantial 
snow on the ground. Snowmobiles have been alluded to in the 
trial and on the field trip and clearly the snow fall in this 
area prohibits use by motor vehicle when there is substantial 
snow. A snowmobile may ride "over" the road but not along it. 
When the court went on the field trip there were patches of snow 
on the north side of trees and hills and that was October 3, 
2007. The court was advised that the Jacob cabins are located at 
approximately 9100 feet above sea level and at times they have 
been completely covered by snow. During trial, in a recess off 
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the record, the court indicated somewhat jokingly to counsel it 
would like to go back to the property, being aware there was 
still substantial snow in the area. The court was advised by 
someone there was probably still approximately 10 feet of snow by 
the Jacob cabins. From all this, the court finds that whatever 
use is and has been made of the road, that use by vehicles is 
seasonal and basically non-existent when there is substantial 
snowfall. The lowest of the Haynes property is approximately 
7500 feet above sea level. 
Based on the above findings and discussion, the court makes 
the following: 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
1. The court will discuss the law it is relying not in an 
attempt to educate the parties or anyone else but itself. The 
parties have filed helpful memoranda, but in an effort to 
demonstrate why the court is concluding as it is the court 
recites its understanding of the governing law. 
2. Jacob's farst alternative relief is for the court to 
declare this entue loop is a public road under law. As noted in 
the court's previous ruling in March 2007, the relative 
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simplicity of what is called the Dedication Statute, UCA 72-5-
104, belies the difficulty of this case. This case is a very, 
very difficult case for the court and it is not a clear cut case 
at all. The court is attempting to follow the law and do equity 
as the relief sought, declaration of a public road, is an 
equitable remedy. Bertagnole v. Pine Meadow Ranches, 639 P. 2d 
211, 213 (UT 1981). The court is also trying to solve an ongoing 
problem between the parties and is trying not to create 
additional litigation. 
3. The case, by its nature, is very difficult. As has been 
recognized in such "public road cases/' a trial court is given a 
fair degree of discretion in determining the legal consequences 
of the facts as found by the court because the legal requirements 
are highly fact dependent and somewhat amorphous. Heber City Corp 
v. Simpson, 942 P. 2d 307, 311 (UT. 1997) . These cases by their 
nature, especially this one because Jacob has asked the court to 
make a determination from a time beginning almost 150 years ago, 
involve "reconstruction of historical facts concerning timing, 
nature, and the extent of public usage. . . [W]itnesses are 
required to dredge the recesses of their minds for aged memories. 
. . . Trial courts should be permitted some rein to grapple with 
the multitude of fact patterns that may constitute . . . " [a 
public road]. Kohler v. Martin, 916 P.2d 910, 912-913 (UT. App. 
1996). Whether the facts show a public road is a question of fact 
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and law which involves complex facts, evidentiary resolutions and 
credibility determinations. The court finds and concludes in this 
case there are very, very few credibility determinations at issue 
of any importance. Almost all the witnesses are found to be 
honest and credible and they saw events as they believed them to 
be from their perspective. Almost none of the court's decisions 
are governed by credibility determinations. 
4. This case is again made very difficult by the history 
involved. As found and discussed herein, the ^original" owners 
back in the early 1940s were Howard Haynes Sr and Joe Jacob, 
along with of course the Christensen family and other siblings of 
those two principal operators of the land. Now a few generations 
have passed and the offspring of those men are at odds. The 
problem has been discussed in many cases, such as Southern Utah 
Wilderness Alliance v. BLM, 425 F.3d 735 (10th Cir. 2005). While 
that case was in a differing context, the problem is now that 
what was once used as part of the public lands is now in the 
hands of private individuals. The owners whose land is crossed 
(Haynes) do not want their land disturbed, ruined, full of 
strangers and "city savages" who may destroy the beauty and peace 
of the area and interfere with a livestock business. Indeed, 
Shirley MacFarlane indicated that the Jacob property users were 
using the Bench Road as a speed way and she feared for the safety 
of the Haynes families. The Jacobs on the other hand want to 
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enjoy their property in the same fashion and be free to allow 
their families, now growing larger just as the Haynes families 
are growing, to fully use and enjoy their land and not be stuck 
with only the ability, figuratively, to herd sheep down the road. 
The Jacobs and Christensens have built a few cabins and want to 
build a few more. The Haynes fear the Jacobs will build a 
veritable city and those residents will have to cross the Haynes 
land to get to that "city." The Jacobs believe they have the 
right to enjoy their property as they have done in the past and 
that now means building some additional cabins for their 
increasing family and does not mean having to use only the two 
small cabins (one is about 700 square feet and one 2500 square 
feet) to attempt to house and provide a refuge and retreat for a 
large family. Each party clearly has a very profound sense of 
right and entitlement and the court's determination will affect 
these parties greatly, as well as several generations of their 
families yet to come. 
8. The case is again made more difficult because of the 
nature of the claim of Jacobs, particularly its timing-that this 
entire loop was and is a public road from over 100 years ago, 
beginning perhaps as early as 1865, but certainly in the period 
1880 to 1896. That obviously entails proof of facts mostly from 
documents rather than live witnesses. No witnesses appeared, nor 
could any be expected to, who were alive before 1896. Further, 
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Haynes argued correctly that it could not possibly prove a 
negative from that time frame. Proving a negative is at best 
difficult and from this time frame may well be impossible. As 
noted by the court in the summary judgment determination, it 
would be highly unlikely to find a government record or newspaper 
article from, for example, 1892, indicating that no one used the 
East Fork loop this season. It is, of course, not the burden of 
Haynes to disprove public use but it is the burden of Jacob to 
prove public use and all that those elements entail. 
9. This case is also somewhat unique in that it is from a 
time when the lands at issue were in the public domain. As 
found, prior to statehood in 1896, all of these sections and 
lands at issue, all of them, were in the public domain. The even 
numbered sections belonged to the United States and in 1869 the 
odd numbered sections belonged to the railroads through a grant 
from the United States. From that time (1869) until about 
statehood in 1896, the odd numbered sections belonged to the 
railroads. The only odd numbered sections involved as far as 
public use in this case has been principally Section 7. Most of 
the cases the courts have considered involved a private party 
seeking to have a road that passes over the private property of 
another declared public. This case differs in that most 
important regard. 
10. This case is also complicated for the court in that the 
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parties, respectfully, all seemed to concentrate on the entirety 
of the road, the entire loop, without any emphasis on any 
particular portion of the road. The court believes the evidence 
was such that the parties probably could have and should have 
focused on a more discrete portion of the road. The court does 
not fault the parties for so arguing, but the court does not 
believe that the entire road merits factually or legally the same 
result. 
11. All of this apologetic aside, this is a close and 
difficult case for the court. 
12. The statute, the Dedication Statute, under which Jacob 
seeks a declaration by the court that this entire loop is a 
public road, states: 
(1) A highway is dedicated and abandoned to the use 
of the public when it has been continuously used 
as a public thoroughfare for a period of ten years. 
(2) The dedication and abandonment creates a right-
of-way held by the state in accordance with 
Sections 72-3-102, 72-3-104, 72-3-105, and 72-5-103. 
(3) The scope of the right-of-way is that which is 
reasonable and necessary to ensure safe travel 
according to the facts and circumstances. 
Utah Code Ann. § 75-5-104 (2000). 
13. As the Utah Supreme Court has noted in Lindsay Land & 
Livestock v. Churnos, 285 P. 646, the federal legislation from 
1866 allowing SR 2477 roads could be viewed as an offer from the 
United States of a free right of way over the public domain. The 
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enactment of Utah statutes,, as well as the common law, is the 
Utah answer of how that offer has been accepted. 
14. It is clear that one who claims a public road exists 
must prove the road is public and has been abandoned and 
dedicated to the public by clear and convincing evidence. Heber 
v. Simpson, at 310. Additionally "the burden of establishing 
public use for the required period of time is on those claiming 
it". Bertagnole v. Pine Meadow Ranches, 639 P. 2d 211, 213 (Utah 
1981). These principles guided the court in its denial of summary 
judgment for Jacob wherein the court stated Jacob had an "uphill" 
battle but would have to prove a public road at trial. 
15. Defendants are required to show by clear and convincing 
evidence that this is a public road and they claim it became such 
in the time frame of 1880-1896. That burden of proof requires 
defendants to produce evidence that causes the court to have a 
firm belief this is a public road. The evidence must reach the 
point where there remains no substantial doubt that this is a 
public road. That is the standard the court is using to 
determine if defendant has shown by clear and convincing evidence 
that there has been a public road created in the time frame 
alleged. Whatever definition of "clear and convincing" is used, 
that burden of proof is less than beyond a reasonable doubt. The 
court is entitled, as the finder of fact, to draw reasonable 
inferences from the facts proven and found. It is clear that one 
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witness can establish proof beyond a reasonable doubt and one 
witness can establish a fact by clear and convincing evidence as 
well. Bonner v. Sudbury, 417 P.2d 646 (UT. 1966). 
16. Recently the Utah Supreme Court decided a trilogy of 
cases in February 2008 which discuss the Dedication Statute and 
apply to this case to some extent, though not entirely. Those 
cases are, of course, Utah County v. Butler, 2008 UT 12; Wasatch 
County v. Okelberry, 2008 UT 10; and Town of Leeds v. Prisbey, 
2008 UT 11. 
17. For purposes of this case only a few of the important 
holdings have an effect. In discussing the elements required for 
a public road to be found the Court made it clear, again, that 
the burden is on the claimant of a public road to prove it by 
clear and convincing evidence. In Okelberry the Court focused on 
what qualifies as a sufficient interruption to restart the 
running of the 10 year period and stated a bright line rule: 
An overt act that is intended by a property owner to 
interrupt the use of a road as a public thoroughfare, 
and is reasonably calculated to do sor constitutes 
an interruption sufficient to restart the running of 
the required ten-year period under the Dedication 
Statute. 2008 UT 14,15. 
Thus, the burden remains on Jacob to prove the road has been 
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dedicated to the public continuously. Evidence of an 
interruption in that 10 year period simply precludes a finding of 
continuous use. 
18. From this bright-line rule it is clear to the court and 
the court finds and concludes Jacob and Boyer have failed to show 
this road, the entire loop, was a public road since 1941. Haynes 
and all their witnesses absolutely preclude the court from 
finding by clear and convincing evidence that the gate off SR 133 
was not locked at least once for a period of 10 years. There was 
a good deal of conflict in the testimony and the court need not 
and did not find which "side"' is correct, but the court has 
absolutely no difficulty in determining that the court is not 
convinced by Jacob that since Haynes owned the Haynes property 
finally in 1941 that the road was continuously used by the 
public. Indeed, Jacob in essence concedes as much. Haynes, 
through Howard Haynes Sr and others clearly locked gates and put 
up signs telling people, in essence, to keep out. Jacob did the 
same on its property line, and locked a gate. Since these parties 
have owned the property, at least since 1941, this has not been 
dedicated as a public road. 
19. Before 1941, of course, is when the Jacob parties claim 
this road became public under law. There is no genuine dispute 
about any ten year period at that time as there was virtually no 
compelling evidence that there were gates or fences or signs or 
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anything else before that time. There was some evidence produced 
by Haynes that gates were up as early as 1932, and one witness 
through deposition thought a gate was in place in 1928, when 
Haynes bought the east and north portions of his property, but 
the court will not focus on that time period between 1932 and 
1941 in any event. The court will do as asked by Jacob and 
examine and discuss the evidence as to use by the public, 
continuously, before 1932. After that time no public road was 
created by public use under the Dedication Statute. 
20. Turning to whether this road has been used by the public 
before 1932 continuously for an uninterrupted period of ten years 
requires an examination of what the "public" is. This case 
becomes more complex and somewhat unguided by past cases because 
of, again, the time frame and the public nature of the land 
before 1896, before statehood. 
21. The recent Butler case is helpful but not fully 
determinative of an issue in this case. The public must use the 
road and it must be a public thoroughfare before a road can be 
determined to be a public road under the Dedication Statute. 
Butler makes clear that those with a private right to use a road, 
such as adjoining property owners or those with permission or 
some prescriptive right, are not members of the public. "People 
as a whole" are considered the public, and that class includes 
all trespassers, those with no right to be on the road at all. 
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22. If the public used this road, meaning the entire loop, 
it must be for 10 years without interruption as Okelberry makes 
clear. Under Butler, the ten year period need not be specified, 
the period must simply be at least 10 years. Here, based on the 
evidence, the court concludes that people (the court will discuss 
whether those people amount to the "public"' using a "public 
thoroughfare" later) certainly used portions of this road (to be 
discussed later) for at least 10 years, from perhaps 1865 to 
1932, and certainly up to the time of statehood in 1896. The 
court finds that evidence overwhelming in fact, despite its 
previous doubts expressed in the court's denial of the summary 
judgment motion brought by Jacob. The court has now had the 
advantage of hearing much additional evidence, more carefully 
considering the documents and relating them to the property 
actually viewed by the court, and having more full argument. As 
found, many, many people before 1932 used portions of this road. 
There were several sawmills along various portions of the road. 
There were many, many sheep that were "dipped," at corrals in the 
area requiring the presence of many people. Many people hunted, 
fished, and went to the lakes by some route or another. While 
the court has found the use seasonal because of the heavy 
snowfall, the court concludes that the use of portions of the 
road was continuous. The use of the road need not be great and 
comparatively few people can use a road to make it public, but 
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when the need to use a road arises and the road is used, that use 
is continuous. Boyer v. Clark, 326 P.2d 107, 1008-109 (UT 1958). 
Natural occurrences, such as flood or snow, which inhibit usage 
of the road do not halt continuous use under the law. Butler, at 
13. If the road is used as often as needed or convenient or 
necessary, even though the use is not constant, it is continuous 
use under the law and mere intermissions by naturally occurring 
events, other than an intentional act of interruption, will not 
halt the continuous nature of the use. Here, pre-1932 and 
certainly pre-1896 the evidence is again overwhelming that a 
large number of persons used some portion of the road for many, 
many purposes on a regular and ongoing basis. 
23. Those purposes are sufficient to establish a road by 
whatever name. In Boyer the Court described the use as being use 
by persons hauling coal, crossing the open range, driving cattle 
and sheep, and people hunting or visiting others. The travel was 
by wagon or other vehicles or horse. The court found that 
sufficient to establish a public road. Interestingly, that case 
arose in Chalk Creek in Summit County as well in an area not far 
from this East Fork drainage area. The Court did not comment or 
discuss the public nature of the domain at the time. Trial was 
in 1956 and the trial court found facts dating back 50 years, to 
presumably about 1900, at or shortly after statehood. 
24. In Lindsay Livestock v. Churnos, 285 P. 646 (UT. 1929) 
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the court dealt with a claim under the predecessor dedication 
statute. There the Court dealt with a time period from 1876 and 
involved findings that the land was patented in about 1900. 
There the lands were similar to these, described as unenclosed, 
uninhabited mountain lands, suitable only for grazing. Lindsay 
involved sheep grazing in the summers, sawmills in 1876, as well 
as a mining camp. Persons used the road at issue in that case to 
get lumber and work at and visit the mining camp, houses were 
built at the campr and the use was extensive from 1876, though 
the mining camp lasted only about 5 years. Since 1900 the use was 
basically only sheep herders moving sheep, supplying sheep camps, 
and fishermen and hunters. No public money was expended on the 
road. The road found to be public in that case was found not to 
be the identical road at the time of trial as was the previous 
use but it was located in substantially the same place. The 
Court upheld the finding of a public road, again without much 
comment about the public nature of the land involved. 
25. The Court upheld the finding of a public road in Jeremy 
v. Bertagnole, 116 P.2d 420 (UT 1941). Important to this case is 
the characterization of the early road, from about 1869, as a 
"trail" or roadway. The road was found to have been used for 
trailing herds of cattle, sheep, and horses. The Court did note 
that all patents issued were subject to the easements and rights 
of way of the public to use all such roads as may have been 
-58-
\ * ii / ~ i 
established according to law. 
26. Thus, whatever persons used this road, and the court 
calls it a road, they did so continuously for over 10 years 
before statehood while the lands were all in the public domain. 
27. The next issue the court must discuss is just what 
portion of this road was used. The parties, again respectfully, 
focused on the entire loop. The court in its findings has 
basically divided the road into four parts for its discussion: 
The Bench Road across Haynes property, the Middle Fork across the 
Jacob property, the Boyer road across the Boyer property, and the 
East Fork Road across Haynes property going east then south from 
the Bench Road. The court does not believe the evidence merits 
treating the entire road, the entire loop, identically. 
28. Without yet addressing whether the use was public, the 
court has found and concludes that the Bench Road and Middle 
Fork, to a somewhat imprecise ending, as well as a portion of the 
East Fork road to a somewhat imprecise ending, have been used by 
persons continuously for over 10 years. The East Fork beyond the 
middle of Section 8 T2 R8 and the Boyer Road have not been shown 
by clear and convincing evidence to have been used by persons, 
whether the public or not, continuously for ten years. 
29. The court has found, as discussed, that the East Fork 
road, based on testimony of Howard Haynes Jr, Kay Crittendon, and 
the early map of 1903 (X134) demonstrate beyond doubt that Jacob 
-59-
has not shown by clear and convincing evidence that a particular 
route was used along the East Fork after leaving the middle of 
Section 8. That area was described as terrible passage, a rock 
pile, and other terms showing it was not heavily or as regularly 
used as the Bench and Middle Fork Roads. Jacob has shown that the 
route along the Bench Road and Middle Fork Roads was used by 
persons regularly and continuously. The East Fork road was 
described as ending in the middle of Section 8 and the early maps 
show that, particularly X134 as reflected in Tab H of X296. The 
road was constructed from the middle of Section 8 for the 
reservoir in about 1940, clearly not 10 years before Haynes 
blocked access. Thus, while there is some evidence people went 
to the blue Lakes regularly, and some evidence that they went via 
East Fork Road, the evidence is not compelling that such use was 
continuous as required at least beyond the middle of Section 8. 
Had it been, the East Fork Road beyond the middle of Section 8 
would have shown up on early maps and it does not. 
30. Contrariwise, the demonstrable depiction of the Bench 
Road and Middle Fork Roads, to some point within Section 4 T2 R8, 
shows a road was created and use. It is only logical that these 
two portions were used by someone or there would not be a road 
shown. A passage is created by use, where timber or vegetation is 
removed for ease of access. Continuous use allows the passage way 
(road) to remain and be depicted on a map. Similarly as to the 
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East Fork Road to the middle of Section 8. A visible road in 
1875, 1893, and on all maps thereafter, together with all the 
other evidence of vast usage, shows it was from early times in at 
least 1875 until statehood, used heavily by persons and that is 
what made the road visible to the surveyor and that use is what 
made the road visible on maps. The court's comments in its March 
2007 ruling to the contrary notwithstanding, the court now having 
viewed the area, the court finds and concludes that persons 
traveling to the blue Lake area would certainly, at least by very 
strong inference, use a road rather than cut through heavy 
timber, up and over cliffs and other steep terrain. Persons 
obtaining timber, for example, whether from a mill or on their 
own from the woods somewhere, would use a wagon to haul the 
timber and that wagon would go on this road, rather than through 
the wild and over steep terrain or over fallen timber. While 
hunters may have strayed off the beaten path to find game, they 
sensibly would travel the road to get to an area to hunt rather 
than take off immediately through the wild terrain, even if on 
horseback. That at least is the reasonable inference the court 
draws from viewing this area and considering normal and 
reasonable human conduct. An inference of reasonable conduct by 
persons can amount to clear and convincing evidence in this 
court's view, when that inference is based on facts proven 
sufficiently. The presence of sawmills, corrals, and homesteads 
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along Bench Road and Middle Fork and along the portion of the 
East Fork Road to the middle of Section 8 show many persons were 
regularly using this road as far back as 1875. 
31. The expert report of Liapis shows that the Bench Road 
and Middle Fork Road and the East Fork Road to the middle of 
Section 8 are substantially the same now as when first plotted in 
1875, and are certainly the same as the 1903 USGS map, X134. 
32. That leads the court to the most difficult question 
involved, and that is whether those persons using these Bench 
Roads and Middle Fork Roads and East Fork Roads to the middle of 
Section 8 and those people who "created" these roads by usage 
were members of the public and whether it was a public 
thoroughfare. 
33. The difficult issue in this case is framed by the fact 
that when these lands were used by people, the Bench Road and the 
Middle Fork Road and the East Fork Road to the middle of Section 
8, whoever these people were, the lands they crossed were all 
public lands because they were even numbered sections, except a 
small portion of Section 35 T3 R7, Section 1 T2 R7 Section 7 T2 
R8, and a very small portion of T2 R8 Sections 19 and 33. Thus, 
ANYONE who used those sections, for any purpose, appears to the 
court to be a member of the public. Timber could be taken, 
livestock grazed, hunting could occur, and homesteads could be 
established, all without prior public approval or oversight on 
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the public lands. The bulk of the Bench Road and Middle Fork 
Road was on public lands as being in even numbered sections. 
Only a portion of the East Fork Road is in Section 8 and most of 
it is in Section 7. None of these roads crossed private land to 
create a situation where another landowner now seeks to take 
something away from a previous private landowner as is the case 
with most of the previous court cases. The cases where the 
public road was created during the time before statehood do not 
discuss this aspect of the facts in any detail but it seems of 
utmost importance to this court. The law is not developed 
concerning this issue. It seems almost tautoloqical or 
definitional that any use of a road (or triai, or passage way) on 
public land is a public road. Who else did it belong to if not 
the public? It was not private and no one is seeking to now make 
something public that was private previously. Jacob in essence 
is claiming what was public should remain public. 
34. As to the odd number railroad sections there is no 
indication in the record that the railroad ever seriously sought 
to use this land, nor that any railroad ever attempted to 
interfere with its use by the public on these odd numbered 
sections. Thus, while technically perhaps private land as 
belonging to the railroad, the odd numbered sections were really 
public as well. It is certainly clear from the record before the 
court that there is no evidence the railroad ever sought to 
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exercise its rights as a landowner, during the tenure of 
ownership, concerning the odd numbered sections at issue in this 
case. 
35. Haynes argues that use is presumed permissive but the 
court believes that is particularly true when the use is by 
prescription. This use is not by prescription as the use of the 
road was use of a public road before Haynes owned the property 
over which the road passes. 
36. Even discounting that concept, however, the court finds 
and concludes, based on all the evidence, that these Bench Road 
and Middle Fork Road and East Fork Road to the middle of Section 
8 portions were used by the public continuously for over 10 years 
as a public thoroughfare. 
37. The court believes Jacob's reliance on Lee v. Masner, 45 
P.3d 794 (CO. App. 2001) as to when homesteaders become owners is 
a reasonable interpretation of the law in Utah. The court agrees 
with Haynes that Kohler v. Martin, 916 P.2d 910, and now Butler 
and other cases make clear that property owners and invitees are 
not members of the public. However, the court does not believe 
that the case relied on by Haynes, Rio Grande Western Railway Co. 
v. Telluride, 63 P. 995 (UT. 1900) , stands for what Haynes claims 
it stands for.2 While these homesteaders Staley, Randall, Huff, 
2The court also does not believe a case cited by Haynes in 
its pre-trial memo, Thurnwald v. A.E. , 2007 UT 38, states at all 
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and Saxton detailed in the findings above had a right to preempt 
others perhaps as against their use of the property, nothing in 
Utah law the court can find indicates these homesteaders are land 
"owners" until at least they apply for homestead rights. Thus, 
the court concludes, those homesteaders were members of the 
public and it follows their guests and invitees were as well. 
Moreover, the court is not basing its conclusion solely on these 
homesteaders. They are merely some members of the public who used 
these portions of the roads as indicated. 
38. The court concludes that many members of the public, 
trespassers or whatever they be called before 1896, (and they 
were trespassers after 1896 and after others owned the property,) 
and all kinds of people used these sections of the Bench and 
Middle Fork and East Bench Roads. Getting lumber, game, and 
recreating over the years seems never to have stopped and was 
continuous for at least 10 years. Again, a "lag" in usage, 
unless the result of an intentional act of interruption, is not a 
basis to conclude the road was not continuously used by the 
public. Thousands and thousands of sheep came to the area and 
used the Bench Road and some of the Middle Fork Road to get to 
the corrals, and those thousands and thousands of sheep did not 
appear only episodically. Those thousand and thousands of sheep 
what Haynes claims for it, though it is not an issue given the 
court's resolution. There can be no "taking" as the public road 
is found to exist before Haynes owned the property. 
-65-
did not get to the corrals or to grazing lands by themselves 
under the direction of a sheep dog. The testimony did not show 
such, but again the court may rely on the common sense notion 
that thousands and thousands of sheep require more than one 
person to herd those sheep. Indeed, Howard Haynes Jr described 
how he helped his father and others with trailing their sheep in 
the 1930s from Tooele. From such facts the court is not amiss in 
inferring many sheep herders and others were responsible for many 
sheep getting to this area. Haynes argues these facts as shown 
are not evidence of continuous use. The court has discussed that 
and use is continuous if use is as needed and desired and is not 
interrupted by an intentional act of the owner. Here, the owner 
of the land at the time, 1880-1896, was the public or the 
railroad, and no objection was ever lodged by the railroad. 
There is no evidence the railroad every did any act amounting to 
an act of interruption. The use was open and the court believes 
the use of the land was use of public lands on all sections. 
39. Further, while neither this factor nor any one factor is 
determinative, Summit County funds were expended on this road on 
the Bench Road, referred to in X244 as Sage Brush Flats. That 
was in 1913, after these sections were in private ownership but 
before Haynes owned the land. That too adds evidence that at 
least this portion of the road was public. 
40. In addition as another factor, while again not 
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determinative as noted in Heber City v. Simpson, at 311 n.8r the 
fact is that Summit County in 1978 determined this was a Class D 
county road. The court is fully aware that this map seems to 
have been created almost immaculately as there is no evidence as 
to its etiology. However, the map exists and is kept in the 
County Recorder's Office and is on file with UDOT pursuant to 
statute. 
41. Even if not used as a public road for years as a public 
road since these parties have owned the land, at least since 1941 
and possibly since 1932, the public nature of the road does not 
"disappear" when the land over which the public road crosses 
comes into private hands. The purchaser, Haynes and before 
Haynes other owners, and Jacob and before Jacob others, all took 
the property subject to the public's right to use the roads. 
Sullivan, at 957. 
42. It is the totality of the evidence that convinces the 
court by clear and convincing evidence these portions of the road 
were used by the public continuously for at least 10 years, from 
at least 1880 to 1896. 
43. The burden of the usage on Haynes is not as great as if 
Haynes had owned the land when this road was made public by 
public use. Haynes frequently argued a taking of land is 
occurring. As noted, this court does believe that this land was 
public and the road over that public land was dedicated to the 
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public for such use before Haynes or Jacob purchased the land. 
These owners took the land subject to the right of the public to 
use the road. Thus, it is not as if Haynes owned land, the 
public then crossed it and used it, and thus Haynes is being 
deprived of something he had but now has lost. Haynes never 
"had" this road, it has been public since long before he 
purchased the land surrounding the public road. 
44. If a road becomes public under the Dedication Statute 
clearly if Haynes or Jacob anyone erects gates and posts signs 
those actions do not extinguish the public nature of the road. 
Sullivan v. Condas, 290 P. 954, 951 (UT. 1930). This court may 
not vacate a public road and the vacation of a public road may 
only be done according to law. An adjoining owner of public land 
may not obstruct the public right. Schettler v. Lynch, 64 P. 955 
(UT 1901). 
45. As to the East Fork Road east of the middle of Section 8 
the court concludes as well that there has been no public access 
at least since 1941. Prior to that time the road went to the 
middle of section 8 T2 R8 as shown on the early maps, the same as 
show the Bench and Middle Fork Roads. From the middle of Section 
8 going east then south the court does not believe that portion 
of the road ever became public because of its much more limited 
use. The court was not and is not convinced by clear and 
convincing evidence that after the usage of the road to the saw 
-68-
mills in the middle of Section 8 and the "bungalows'" in that area 
the use was anything other than sporadic and the route was and is 
unknown. While there were some references to going that way to 
the blue Lakes, the use beyond the saw mills by hunters and 
fishermen and others was far more limited and not conclusive by 
clear and convincing evidence that that portion of the East Fork 
Road was ever abandoned and dedicated to the public. Certainly 
until about 1940 when the present iteration of the road was 
constructed by the Water Users the descriptions of the area 
included phrases such as rocky, a wagon trail, a terrible route, 
almost unpassable, and so forth. While such can still be a road, 
the court is not convinced by clear and convincing evidence that 
any particular route was traveled beyond the middle of Section 8. 
To the extent it was traveled, its use was not continuous and was 
at best episodic by far less members of the public than traversed 
the Bench Road or Middle Fork Road or the East Fork Road to the 
middle of Section 8. The more heavy usage to Peter's Park, so 
called, was before the split of the road. The two homesteads 
that were in the area were at the middle of Section 8 and were 
accessed by the East Fork Road as it ended at the middle of 
Section 8. The one saw mill just east of the split of the road in 
Section 7 is certainly similar in character as the same features 
of usage on the Bench and Middle Fork Roads. However, the court 
finds the evidence of usage simply not as convincing beyond the 
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mapped ending of the East Fork Road at the middle of Section 8. 
46. Thus, the court concludes that the only public road from 
the early days of 1880 to 1896 and beyond until about 1932 was 
what the court is calling the Bench Road, the Middle Fork Road, 
and the East Fork Road to the middle of Section 8. 
47. As to the remainder of what is now the East Fork Road, 
however, the Jacob-Christensen entities have been given by 
stipulation a prescriptive easement to use that road for 
traditional purposes for which Jacob has used it in the past. 
That is, for recreation and moving livestock as read into the 
record at the beginning of trial. The Jacob-Christensen family 
may continue to use that East Fork Road simply for access as 
agreed by Haynes but it may not be used for other purposes if 
Jacob desires to in fact build additional cabins, for example. 
That has not been the traditional use of that portion of the 
road. The public road may be used for those reasons beyond the 
stipulated prescriptive easement but the East Fork Road east of 
the middle of Section 8 may be used only for pure access for the 
traditional purposes. It will also allow ingress and egress in 
case of some type of emergency. Of course, in an emergency 
easements are not governing in any event. Simply, the East Fork 
Road east of the middle of Section 8 is not now and has not ever 
been a public road under the Dedication Statute. 
47. The court is aware that does not solve the Boyer's 
-70-
problem as to the East Fork Road. The court does not believe 
that the Boyer's have established a prescriptive easement over 
the East Fork Road for at least 20 years before ownership by 
Haynes. Before statehood use by Boyers was not shown. After 
ownership of property in about 1905 the travel demonstrated by 
Boyers was for purposes of going to the lakes and nothing more. 
That court concludes that is not sufficient to demonstrate a 
prescriptive easement for the Boyers over the entirety of East 
Fork Road. If they desire to build a cabin, as they testified, 
the route to be used would have to be along the public road of 
the Bench Road and Middle Fork Road. Any access the Boyers have 
to their property has to be over the public road and then by 
permission by Jacob. 
48. That leaves the Boyer Road at issue. The court is not 
attempting to resolve any reservoir disputes, but the court has 
seen no convincing evidence that at any point in time, except 
recently, that the road across the Boyer Reservoir was used by 
anyone. Of all the travel to the blue Lakes for varying purposes 
by the public or by the Boyers or even the Jacobs, the evidence 
is not convincing that the road used went across the Boyer 
Reservoir. The court concludes that the Boyer Road is then not 
the subject of being a public road nor has anyone shown a 
prescriptive easement right to use the Boyer Road. The Boyer 
Road on the Boyer property is for their use and for the use of 
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those they allow to use that road. With the availability of the 
public road along the Bench Road and the Middle Fork road to a 
point to be discussed further below both the Jacob and Boyer 
entities may use that road to the point where the public road 
ends in Section 4. Beyond that, and onto the Boyer property, the 
Boyer's will have to obtain access by permission of Jacob to go 
from that point to the Boyer property where the current iteration 
of the road leaves the Jacob property onto the Boyer property in 
Section 34 T2 R8. 
49. The court concludes, based on the testimony and again 
relying heavily on X134 and X296, that the public used the Bench 
and Middle Fork Roads as shown on X134 to the eastern most point 
on the Jacob property where the road crosses from Tl R8 Section 4 
into T2 R8 Section 33. At that point the public road established 
by the testimony from 1880 and beyond has not been shown to have 
been established. Thus, any use of the road beyond that point by 
anyone will have to be permissive. The travel routes shown on 
X134 and the historic usage described leads the court to find and 
conclude that is the approximate point where the public gained 
access to the lakes. Beyond that lies the Boyer property line in 
Section 34 from the Jacob property and the evidence does not 
convince the court that any particular route was used to gain 
access to the blue lakes area, and certainly there was 
insufficient evidence (if any) that the public went across the 
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Boyer property and across the Boyer Reservoir. 
50. Thus, the court concludes the road as it currently 
exists, what the court is calling the Middle Fork Road, ends as a 
public road where it crosses at the eastern most point from Tl R8 
Section 4 onto T2 R8 Section 33 as now shown on X117. 
Thereafter, through the Jacob property and across the Boyer 
property on what the court is calling the Boyer Road, the road is 
a private road and may be blocked and permission may be given or 
obtained for the use of the road or any existing easement may 
allow access. The Boyer Road is private except as to any 
easement in favor of the Water Users, who also enjoy a 
prescriptive easement along the East Fork Road to the Boyer 
property and to the Boyer Reservoir. 
51. Thus, to summarize, the court, from the evidence, 
concludes that the East Fork Road is a public road from the point 
in Section 7 T2 R8 where it splits from the Bench Road to the 
middle of Section 8. From that point the East Fork Road is 
private. Jacob enjoys a historic easement along that road from 
the middle of Section 8 only for access as historically used. 
The Boyers do not enjoy a similar prescriptive easement for the 
same purposes. The Water Users enjoy a prescriptive easement 
along that road as well as Jacob but only as necessary for its 
purposes. Where that East Fork Road joins onto the Boyer 
property at the tri-junction of the Haynes, Jacob and Boyer 
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properties, at the junction of T2 R8 Sections 34 and Section 27, 
the road remains private through the Boyer property in Section 34 
and it remains private until, going southerly, it enters the 
Jacob property at the eastern most portion of the division of 
Sections 33 T2 R8 and Section 4 Tl R8. The Water Users enjoy a 
prescriptive easement on the Boyer Road and any other use by 
others is permissive. The road is then public back to SR 133 from 
the Jacob property going along the Middle Fork and Bench Roads. 
Boyer does not enjoy a prescriptive easement from its property to 
the point the pubic road begins and any access will have to be by 
permission of Jacob. 
In an attempt to again clarify, BASICALLY as shown on X117, 
the court is concluding, with the slight adjustments noted above, 
that as shown on X117, Section A so labeled is public, Section C 
is private, and Section D is private subject to the easements 
described. Section B is public. 
52. One of the arguments Haynes has made against any portion 
of the road being declared public is that it goes "nowhere/' 
there is no destination, it does not lead to a public place or 
even a particular site. That has indeed caused the court some 
concern throughout this litigation. In fact the court is aware of 
a few cases cited by the parties that deal with a "dead end" as a 
public road. In Renfro v McCowan, 2006 Dist. LEXIS 84439, the 
road found to be public went to a "view" area as described by the 
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court. In Bertagnole v. Pine Meadow Ranches, 639 P. 2d 211
 f (UT. 
1981), the road seems to go to many, many cabins, but it does not 
lead to some other public area and when a member of the public 
gets to the "end" the same route, with lots of possible branches 
and loops, must be taken to return to 1-80. Thus, the road in 
that case seems to be similar to the public aspects of this road, 
it leads to a "dead end" with some more loops in the Bertagnole 
road up Tolgate Canyon. The court concludes that such a 
"nowhere" road may still be a public road. The public may drive 
this road from SR 133 on either branch, along the East Fork Road 
to the middle of section 8, or along the Bench and Middle Fork 
Roads to Section 4, view the surroundings and turn around and 
travel back the same route as they took to SR 133. That is the 
nature of public roads under these Dedication Statutes based on 
older federal law which allowed creation of such roads. The fact 
that the public aspect of this road leads to a "dead end" as far 
as an actual destination does not defeat the public nature of its 
creation. 
53. As to the width and scope of the public road it has been 
noted, in Bertagnole at 213, that the width of a dedicated 
highway is not limited to the beaten path. The width of a public 
road is to be determined as a question of fact. Butler et.al. v. 
The Pinecrest Water Company, 909 P.2d 225 (UT 1995). In the case 
cited for that proposition, Blonquist v. Blonquist, 516 P.2d 343 
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(UT. 1973), the court upheld a finding, without much discussion, 
of a width of 44 feet as being necessary and reasonable under the 
circumstances based upon the uses made of the road. The width 
which is reasonably safe and convenient for which the road was 
put is the width to be declared. In Memmott v. Anderson, 642 750 
(UT. 1982), the trial court declared a public road a certain 
width and the Supreme Court found it was unable to determine what 
basis was used to determine the declared width. Bertagnole 
categorized, at 213-214, some past cases involving mountain 
canyons, and discussed findings of 44 feet, 60 and 82.5 feet in 
varying parts, 49.5 feet and 100 feet. The court in Jeremy v. 
Bertagnole, 116 P.2d 420 (UT 1941) discussed a public road 
created similarly to this case. That case made clear the width of 
the road is not to be measured by the width of the beaten track. 
It was necessary for the court to determine, according to what 
was reasonable and necessary, under all the facts and 
circumstances, the proper width and "where the public have 
acquired the right to a public highway by user, they are [not] 
limited to such width as has actually been used by them." That 
court noted that generally the greater portion of travel on a 
county road is confined to the tracks made by vehicles, but there 
must bee room enough for travelers to pass each other. The road 
must be kept in such condition that the public will be safe and 
their rights protected. That court was citing Lindsay Land which 
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had indicated that the declared 100 foot width was justified by 
the evidence which showed more than that had probably been used. 
That case also stated, however, that the court must fix a width 
according to what was reasonable and necessary, under all the 
facts and circumstances, "for the uses which were made of the 
road." The court in Jeremy went on to say the court could not 
turn a bridle path abandoned to the public into a boulevard. "On 
the other hand, the implied dedication of a roadway to automobile 
traffic is the dedication of a roadway of sufficient width for 
safe and convenient use thereof by such traffic." 
54. These cases do not clearly answer the question for the 
court for a number of reasons. First, the cases seem to refer, 
on one hand, to what "was" the use. On the other hand, 
especially in Jeremy, the courts discuss what "is" necessary now 
that the road is declared public for the safety of those "now" 
using the road. The Court has pointed out, in Butler v Pinecrest, 
id, that it was not error for the court to fail to determine 
width when that was not the focus of the litigation. Secondly, 
none of the cases refer to any statutes which state public 
policy. 
55. In this case the court in its own defense must comment 
on how this issue was raised. During the trial there was 
precious little by way of evidence presented concerning the width 
of any portion of this road. The only direct evidence was from 
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Grant MacFarlane, who testified that at the lower, or northern-
most portions of the Bench Road, that the road was perhaps an 
average of 20 feet wide there. There was evidence from Haynes 
that the road was in places only 8 feet wide and vegetation had 
to be cut in the Spring as it had grown over the space of the 
road when Haynes was a young man. The testimony did not reveal 
any specific places where that occurred or how wide the road was 
at any particular place nor how wide on average the road was. 
Jacob, to the court's recollection, did not present any evidence 
directly as to the road width at any point along the entire loop. 
There was some evidence that the road across the Boyer Reservoir 
was 12 feet. The court, as noted, traveled the entire loop in 
October 2007 with counsel. The court was unaware the issue of 
width may arise specifically, and in fact it was hardly mentioned 
during trial except in closing argument and in one post-trial 
brief. It was not mentioned in pre-trial briefs. It was first 
mentioned in the trial in Jacob's closing argument, then Haynes 
responded and Haynes responded in its post-trial brief. During 
the field trip the court did not pay particular attention to the 
width of the road. However, from that field trip alone the court 
would simply find and conclude that the width of the road seemed 
to vary greatly from the court's observations from one point to 
the next. It indeed seemed as narrow as 8 feet in places and it 
seemed wider than 20 feet in others. At the very base in the 
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northern most portions of the Bench Road testimony showed the oil 
and gas companies expanded the road in the 1980s but the exact 
beginning and ending of that widening was not revealed. Thus, 
respectfully, the court is operating under somewhat of a 
disadvantage. No party referred to any statutes whatever. 
55. Most recently, in fact on March 18, 2008, the Utah 
Supreme Court decided Pearson v. Pearson, 2008 UT 24. In her 
dissenting opinion Chief Justice Durham noted that the courts are 
to examine statutory public policy before turning to common law. 
In this instance a statute and the case law seem to conflict to 
this court's thinking, though again no party briefed the specific 
issues. 
56. UCA 72-5-108 seems to provide a stated legislative 
police that the "width" of rights of way for public highways 
shall be set as the highway authority of the State or county may 
determine for highways under their respective jurisdiction. This 
has been declared by Summit County in 1978 a Class D county road 
and it has now been declared, as described herein, a public road 
by this court. It would thus seem under that statute that the 
county, Summit County, determines the width. The "scope" of the 
right of way is that which is reasonable and necessary to ensure 
safe travel according to the facts and circumstances. UCA 72-5-
104. Thus, to this court these statutes indicate, despite the 
cases to the contrary, that the court need not declare a width as 
-79-
the court defers to the county authority to determine width. The 
cases that upheld the trial court's determination of width did 
not refer to UCA 72-5-108 or its predecessors, UCA 27-12-93, 
which have seemingly been in effect since 1963. The court, based 
on that statute, believes that the determination of width is NOT 
for the court but for county authorities. The determination of 
the width appears to be the responsibility of the county if this 
remains a Class D road. 
57. From these thoughts and recitation of the law the court 
is of the belief that it ought not to declare a width. However, 
if the court's reading of the above statute is wrong, the court 
offers these thoughts and conclusions so that the parties need 
not return to court in the event the county either vacates this 
road or does not believe it is the responsibility of the county 
to declare the width of such a road or highway. 
58. The court believes that it is attempting to solve a 
problem, not merely "find" the law though that is its principle 
task. The evidence showed that Jacob had a crane, cement trucks, 
front end loaders, caterpillars, road graders, pipe hauling 
trucks, 10 wheel dump trucks, media broadcast trucks, and other 
large vehicles on the Bench and Middle Fork Roads. Those 
vehicles seemed to have made it to what the court has concluded 
is the end of the public road without altering the road in its 
public portions. Evidently all construction equipment went along 
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the Bench and Middle Fork roads and not on the East Fork Road. 
The historic use by wagon and foot and horse indeed would require 
much less width in a road normally. The court has not in any way 
focused on the "trailing right'7 easements contained in X7 and X8 
for example, whereby a 100 foot easement along the road was given 
for trailing and moving sheep. The court believes the language 
of the cases does not restrict the court to the historic uses 
only, but the court may and does consider what will now be safe 
for the public who may use that road if in fact it is the court's 
responsibility to declare a width. Again, the cases seem to say 
it is the court's responsibility but to this court the statute 
seems to say otherwise. If the court is responsible to declare a 
width the court believes the evidence and law allow the court to 
declare the road should be 18 feet in width. That is a far cry 
from that requested by Jacob but given that they have built 3 
cabins and at least part of a fourth cabin at the southern end of 
this now-public road, and given that there may well be greater 
vehicle traffic now that the public may visit the area, and given 
the safety concerns involved in vehicles passing each other, it 
seems to the court a modest change will be required but this will 
still allow what the court concludes is reasonable and necessary 
and convenient for what uses are likely to be made of this public 
road. This will allow two vehicles to pass each other. 
59. Again, the court's view is that the common law of Utah 
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allows the court to declare a width, but the statutory law 
reflecting public policy requires the county to declare the 
width. The court defers to the county but if the court is wrong, 
rather than return to court, the above conclusions are the 
court's view on the matter. 
60. Haynes' contention that this "road widening" could 
amount to a taking is rejected. Again, this public road was 
actually created long before Haynes purchased the property and 
Haynes took the property subject to the public's right of usage. 
The court is now merely determining, if it must, what that usage 
is as far as being reasonably necessary and convenient to the 
public today. A width such that two vehicles can pass each other 
is deemed by the court to be reasonable and proper. 
61. As to the width of the East Fork Road, the court 
believes no evidence justifies any conclusion other than that the 
width should remain just as it is presently on the non-public 
portion. The public portion is subject to the above comments. 
That historical use on the private road amounted to less use than 
the public portion, it is used less in the modern time, and is a 
private road with limited prescriptive use by only the Jacob and 
the Water User entities. Boyer can, of course, fully access 
their property via the public road and so there is no need nor 
justification for any other determination as to the East Fork 
Road east of the middle of Section 8. That is also true of the 
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Boyer Road. 
62. The court does not believe the litigation initiated by 
Haynes was in bad faith. It is a most difficult case for the 
court and the court sees no bad faith on behalf of any party 
though the court does wonder why the concessions given by Haynes 
were not announced 10 years ago. It appears true Haynes has not 
really attempted to stop the Jacob entities from use of the loop 
road, but Haynes for some reason believes Boyer has no access. 
Haynes is wrong, but not in bad faith for so believing. 
63. Similarly, the court concludes there are no damages for 
any trespass Haynes has caused by interfering with right of 
access. No evidence was presented on any such damages in any 
event. 
Defendant is to prepare an order in compliance with URCP, 
Rule 7(f) setting forth this ruling. THIS MEMORANDUM DECISION IS 
INCORPORATED INTO ANY PREPARED ORDER AND THIS DECISION IS 
CONSIDERED AS PART OF THE COURT'S FINAL ORDER. 
DATED this day of . / / W. , 2008, 
BY THE COURT: 
BRUCE C. LUBECK 
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APPENDIX B 
RULING and ORDER, August 29, 2008, H.R. 001678-001692 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR SUMMIT COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
HAYNES LAND & LIVESTOCK 
COMPANY, 
P l a i n t i f f , 
v s . 
JACOB FAMILY CHALK CREEK, LLC, 
e t a l . , 
D e f e n d a n t . 
JACOB FAMILY CHALK CREEK, LLC, 




HAYNES LAND & LIVESTOCK 
COMPANY, et al., 
Counterclaim 
Defendants. 
TRIPLE H. RANCH, LC, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 





HAYNES LAND & LIVESTOCK 
COMPANY, et al. , 
Third-Party 
Defendants. 
RULING and ORDER 
Case No. 980600244 
[Consolidating Case Nos. 
00600299 and 980600244] 
Judge BRUCE C. LUBECK 
DATE: August 29, 2008 
The above matter came before the court on August 26, 2008 
for oral argument on various motions and requests. 
Haynes was present through Ray G. Martineau and Leslie W. 
Slaugh; Jacob was present through Clark Waddoups, Jonathan 0. 
Hafen, and Tobi D. Potestio; Boyer was present through Brent A. 
Bohman; Summit County was present through Jami R. Brackin, and 
the State of Utah was present through Steven G. Schwendiman. 
Discussion was held on the following: Jacob Family Chalk 
Creek, LLC, Catherine B. Christensen, LLC, and Brian Garff's 
(Jacob) Motion for Entry of Proposed Form of the Order and in the 
alternative to Reopen Evidence for Limited Purpose; Haynes Land & 
Livestock Company, Triple H. Ranch, LC, and Chalk Creek-
Hoytsville Water Users Corporation's (Haynes) Motion for 
Reconsideration of Road Width; and Fern Boyer, Gerald G. Boyer, 
Gregory J. Boyer, and J.S. Hansen's (Boyer) Motion for 
Reconsideration, or in the Alternative, for Clarification. 
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Jacob filed their motion on May 15, 2008. Haynes filed an 
opposition memorandum on May 21, 2008. Jacob filed a reply 
memorandum on June 9, 2008. Haynes filed their motion for 
reconsideration on May 21, 2008. Jacob filed an opposition 
memorandum on June 9, 2008. A request to submit was filed by 
Jacob on June 17, 2008. Based thereon oral argument was 
scheduled. That was postponed as Boyer filed their motion for 
reconsideration on July 30, 2008. Haynes filed a memorandum in 
opposition and Boyer filed a reply and request to submit for 
decision the same day. The court scheduled argument on all 
motions for August 26, 2008. 
Oral argument was held and the court took the issues under 
advisement. Before the hearing the court carefully considered the 
memoranda and other materials submitted by the parties. Since 
taking the issues under advisement, the court has further 
considered the law and facts relating to the issues. The court 
has further reviewed the trial proceedings and relevant exhibits. 




The background for this case was set forth in the Court's 
prior memorandum decision of March 21, 2008. 
ARGUMENTS 
Jacob moves for entry of their proposed form of order and 
final judgment and alternatively to reopen evidence for the 
limited purpose of addressing the issue of the road's width. A 
newer version of a proposed order was provided at argument. 
Jacob's proposed order differs from the decision of the court in 
some respects. First, they request the order be modified to show 
they do not have a prescriptive easement on the East Fork road. 
Second, they requested but withdrew at oral argument that the 
order be modified to state the road is 36 feet wide for "safety 
and maintenance" purposes instead of the court's 18 foot 
determination. 
Jacob, after reviewing the tape of the trial record, 
suggests that Haynes only stipulated that Jacob had a 
prescriptive easement across the Bench road. 
Jacob agrees that Summit County should determine the width 
of the road. 
-4-
Haynes argues in their opposition memorandum that the road 
should not be expanded beyond the 18 foot declaration and that 
the court should not reopen evidence on the issue of road width. 
Haynes claims that testimony set the traveled surface of the road 
at only eight feet. Eighteen feet would be more than twice that 
width. Haynes says the court found the existing road sufficient 
for travel by large trucks and equipment. Further, Haynes denies 
that the Summit County Development Code, upon which Jacob relies, 
is controlling and that the recommendation contained therein 
pertains to subdivisions only. Haynes argues that the "Rights-
of-way Across Federal Lands Act" upon which Jacob relies is not 
applicable because it was not enacted until after this lawsuit 
commenced. 
Haynes cites Western Kane County Special Service District 
No. 1 v. Jackson Cattle Co., 744 P.2d 1376, 1377 (Utah 1987) 
which upheld the determination that a road should be 10 feet wide 
while noting it was of such width during its public use. Haynes 
argues that there is no evidence that the road in its present 
condition is not safe. 
Haynes contends that to reopen evidence now on the issue of 
road width would cause them prejudice, be unfair, and would 
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unnecessarily delay proceedings. 
In reply Jacob again asserts that Utah Code Ann. § 72-5-108 
supports a statutorily prescribed road width to be determined by 
Summit County. Summit County joins that position. 
Jacob cites Hunsaker v. State, 509 P.2d 352, 354 (Utah 1973) 
to show the Utah Supreme Court in determining the width of a road 
started with a statutory presumption and then looked to 
potentially rebutting evidence. Jacob asserts, quoting Jeremy v. 
Bertagnole, 116 P.2d 420, 424 (Utah 1941), that any established 
use should be continually possible in a safe and convenient 
manner. 
Haynes objects to certain portions of the proposed order 
submitted by Jacob. Haynes points to Rule 7(f)(3), URCP, to 
support its assertion that the order should not include a 
reference to incorporating the court's memorandum decision. 
Haynes agrees with Jacob that the order should reflect that 
Jacob has a right to use the Bench road, but not the East Fork 
road. 
Haynes contends the boundary between the Haynes and Boyer 
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properties is at the boundary of sections 27 and 34, not "in" 
section 34 itself. 
Haynes objects to making the road 36 feet wide and insists 
it should remain at 18 feet as originally determined by the 
court. Haynes argues Summit County should not determine the width 
of the road but the court must do so. 
Haynes assert the Boyer Defendants' easement denial was a 
denial of all types of easement, not just prescriptive. 
Haynes asserts the order should state that all other claims 
of access by Jacob are denied. 
Finally, Haynes asserts that the order should say the Jacob 
claim for easement is denied instead of not reached. 
Jacob objects to the proposed order of Haynes. 
Jacob asserts there is a significant difference in denying 
its claim and not reaching it and the language of the order 
should be the claim was not reached. This would enable an 
appellate court to remand with Jacob retaining access to its 
property. If the claim was denied and the appellate court 
reversed the decision that the road is public, Jacob is denied 
access to its property. 
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Boyer argues that the Court has decided without elaboration 
that they do not have a prescriptive right to use the East Fork 
road to access their property and that Water Users have a 
prescriptive easement across their property. Boyer argues the 
court misapprehended their argument as to when the prescriptive 
easement was acquired- Haynes did not even know Boyer had an 
interest in the Boyer property until long after the twenty-year 
period was over. Evidence that a key was given to the gate does 
not mean the use was permissive. 
Boyer recites from the courts memorandum decision that Gary 
and Greg Boyer have used the road for more than the 20-year 
prescriptive easement period. They assert their use was not 
permissive and there was never any interruption of the use. 
Boyer argues the Water Users never asserted a claim for a 
prescriptive right of way across the Boyer property and never 
presented any evidence to that effect. Boyer therefore claim 
there is no legal basis for granting such a right of way. 
In opposition Haynes asserts no road existed during the time 
Boyer claims prescriptive use. Haynes maintains that the key 
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given by Howard Haynes, Sr. granted permission to use the road 
and thus the use could not be adverse. By locking the gate, 
Haynes interrupted the statutory period for a prescriptive 
easement. 
Haynes also asserts that the Water Users claims were tried 
by consent. Since there was no objection to the evidence on the 
matter, it would be a waste of resources to try the issue again 
separately. 
Boyer in reply again maintains its use of the road was 
adverse, that provision of a key to the gate does not rebut the 
presumption of adversity, that the Okelberry case does not apply, 
that their use of the road was not under the claim of Jacob-
Christensen, and that Water Users have not presented any evidence 
to support a prescriptive easement. 
DISCUSSION 
The court has fully considered the positions of the parties 
and again reviewed the relevant portions of the file and exhibits 
and reviewed the necessary parts of the file. 
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1. Road width 
The court believes its memorandum decision was correct. 
Under UCA 72-5-108 the relevant highway authority considers the 
factors set forth by statute in that chapter 5 of Title 72. The 
court's comments as to its "feelings" were in essence dicta and 
thoughts as the court ruled and reaffirms that the decision as to 
the width of a public road belongs to Summit County. This court 
is not "delegating" the decision to a governmental entity as the 
legislature has done that. The court believes not only does the 
statute make that clear but policy does as well. Summit County 
is certainly able to conduct hearings and consider input and 
exercise its expertise in a more meaningful manner than is the 
court on such issues as what is reasonable and necessary for 
safety of the public. 
Haynes arguments as to the "taking" are again rejected. The 
court determined previously and reaffirms that Haynes never had 
something to take. This road was public before Haynes bought the 
property and Haynes accepted and took the property subject to 
that public right. Further, there has been no taking at this 
point in any event. 
The court DENIES Haynes motion for reconsideration. Thus, 
-10-
Jo lOo / 
the court will sign an order in the language of paragraph 12 of 
the order provided to the court August 26, 2008. 
2. Boyer's motion to reconsider or clarify. 
The court will not change or modify its final conclusion 
about Boyer's not having any type of easement along the East Fork 
road. The court does not believe any further findings are 
necessary as the court found any use was permissive. The only 
reasonable explanation for having a locked gate and advising 
someone of where a key can be found to open that gate is that the 
use was permissive. Thus, the court will clarify to the extent 
needed that the court found and concludes that any use by the 
Boyers since ownership by Haynes has been permissive and thus 
there can be no prescriptive easement. 
The court does not determine that the bright-line principles 
of Okelberry govern in this situation but the court does conclude 
the reasoning of that case applies as well to a prescriptive 
easement situation. Where a gate is erected, whether over a 
public road or otherwise, that is a clear interruption of the 
allowed use, whether it be a public road or use under a 
prescriptive easement. Haynes intent is clear here since 
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ownership and the gate along the East Fork was intended to keep 
people out. Again, use by the Boyers was permissive and thus the 
court's conclusion that they have no right of prescriptive 
easement use remains the court's ruling. 
The court believes its conclusion as to the easement of the 
Water Users is also justified by the court's findings as well and 
no modification of that ruling or clarification is granted. 
Boyer's motion to reconsider is DENIED. 
The court has carefully examined the proposed order given 
to the court August 26, 2008, and has considered the comments and 
arguments of the parties as to that order. The court directs 
Jacob-Christensen to prepare a final order in that same form and 
content but adding paragraph 21 from Haynes's proposed order 
dealing with the private nature of the Water User's road. 
The court will then sign that final order which is again to 
incorporate fully the court March 21, 2008, memorandum decision 
as well as this brief clarification to the court's denial of 
Boyer's claim of prescriptive easement over the East Fork Road. 
The court believes its memorandum decision of March 21, 
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2008, was correct and reaffirms it in all aspects other than as 
indicated in the order the court will sign. 
DATED this I day of , 2008. 
BY THE COURT: 
/ 
BRUCE C. LUBECK 
DISTRICT COURT JUDGE 
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JACOB FAMILY CHALK CREEK, LLC, \ 
et al., : 
Defendants. ; 
JACOB FAMILY CHALK CREEK, LLC, : 
et al., ' 
Counterclaim Plaintiffs, ' 
vs. 
) ORDER AND FINAL JUDGMENT 
1
 Civil No. 980600244 
\ [Consolidating Case Nos. 00600299 
, and 980600244] 
! Judge: Bruce C. Lubeck 
HAYNES LAND & LIVESTOCK 
COMPANY, et al., 
Counterclaim Defendants. 
TRIPLE H. RANCH, LC, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 




HAYNES LAND & LIVESTOCK 
COMPANY, et al. 
Third-Party Defendants. 
The above-captioned matter came on for trial before the Honorable Bruce C. Lubeck on 
March 4, 5,6,7, and 11,2008. The Court took the matter under advisement at the conclusion of the 
trial and on March 21,2008 issued a Memorandum Decision in which the Court set forth its Findings 
of Fact and Conclusions of Law pursuant to Rule 52 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. On 
August 26, 2008, the Court heard oral argument on various motions and requests pertaining to the 
Memorandum Decision. After taking the additional matters under advisement, the Court issued a 
-2-
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Ruling and Order on August 29, 2008. For the reasons set forth in the Memorandum Decision, the 
Ruling and Order, and for good cause appearing, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND 
DECREED AS FOLLOWS: 
1. The Memorandum Decision of the Court, dated March 21,2008, and the Ruling and 
Order of the Court, dated August 29, 2008, are incorporated into this Order and are considered as 
part of the Court's Final Order. 
2. Jacob Family Chalk Creek, LLC, Catherine B. Christensen, LLC, and Brian Garff s 
(collectively, "Jacob-Christensen") declaratory action seeking judgment that the road at issue in this 
dispute (the "Road") is a public right of way is GRANTED in part and DENIED in part as follows: 
A. Pursuant to "R.S. 2477," Act of July 26,1866, ch. 262, § 8,14 Stat. 251,253, 
codified at 43 U.S.C. § 932, repealed by Federal Land Policy Management 
Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-579 § 706(a), 90 Stat. 2743, the Road is apublic 
way as it traverses through every even numbered se ction specified in 
Paragraphs 3 through 5 below. 
B. Pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 72-5-104 (2007), the Road is a public way as 
it traverses through every odd numbered section specified in Paragraphs 3 
through 5 below. 
C. The Road is a private way as it traverses through the sections or portions of 
sections specified in Paragraphs 6, 7, 8, and 9 below. 
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3. From where the Road forks off of State Road 133 approximately eighteen miles east 
of Coalville, Summit County, Utah and travels in a southeasterly direction along the East Fork of 
Chalk Creek through Sections 35 and 36 of Township 3 North, Range 7 East; Section 1 of 
Township 2 North, Range 7 East; and Sections 6, 7, and 18 of Township 2 North, Range 8 East the 
Road is a public way ("Bench Road"). 
4. From where the Bench Road ends and the Road travels through Sections 19, 20, 29, 
32, and 33 of Township 2 North, Range 8 East; and Section 4 of Township 1 North, Range 8 East 
the Road is a public way until the eastern most point where the Road crosses back from Township 1 
North, Range 8 East, Section 4 into Township 2, Range 8 East, Section 33. 
5. From where the Road forks off of the Bench Road in Section 7 of Township 2 North, 
Range 8 East and travels in an easterly direction through Sections 7 and 8 of Township 2 North, 
Range 8 East, the Road is a public way through the west half of Section 8 in the township until it 
reaches the center line. 
6. The portion of the Road beginning at the center line of Section 8, Township 2 North, 
Range 8 East and traveling through the east half of Section 8 and Sections 9,15, 16, 22, 23, 26, and 
27 (to the boundary between Sections 27 and 34) of Township 2 North, Range 8 East is not a public 
road. 
7. The portion of the Road described in Paragraphs 5 and 6 above is collectively referred 
to as the "East Fork Road." The East Fork Road ends in Section 34, Township 2 North, Range 8 
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East where the property of Fern Boyer, Gerald Boyer, Gregory Boyer, Alfred Blonquist as Trustee 
(collectively "Boyer Defendants"), and Triple H Ranch LC begins at its north boundary line. 
8. The portion of Road that traverses the property of the Boyer Defendants and Triple H 
Ranch LC in Section 34 of Township 2 North, Range 8 East is a private way and shall be referred 
to herein as the "Boyer Road." 
9. The portion of the Road beginning at the eastern most point where it crosses between 
Township 1 North, Range 8 East, Section 4 and Township 2 North, Range 8 East, Section 33 until 
it reaches the Boyer Road is a private way. 
10. The portion of the Road described in Paragraphs 4 and 9 above is collectively referred 
to as the "Middle Fork Road." 
11. The course of the Road stated in Paragraphs 3 through 10 above is depicted on the 
map introduced as trial Exhibit 117, which is attached hereto as Exhibit A and incorporated herein 
by this reference. 
12. The width of the portions of the Road that have been declared a public way shall be 
determined by Summit County, Utah according to that which is reasonable and necessary to ensure 
safe travel based on the facts and circumstances. 
13. The Chalk-Creek Hoytsville Water Users Corporation have a prescriptive easement 
for ingress and egress over the Boyer Road only for purposes of operating and maintaining Joyce 
Lake and Boyer Lake reservoirs. 
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14. The Boyer Defendants' claim for an easement over the East Fork Road is DENIED. 
15. Haynes Land & Livestock Company's ("Haynes") claim that a taking has occurred 
is DENIED. 
16. Haynes' claims to quiet title in the Road as against the Jacob-Christensens 
individually and collectively are DENIED for the portions of the Bench, East Fork, and Middle Fork 
Roads that are public as described above. 
17. Haynes' claims to quiet title in the Road as against the Jacob-Christensens 
individually and collectively are GRANTED for the portion of the East Fork Road that is not a public 
way, as described above, based on a stipulation between Haynes and Jacob-Christensen after the 
Memorandum Decision issued whereby the parties agreed Jacob-Christensen does not have a 
prescriptive easement across the private portion of the East Fork Road. 
18. Jacob-Christensen's claim for damages due to trespass by Haynes is DENIED. 
19. Jacob-Christensen's claim for easement by grant, easement by necessity, and 
prescriptive easement on the Bench Road are not reached based on the Court's ruling that the Bench 
Road is a public way. 
20. Default judgment is hereby entered against B.A. Bingham & Sons, LLC, a limited 
liability company; David B. Williams, an individual; Stillman Seven, a partnership; Karel J. Snyder, 





21. That portion of the road over the property of Chalk Creek-Hoytsville Water Users 
Corporation in Section 34, Township 2 North, Range 8 East is a private road and no party has 
established any easement or other right of access for the use of that road. 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that, there being no just reason for delay, pursuant to 
Rule 54(b) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, this judgment is entered as a final judgment and 
immediate execution may be had and issued on this final judgment. 
ORDER AND JUDGMENT ENTERED this / S _ day of September, 2008. 
BY THE COURT: 
Honorable Bruce C. Lubecfc, *o$sm&y^* 
Utah District Court Judge ^ ' V ^ S ^ 
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B. Section 8 
C. Section 8 
D. Section 10 
E. Section 18 
F. Section 18 
G. Section 18 
H. Section 20 
I. Section 20 









Old Saw Mill 
Clark's Dipping Corral 
K. Section 4 Cabin 
APPENDIX F 
Transfer of Titles of Relevant Sections, from the U.S. Government to New Owners 
Section Date Federal Gov't Transferred New Owner 
Sec 35, T3N, R7E 
Sec 36, T3N, R7E 
Sec 1,T2N, R7E 
Sec 6, T2N, R8E 
(Lots, 5, 6, and 7) 
Sec 7, T2N, R8E 
Sec 8, T2N, R8E 
(SWAofNWA) 
Sec 8, T2N, R8E 
(SE'/4 of NW'/t) 
Sec 8, I2N, R8E 
(N'/2 of SE% and NVi of SWA) 
Sec 8, T2N, R8E 
(S!/2 of SE% and S'/2 of SW%) 
Sec 18, T2N, R8E 
(Lots l^andE^ofNW 1 / , ) 
Sec 18, T2N, R8E 
(Lots 3, 4 and EVi of SWA) 
Sec 18,T2N, R8E 
(W/2ofSE]A) 
Sec 18, T2N, R8E 
(SE'/.ofSE1/,) 
Sec 19, T2N, R8E 
Sec 20, T2N, R8E 
(NW/4 ofNW/4) 
Sec 20, T2N, R8E 
(Remamdei of section) 
Sec 29,12N, R8E 
Sec 32, T2N, R8E 
Sec 33, T2N, R8E 
Sec 4, TIN, R8E 
(Lot 3) 
January 8, 1869 
January 4, 1896 
January 8, 1869 
May 26, 1903 
January 8, 1869 
September 6, 1901 
Febiuaiy2, 1901 
December 14, 1895 
May 20, 1896 
December 26, 1895 
Febiuary 17, 1896 
June 5, 1909 
August 29, 1900 
January 8, 1869 
Decembei 19, 1899 
Decembei 7, 1906 
January 8, 1869 
January 4, 1896 
January 8, 1869 
July 27, 1899 
Union Pacific Railroad 
State of Utah 
Union Pacific Railroad 
State of Utah 
Union Pacific Railioad 
State of Utah 









State of Utah 
State of Utah 
Union Pacific Railroad 
State of Utah 
State of Utah 
Union Pacific Railroad 
State of Utah 
Union Pacific Railroad 
State of Utah 
